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Abstract 
Electrification has become a pivotal development issue in the developing countries, as it 
provides a huge range of social and developmental advantages. At the same time it 
has been realised that delivering electricity in the rural areas, particularly to poor, is a 
hard task and requires establishment of effective institutions and delivery mechanisms. 
If not properly planned, highly subsidised rural electrification programmes may end up 
in drain of resources and damaging impacts on the utilities. These challenges are 
probably better illustrated in the Indian case, where half of the population still living in 
dark. 
In recent years, centralised planning and resource allocation, which used to be 
the governing principle for development, has been blamed for the failure. As a response 
to the perceived failure of top-down centralised planning and implementation, bottom-
up decentralised participatory models have been proposed by international 
development organisations. The bottom-up model proposed for electric service delivery 
seek to involve the users in the delivery process through building micro-institutions and 
empowering them to plan, manage, monitor, and own the local service delivery 
mechanism. The proposed model marks the beginning of a new paradigm for electricity 
service delivery that relies on the users and their democratic capabilities. 
In this context, this study, drawing on experiences in two cases in Eastern India, 
analyses the potentials of decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery. It 
provides an empirical analysis of how and to what extent decentralisation and users’ 
participation in electricity delivery contributes to efficiency and effectiveness gain in 
electricity supply system. Moreover, building on participatory democracy, the study 
analyses the empowering effects of participation in electricity users associations. It 
concludes that decentralisation and users’ participation has significant contributions to 
electricity service improvement. Yet, it identifies scope for improvement in the model 
and suggests some methods and approaches by which the model could be made more 
efficient and effective, and can produce real gains for the poor.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Alternating Current 
Introduction to the Study of Decentralisation and user’s Participation 
in Electricity Supply 
 
1.1 Introduction 
After more than six decades of public electrification, the state of electricity 
supply in India is really appalling. Those who have access to electricity service 
have to bear with poor quality of supply in form of frequent load-shedding and 
low voltage, while more than one-third of Indians are yet to get access to the 
service. Moreover, there is a rural- urban gap in electricity supply; the rural 
population has to bear with worst quality of supply and low access. It shows that 
the country is faced with a severe electricity crisis, where the demand for 
electricity is much higher than available electricity. Even though the current 
crisis had surfaced and was identified during early 1980s, India is yet to find an 
effective solution or strategy to address it. Structural reforms during 1990s, 
based on neoliberal economic principles, have hardly helped to improve the 
situation. However, India ambitiously aims to provide universal access to 
electricity by 2015. 
In this context, the big questions are how to provide universal access to 
electricity and improve quality of electricity supply? The conventional wisdom, 
based on technocratic knowledge, would suggest increasing electricity 
generation capacity. In recent years, there is a growing consensus that the 
technocratic solution is limited for various reasons. First, the source of the 
current electricity crisis in India is rooted in the delivery end; increasing 
generation only would not address the crisis. Second, it is a difficult task to 
increase generation in tune with growing demand in rapidly industrialising and 
populous country like India. Third, rapid increase in generation capacity, with 
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the current energy mix1, would expose the country to severe energy security 
threats. Finally, in a climate constrained world, where there is global consensus 
on reducing fossil fuel consumption to protect the environment, India have to 
rely heavily on renewable energy development to increase its electricity 
generation capacity. It must be noted that renewable energy development has 
high economic cost for the state and the electricity users, which is beyond their 
affordability. 
Though, there would be a need for increasing electricity generation to 
meet the growing demand, it could not address India’s electricity crisis 
adequately and effectively. There is a need to improve electricity supply 
systems, particularly when the concern is improving access and quality of 
supply. However, past experiences suggest that state and market agencies have 
failed to improve the electricity supply system and to bring in efficiency and 
effectiveness in electricity delivery. In response, decentralised participatory 
governance of electricity supply has been proposed to bring in efficiency and 
effectiveness in electricity delivery. 
The current research is an attempt to identify and analyse the potentials 
of decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity supply. Can 
decentralisation and users’ participation lead to an efficient and effective 
electricity supply system? Can decentralisation and users’ participation achieve 
what the state and market agencies failed to achieve? Based on study of two 
empirical cases in eastern India, the study aims to identify opportunities and 
challenges in decentralised participatory governance of electricity supply.  
1.2 Research Context 
Electrification is a pivotal development issue in the developing world as it 
                                                          
1 The current energy mix in India is dominated by non-renewable fossil fuel based 
electricity, for which India is already importing input energy (e.g. coal). Further 
expansion of fossil fuel-based electricity generation would require higher energy 
import exposing India to energy security threats. 
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provides a huge range of social and developmental advantages. The provision of 
electricity has become synonymous with economic development and social 
progress today. It is a prerequisite for ameliorating the lifestyle of the poor and 
an indispensable input for productive and economic activities. By making home 
life more convenient and household work easier, even in minimal quantities2, 
electricity brings in profound lifestyle changes for the poor. Poor households 
highly value and benefit from electrification through improved public services3 
and economic development, although it requires many complementary inputs, 
including end-use technologies to convert electricity into useful outputs 
(Cecelski, 2002). Barnes (2007: 3) points out that there is a positive relationship 
between electricity consumption and gross domestic product – a greater degree 
of electrification is not only correlated with but also contributes to a lower 
poverty level. Access to electricity service facilitates economic development 
through promotion of micro-enterprises, livelihood activities beyond daylights 
hours, local entrepreneurship and thus employment. The World Bank (2004: 7) 
rightly claims that access to electricity service could be a key driver for economic 
growth, development and poverty reduction. Although electricity provision is 
not stated in the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals, it provides 
foundations for most of these goals – from halving the number of people living 
on less than US$ 1 per day to better education and improved health facilities 
(EDF, 2002; Modi et al., 2006). More recently, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations claimed that “the decision we take today on how we produce, 
consume and distribute energy will profoundly influence our ability to eradicate 
poverty” (AGECC, 2010: Foreword). 
                                                          
2 EDF (2002) points out that the positive contribution of electricity to the Human 
Development Index is strongest for the first kilowatt/hour. 
3 From the Census of India (2001) data on household amenities, it is evident that basic 
public services are bundled together. For example, 70 per cent of the rural households 
that have tap water have access to electricity, while only 32 per cent of the 
households getting water from hand pump are electrified (EPW, 2006). 
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The increasing significance of electricity services is reflected in the 
broadening of the definition of ‘sustainable energy’ from its primary economic 
development focus in the 1970s, through the inclusion of concerns with 
environmental sustainability in the 1980s and financial sustainability in the 
1990s, to social sustainability, equity and poverty in recent years (Cecelski, 
2002). Despite sustained efforts, an estimated population of 1.64 billion 
worldwide lack access to the service, 99 per cent live in developing countries, 80 
per cent in rural areas and 35 per cent in India. If the current policies for 
electrification are followed, 1.4 billion will still lack electricity in 2030 (IEA, 
2002). 
However, electrification is often easier said than done. It can face major 
obstacles at every level and thus requires establishment of effective institutions, 
delivery mechanisms, coherent policy choices and effective implementation. If 
not properly planned, highly subsidised rural electrification programmes may 
end up as a drain on public resources and have damaging impacts on utilities. 
These challenges are probably better illustrated in the Indian case. After 60 
years of independence and state- led development, India has not achieved 
universal electrification. Despite repeated efforts, out of approximately 192 
million households, around 85 million do not have access to electricity, 78 
million of which are in rural India, and the remaining 7 million are urban 
households. In per centage terms, 56.6 per cent of rural households and 12 
per cent of urban households do not have access to electricity (Bhattacharyya, 
2006). The current rate of electrification has failed to keep pace with 
population growth, making the problem worse. India houses the highest 
number of people for any one nation without electricity. They are mostly poor, 
located in rural areas and deprived of other related services and socio-economic 
benefits. On the other hand, those who have access to the service are highly 
dissatisfied with the poor quality and limited hours of supply. While aggregate 
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technical and commercial (AT & C)4 loss is around 35 per cent and the gap 
between demand and supply hovers around 10 per cent, the utilities are 
reluctant to take up new loads. 
In recent years, centralised planning and resource allocation, which used 
to be the governing principle for public service delivery, has been blamed 
for the failure. State provision of electricity in India has proved to be 
inefficient and has failed to deliver to the poor. It is argued that centralised 
service delivery results in non-uniform and inefficient delivery patterns (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2006), undermining its objective for uniform provision, and a 
weak relationship between users and the provider (Barnes, 2007). As a 
response to the perceived failure of top-down planning and implementation, 
decentralised participatory models have been proposed by international 
development organisations. They claim that while inflexible top-down planning 
favours the elites and the status quo, bottom-up participatory planning 
increases the choices for the poor (DFID, 2002). The decentralised participatory 
model proposed for electricity service delivery seeks to involve the users in a 
decentralised delivery process through building micro-institutions (users’ 
associations or cooperatives). In the model, the users are empowered to plan, 
manage, monitor, and own the local service delivery mechanism. 
While there is a consensus that “too often, services fail poor people – in 
access, in quantity, in quality”, there is a claim made that the situation could be 
altered “by putting poor people at the centre of service provision: by enabling 
them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in 
policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the 
poor” (World Bank, 2003: 1). International development organisations, through 
their lending policies, have been pushing for decentralisation and users’ 
participation in basic service delivery. Can decentralised participatory model 
                                                          
4 AT & C losses include technical losses at transformer and feeder level and non-
technical and commercial losses due to faulty meters, theft and non-payment. A major 
portion of the loss is due to unaccounted theft. 
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address the inefficiencies in basic service delivery? Can making the service 
users partners of service provider work for better quality of service and access? 
The claims on effectiveness of the decentralised participatory approach 
in public service delivery lack enough empirical validity. It has been criticised as 
an effect of the ‘hollow state’ and as a strategy to transfer the responsibilities 
from the state to the people.5 More empirical research is required to examine 
the effects of decentralisation and users’ participation in service delivery in 
different contexts. Douglas Barnes, based on an analysis of ten cases of 
successful national electrification programmes, finds decentralisation and 
users’ participation as two of the key factors for effective electricity supply. He 
claims that rural electrification programmes can benefit greatly from the 
involvement of local people or can suffer in its absence (Barnes, 2007). 
However, he does not explain whether and how different levels of 
decentralisation and participation result in varying degrees of service delivery 
and how it is affected by other contextual factors. 
In past two decades, there has been a push for decentralisation and 
users’ participation in electricity supply, reflected in India’s current electricity 
policy. It raises the question of whether the success of the decentralised 
participatory electricity supply model in other parts of the world could be 
replicated in India. If so, this raises a further question of how to fit the model 
into Indian context. These questions are relevant because the proposed 
approach for decentralised electrification requires grassroots participation, 
which is notably low in India despite the fact that the institutional structures of 
local government (i.e. Panchayat Raj Institutions) are available for it (Dreze and 
Sen, 2002). Moreover, in practice, transfer of power and resources to 
decentralised units from centralised agencies has been an issue of contention. 
                                                          
5 Even though private agencies have a presence in public service delivery, it has 
been the responsibility of the state to deliver to the financially less attractive rural 
population. 
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It is accepted that state provision of basic services in India has been 
plagued with many systemic problems and weak accountability mechanisms 
(Chand, 2006, World Bank, 2006). While the physical extension of these services 
has improved greatly over time, the state, with virtual monopoly over their 
production and delivery, has been doing far less well in terms of ensuring their 
quality, reliability and effectiveness. Can decentralisation and users’ 
participation address all these problems in Indian electricity? Can a 
decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in electricity supply? 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The perceived failure of centralised electricity delivery and market-focused 
approach has resulted in increasing emphasis on decentralised and participatory 
approaches to electricity delivery in rural India. The new paradigm of rural 
electrification draws on international experience and global debate on 
participatory development promoted by international development 
organisations. Once again, the institutional reform in electricity service delivery 
has ignored the significance and uniqueness of the Indian experience and 
context. It has simply been accepted that international experience in electricity 
delivery could be replicated in India by engaging users’ in the delivery process. 
The current research, based on empirical study of two cases of decentralised 
participatory electricity delivery in Eastern India, seeks to fill the gap and 
contribute to the policy process. 
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyse the potential effects 
of decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery in Indian 
context. The key question is whether decentralisation and users’ participation 
can address the problems existing in the conventional model of electricity 
delivery and improve efficiency and effectiveness of electricity supply system. 
My ambition in this thesis is not to do a scientific assessment of the 
decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery. Instead, my goal is 
more modest, and my prime concern is to point out potential contributions of 
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the model to the efficiency and effectiveness of electricity supply system in 
India. 
Drawing on the normative claims around decentralisation and 
participation, the study aims to find answers for a range of questions. The main 
objectives of decentralised participatory approaches have been efficiency and 
effectiveness enhancement in service delivery. Does decentralisation and 
greater participation in electricity delivery contribute to efficiency in electricity 
supply system? Is a decentralised participatory electricity delivery system more 
effective than the conventional centralised supply system? While contributing to 
the primary objectives, participation in users’ associations is expected to 
produce some democratic outcomes, viz. political efficacy and civic values. Does 
users’ participation in electricity users’ association enhance their political 
efficacy and civic values? 
Theoretically, the study builds on different set of literatures on 
decentralisation, participatory democracy and participatory development. It 
aims to complement existing literature by drawing on the Indian experience. 
However, the study does not aim to test the validity of the existing theories. 
Rather, based on case studies and by analysing existing theories, it aims to 
explain any variations and contradictions found and thus contribute to the 
theory. In addition to contributing to the literature, the study aims to raise 
further research questions relevant to decentralisation, public participation and 
electricity supply. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The next chapter, analysing the literature on decentralisation and participation, 
sets out the normative responses to the problems in public service delivery 
(which are identified in Chapter 3, in case of electricity service delivery in India). 
The chapter analyses the emergence of decentralisation and users’ 
participation in debates about development policy, and expected shifts in the 
governance of public service delivery. In the literature on public service delivery, 
decentralisation is often associated with participation resulting in the literature 
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on ‘democratic decentralisation’ or ‘democratic local governance’. However, the 
alleged association is problematic; decentralisation does not necessarily imply 
democracy- and vice-versa. The chapter considers decentralisation and 
participation as two different approaches for public service improvement; 
analyse their origin, transformation and convergence in development context; 
and interrogates the various forms and degrees they can take, their underlying 
rationale, and expected outcomes. 
Chapter 3 provides a background to the state of electricity service 
delivery by critically examining the institution building and policy process in the 
Indian electricity sector. The objective is to analyse institutional and policy shifts 
leading to decentralisation and users’ engagement in electricity delivery, their 
underlying rationales, and their outcomes. It argues that the policy shifts in the 
Indian electricity sector over the past six decades are reflections of 
developments in India’s political economy, dominant interests and prevailing 
development ideologies. During each phase of policy shifts, a set of new 
institutions were created to implement these new policies, which has resulted in 
institutional layering and pluralism in the sector. Though there have been 
several efforts to electrify the whole country, due to complex and inefficient 
institutional structure and gaps in design and implementation of policies, these 
efforts have only delivered limited results. Moreover, the sector has developed 
several chronic inefficiencies affecting electricity delivery in India as a result of 
these policy shifts. 
Chapter 4 outlines and justifies the research methodology and case 
studies of the research project. The chapter explains the research questions and 
hypotheses addressed in the study, why they are relevant and expected answers 
to these questions. It identifies and explains various indicators to find out 
improvement in electricity supply as a result of decentralisation and users’ 
participation. It also elaborates on specific cases studied in the research, 
outlines various research methods used for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation and limitations of the study. Following three chapters, discuss the 
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empirical findings of the study. Chapter 5 analyses the contributions of 
decentralisation and users’ participation to the improvement of efficiency in 
electricity delivery. Chapter 6 discusses the improvements in the effectiveness 
of service delivery systems in the presence of decentralised service providers 
and users’ participation. Both chapters conclude that decentralisation and users 
participation make a positive contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the electricity supply system and identify gaps and scopes for improvement. 
Chapter 7 examines empirical validity of the claims for participation as an end-
in-itself, drawing on users’ participation in electricity supply. It identifies the 
spillover effects of users’ participation and analyses their contribution to the 
civic values of the users and their implications for democratic practice at the 
grassroots level. The concluding chapter summarises the key findings of the 
study and points out the limitations. It makes a case for an integrated approach 
to local public service delivery. The chapter, based on the finding of the study, 
outlines several policy recommendations for improving electricity service in 
rural India. It also points out some unanswered questions and identifies issues 
for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Reinventing Public Service 
Delivery 
Decentralisation and Participation in Governance of Service Delivery 
 
Too often, services fail poor people- in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact 
that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and 
citizens can do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of service 
provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by 
amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for 
providers to serve the poor. 
World Development Report 2004 (World Bank, 2003: 1) 
People’s participation is becoming the central issue of our time… People today 
have an urge- an impatient urge- to participate in the events and processes that 
shape their lives. And that impatience brings many dangers and opportunities… 
If properly nurtured in a responsive national and global framework, it can also 
become a source of tremendous vitality and innovation for the creation of new 
and more just societies. 
Human Development Report 1993 (UNDP, 1993: 1) 
2.1 Introduction 
The future of public service delivery, particularly to the poor, has been an issue 
of contention in the developing countries, at the level of national and sub-
national governments, international financial institutions, development 
organisations and social movements. The contention is so intense that, in 
recent years, we have seen major shifts in global policy paradigm for public 
service delivery- from state provision of the services to market oriented reforms 
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in 1990s, to introduction of ‘democratised governance’ in service delivery 
systems during the current decade. In all these paradigms, however, the quest 
has been for improving efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. The 
current paradigm of democratic governance in service delivery emphasises 
‘decentralisation’ to and ‘participation’ of service users. While the intrinsic 
values of decentralisation and participation makes them desirable goals in their 
own right, as the proponents claim, it has mostly been promoted to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of public services through equitable, responsive and 
efficient management. However, the jury is still out. The chapter analyses the 
theoretical foundations and practical implications of the current paradigm for 
public service delivery. The chapter explores normative claims around potential 
of the current paradigm, which relies on the users and their democratic 
capabilities, to bring in efficiency and effectiveness in service provision- 
something the state and the market failed to achieve. 
Provision of basic services, such as health, education, water and 
electricity, all of which are largely being provided by the state, are systematically 
failing- and especially failing for the poor (World Bank, 2003). Centralised state 
provisioning of basic services has ended up, undermining its objective of uniform 
provision, in non-uniform and inefficient delivery patterns (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006: 102) and weak relationship between the service providers 
and the users (Barnes, 2007). The result is very limited access to modern 
infrastructure and services among the poor, particularly in low-income 
countries. Where there is physical access to these services, the quality, reliability 
and effectiveness remains poor. Public spending on these services seems to 
have a weak relationship with effective outcomes (Ahmad et al., 2005: 1) due to 
systemic problems like under-management, weak accountability mechanism, 
corruption and rent-seeking (Chand, 2006: 18-22; World Bank, 2006: 1-4). This 
has led to questioning of state capability and centralised approaches to deliver 
local public services. 
In the era of ‘new governance’, the state and its institutions has been 
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seen as chief source of many problems in society, predominantly the 
economic ones (Pierre, 2000: 1), resulting in its retreat by handing over many of 
its responsibilities to non-state actors (Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 2003), including 
the responsibilities to deliver vital services. During initial phase of the era, the 
space vacated by state’s retreat was captured by the market players in the name 
of ‘reforms’. The advocates have portrayed reforms as “an indispensable and 
positive transition in service delivery, a necessary move away from the 
outdated public policy of previous decades and a pre-condition for economic 
growth and social development” (Chavez, 2006: 1). The view echoed World 
Bank’s new discourse on development that emphasised on the importance of 
institutions and governance, considering existence of ‘week institutions’ and 
‘poor governance’ as the main hindrance to development (Kagia, 2005). After a 
decade of reform experience, however, it is realised that market-oriented 
reforms based on ‘good governance’ establishes the supremacy of ‘economics’; 
it has been criticised for undermining social and economic benefits of a vast 
majority of the population, particularly disadvantaged sections of the society.  
In response to the perceived failure of ‘statist’ model and market 
reforms, drawing on analytical critiques, an alternative perspective emerged 
that emphasised on ‘public control over governance’ or ‘democratisation of 
governance’ as a solution to the crises in public services (Wagle and Dixit, 2006). 
This alternative perspective traces the roots of the crisis to strong control 
wielded by vested interests in public as well as private service delivery 
mechanisms. It emphasises “management of affairs in the public (non-private) 
domain of society, in order to serve the public interests at large” and thus 
increase transparency, accountability and participation in governance of service 
delivery (Wagle and Dixit, 2006: 26). In the wake of these changes and with the 
objective to increase transparency, accountability and participation, governance 
of many public services has been decentralised to local governments and newly 
established micro-institutions of users. 
In this context, the chapter analyses the emergence of decentralisation 
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and users’ participation in development debate, and subsequent shifts in 
governance of public service delivery. The emerging literature frequently 
visualises decentralisation and democracy together, leading to the concept of 
‘democratic decentralisation’ and ‘democratic local governance’ (Blair, 2000; 
Manor, 1999). Democratic decentralisation is described as a status or process 
where resources, power, authority, and often, tasks and responsibilities are 
transferred to ‘lower-level’ or ‘local units of governance’ “which are largely or 
wholly independent of higher levels of government, and which are ‘democratic’ 
in some way and to some degree” (Manor, 1999: 6) and “accessible and 
accountable to local citizenry” (Blair, 2000: 21). The ‘democratic’ component of 
democratic decentralisation requires the local/decentralised units to be open for 
participation (direct or representation), accessible and accountable to citizens 
(or users in service delivery). However, association of decentralisation and 
democracy is problematic; decentralisation does not necessarily imply 
democracy- and vice-versa (Crook and Manor, 1998: 2; Hutchcroft, 2001: 33). 
In this chapter, I consider decentralisation and participation as two 
different approaches for public service improvement; analyse their origin, 
transformation and convergence in development context; and interrogate the 
various forms and degrees they take on, their underlying rationale, and 
outcomes. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 analyses 
transformations in decentralisation paradigm- from progressive public 
administration era through new governance era- in post-World War II period. 
Section 4.3 analyses transformations in participation paradigm- from 
participation in democracy to participatory development- during the same 
period. The final section provides some concluding thoughts on the way forward 
for governance of public service delivery. 
2.2 Unpacking Decentralisation: Progressive Public Administration to New 
Governance 
Decentralisation is not a new concept; it has taken place across the globe over 
the 20th Century (Ribot, 1999). Since 1980s, however, decentralisation of 
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governmental functions for development objectives has become a true global 
movement- affecting most developing countries (Bardhan, 2002; Dillinger, 
1994; Hutchcroft, 2001; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Manor, 1999; Work, 2002; 
World Bank, 2000) - induced by several pressures like poor governmental 
performance, rapid urbanisation, democratic transition, societal demands and 
shifts in lending portfolio of international donors (Diamond, 1999: 120-121). 
During this period, the concept of decentralisation has become so popular, 
particularly among bilateral aid donors and academics, that it is referred as ‘the 
latest fashion’ (Conyers, 1983: 97) and ‘a fashion of our time’ (Manor, 1999: 1). 
Though the concept has been widely used, there is a lack of comprehensive 
framework of decentralisation due to its use in various ways and in different 
context. As Mawhood (1983: 1) claims, “[d]ecentralization is a word that has 
been used by different people to mean a good many different things.” It has 
been seen as a means of ‘shifting power away from the commandist state’ by 
neo-liberals, an alternative strategy for poverty reduction by critic of centralised 
interventions, a means of encouraging cooperative development by village 
communities and an opportunity for use of local knowledge by ‘anarcho-
communitarians’6, ‘a substitute for democratisation at the national level’ by the 
leaders in autocratic regimes to gain legitimacy and grass roots support, and 
finally as ‘a device for deepening democracy’ by advocates of pluralist and 
competitive politics (Crook and Manor, 1998: 1; Manor, 1999: 1). On the 
other hand, the western world sees it as an alternative to provide public 
services in a more cost- effective way; developing countries are pursuing it to 
counter economic inefficiencies, macroeconomic instability, and ineffective 
governance; post-communist transition countries are embracing it to transit to 
market economies and democracy; Latin America is decentralising in response 
                                                          
6 Bardhan (2002: 186) confers the unifying name ‘anarcho-communitarian’ to the group 
of post- modernist anthropologists, multicultural advocates, grassroots activists and 
proponents of indigenous technologies and people, who are usually ‘anti-market and 
anti-centralized state’. 
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to political pressure to democratise; and African states view it as a strategy for 
national unity (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2001: 1). 
Decentralisation has conventionally been defined as transfer of power, 
authority and responsibility from higher to lower levels of government- from 
national to sub-national to local levels (Fesler, 1965; Maddick, 1963; 
Rondinelli, 1980; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Rondinelli et al., 1983). In this 
conventional sense, Scott (1996: 3) argues, “decentralisation might be seen as a 
simple structural consequence of a re- allocation of functions within 
government.” Decentralisation is not so simple, as it can take on numerous 
forms and degrees with various reasons. It is rather a process of redefining 
structures, governance procedures and practices. Mawhood (1983: 18) defines 
decentralisation as “the sharing of part of governmental power by a central 
ruling group with other groups, each having authority within a specific area 
of the state". Smith (1985: 1) argues “[d]ecentralization involves the delegation 
of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is 
one of governments within the state or offices within a large-scale 
organization.” Both Mawhood and Smith highlight spatial aspect of 
decentralisation though pointing power ceding in a political- administrative and 
territorial hierarchy. Rondinelli (1980: 137) provides a more comprehensive 
definition of decentralisation: “...the transfer or delegation of legal and political 
authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the central 
government and its agencies to field organizations of those agencies, 
subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, 
areawide or regional development authorities; functional authorities, 
autonomous local governments, or non-governmental organizations.” 
Comprehensiveness of the definition lies in its recognition of non-governmental 
actors and institutions as part of decentralisation process; still it is limited in the 
sense that decentralisation is treated as a process that occurs within political 
systems and the process remains top-down. 
Decentralisation as a concept has evolved and transformed, over time 
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with undergoing social, economic and political changes, to take on diverse and 
varied meanings, forms and objectives (Rondinelli, 2005). Scott (1996) 
demonstrates the transformation of decentralisation by pointing out the shifts in 
its objectives at different points in time. During 1950s and 1960s, 
decentralisation was introduced in many post- colonial countries as an attempt 
“to create or recover indigenous local government from colonial practice.” In 
1970s, the objective shifted “to achieve greater responsiveness and 
responsibility” in public administration. In 1980s, decentralisation was promoted 
as a method of “effective ‘bottom-up’ planning”, in response to perceived failure 
of centralised planning. In 1990s, there was shift in application of the concept to 
achieve “a functional division between policy-making and execution”, moving 
away from territorial and structural concerns (Scott, 1996: 3-4). The shift in 
1990s left the central unit with “power without responsibility” (Scott, 1996: 14) 
where it holds the power to make overall policy, while the decentralised units 
got the responsibility to execute these policies. In this phase, under influence of 
New Public Management, the objective of decentralisation shifted to achieve 
cost-effectiveness and establish accountable units of management (Scott, 
1996: 13). However, a new wave of change that emerged in late 1990s, and 
is still underway, draws attention to ‘democratic decentralisation’ as the 
favoured reform strategy for public service delivery, whose ‘democratic’ content 
lies in participation of service users in decentralised units/agencies (Crook and 
Manor, 1998). 
Clearly, there are two broad stages in development of 
decentralisation: first, the Progressive Public Administration era that started 
after World War II and continued till 1980s; second, the New Governance era 
that started in early 1980s and still continuing. During the progressive public 
administration era, decentralisation was seen as a process of sharing authority, 
responsibility and resources- through deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution- within the government and its agencies (Cheema and Rondinelli, 
2007; Rondinelli, 1980; Rondinelli et al., 1983). It was primarily because, during 
the period, the state and government were perceived interchangeably. The 
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former was the institutional embodiment of state sovereignty and dominant 
source of political, legal and developmental decision-making and execution. In 
the new governance era, new concepts and practices of decentralisation are 
emerging- labelled as ‘democratic decentralisation’, ‘democratic local 
governance’ and ‘decentralised governance’ simultaneously- with new 
institutions, new forms of participation, power sharing and new sources of 
influence over public policy-making and execution. In the following sections, I 
will explore the new forms of decentralisation emerged during the current era 
of new governance. 
In the new governance era, there are four primary sources of influence 
which has resulted in transformation of decentralisation in theory and practice. 
The first profound influence comes from the emergence of new public 
management (NPM) in early 1980s as the new global paradigm for public 
administration. NPM includes a set of reforms, based on economic rationalism, 
in governance of public sector to improve economy and efficiency. Common 
(1998: 60) describes it as “the reassertion on traditional public administration 
plus introduction of managerial techniques and ‘market values’.” The objective 
of NPM was to reduce expenditure and cost while improving efficiency in 
public service. It sought to reduce the distinction between private sector and 
public sector by applying management techniques of private sector in public 
services and to reduce the limitations on discretionary power by reducing 
density of uniform and general procedural rules. The approach included 
disaggregating separable functions of public service into quasi-market forms, 
opening up provider roles to competition between public and private agencies, 
and deconcentrating provider roles to the minimum feasible size (Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994: 9). The outcome was disintegration of monolithic public sectors 
into multiple functional and geographic segments and entry of private players in 
public services. It resulted in transfer of power, authority and responsibility to 
private actors and institutions from government institutions, thus giving a new 
dimension to decentralisation. The governments were pushed to ‘steer rather 
than row’ and supervise service provision rather than delivering it directly 
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(Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 4), reducing their direct authority to indirect 
control. 
  The second source of influence comes from emergence of a new 
governance paradigm. In the era of new governance, the state and the 
institutions of representative democracy on which it rests are viewed as unable 
to deal with the complexity of policy problems and to respond to differential 
needs of citizens. This realisation has contributed to pluralisation of the policy 
arena with non-state (or non-governmental) actors and organisations, including 
private sector and civil society associations. Government is now seen as one, 
albeit the dominant one, of the governance institutions that works collectively 
with other institutions of governance for decision- making and execution. 
Chhotray and Stoker (2009: 3) rightly claim that “[g]overnance theory is about 
the practice of collective decision-making”. Kooiman (2000: 142) refers it as a 
‘two-way traffic’, “based upon broad and systematic interactions between those 
who are governing and those who are governed.” Governance is about 
reshaping the relationship between the nation-state and the citizens, service 
providers and users. It sees the service users not as recipients or customers, but 
as co-producers by empowering them to manage and monitor service delivery. 
It has affected practice of decentralisation with a shift from transfer of power, 
authority and responsibility within government institutions to sharing or power, 
authority and responsibility among various governance institutions with wider 
public participation. 
Globalisation process has also significantly influenced the form 
decentralisation has taken in recent years. Globalisation- in the narrow sense of 
‘economic integration in the international system’- has created pressure for 
relocation of decision-making authority away from the nation-state, upward to 
supra-national institutions or downward to sub-national and grassroots 
institutions. In the developing countries, the relocation has often been 
downward (Sharma, 2005: 3). Globalisation has shaped not only the concepts of 
economic growth, but also perceptions of governance and functions of 
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government by relocating much of decision-making power away from the 
national governments. At the same time, deconcentration of economic activity 
within state, as part of globalisation process, has exhorted pressure on 
governments to enhance the administrative and fiscal capacity of sub-national, 
regional and grassroots agencies and institutions, to facilitate participation in 
the open global market (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 5). Global economic 
integration has been facilitating decentralisation by reducing economic costs 
associated with small agencies and institutions; the process also strengthens the 
decentralised agencies of governance by making them economically 
autonomous. 
Finally, shifts in development paradigm, during same period, is claimed 
to have significant influence over decentralisation process. The shift from 
central economic planning towards bottom-up planning and participatory 
development to achieve growth-with-equity objective has led to increasing call 
for decentralisation (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 3). The development 
paradigm has undergone a dialectical movement that involves the idea of 
commandist state at one end and minimalist state in other end. Till mid-
1980s, state-directed development was the dominant principle that has 
contributed to extreme forms of centralisation. It resulted in top-down planning 
and resource allocation, and cautious moves of decentralisation within 
government institutions. The second phase of development paradigm, beginning 
in late 1980s, is obsessed with curtailing economic and developmental role of 
the state and reducing size of public sector. This shift in development 
paradigm, taking place simultaneously with the governance changes, has 
created a need for grassroots civic institutions to share responsibilities and 
resources that used to be at the discretion of government institutions. 
Better understanding of decentralisation requires explaining why it 
occurs, what objectives it wishes to achieve and what form it takes. Various 
explanations have been provided for why decentralisation occurs- pressure from 
economic crises, increasing fiscal and administrative burden at centre, failure 
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of central administration, donor pressure and conditionalities of structural 
adjustment programme, policy transfer and emulation, pressure from regional 
splinter groups (Ribot, 2002: 7). The dominant explanation remains political- 
failure of centralised state. However, decentralisation is often a conjunctional 
result of multiple forces. In case of service delivery, the major driving forces are 
increasing burden on public funds, under- management, declining efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
With multiple forces working at the back, decentralisation aims to 
achieve several objectives. Conyers (1999: 3-7) provides four broad categories to 
outline objectives of decentralisation. Firstly, decentralisation has been 
frequently promoted as a means of local empowerment, directly or through 
representative institutions. Local organisations, international agencies, NGOs 
and central governments advocate local empowerment for different purposes- 
to influence national policies that affect local affairs, to promote democracy, to 
prevent secession, or to reinforce the role of their organisation. Secondly, 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of development planning and 
implementation has been the overriding impetus for decentralisation in the 
public sectors as well as private sectors, particularly since 1980s. Thirdly, 
decentralisation is also pursued by the governments to achieve national 
cohesion and increase central control. In this case, the nature and extent of 
decentralisation is limited by the aim of gaining central control rather than 
losing it. Finally, decentralisation advocated as part of structural reforms, by the 
World Bank and other bilateral agencies, is designed to reduce public 
expenditure by using existing financial resources more efficiently, increasing 
revenue base and transferring financial responsibilities to decentralised units. 
The objective of local empowerment and public expenditure are unique to the 
current decentralisation strategies initiated during the new governance era. 
While first two objectives are explicitly stated in decentralisation plans, as they 
appeal to general public, the last two are often implicit and unlikely to be 
spelled out. On the other hand, there are conflicts between the objectives: it is 
difficult to achieve local empowerment while increasing central control; and 
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the objective of increasing efficiency and effectiveness is affected by pursuing 
the objective to reduce public expenditure (Conyers, 1999: 7). So the success of 
a decentralisation initiative would partly depend on the balance of objectives. 
When it comes to decentralisation in service delivery, the overriding 
objective has been increasing efficiency and effectiveness, while reducing public 
expenditure. The failure of public service delivery is blamed on under-
management and aggregate resource constraints (Dillinger, 1994: 7). 
Decentralisation is believed to address these problems and bring in economic 
and administrative (or managerial) efficiency through accounting for costs in 
decision-making, increasing accountability, reducing transaction costs, matching 
service to needs, mobilising local knowledge, improving coordination and 
providing resources. At the same time, decentralisation is also expected to 
improve equity through greater retention and fair distribution of the benefits 
accrued (Ribot, 2002). However, the other objectives are not ignored, if not 
given equal importance, in public service reforms. Even in the case of public 
service decentralisation, efficiency and effectiveness gain and local 
empowerment are often projected as explicit objectives to gain public support 
for reforms. Though the objectives of public expenditure reduction and 
retraining central control are given significant importance in design of 
decentralisation initiative, they are rarely spelled out. 
There is a close relationship between the objectives of decentralisation 
and the form which it takes: the objectives determine the form; the form 
determines the achievement of objectives. Rondinelli et al. (1983: 13-32) 
identify four different forms of decentralisation based on the organisation to 
which power is transferred from the central government administration. Firstly, 
deconcentration is defined as a transfer of power to local administrative offices 
of the central government; Secondly, delegation as the transfer of power to 
parastatals; thirdly, devolution as the transfer of power to sub- national political 
entities; and finally, privatisation, as the transfer of power to private entities. 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) provide an updated and broader categorisation 
 23 
based on the nature of decentralisation: administrative, political, fiscal and 
economic. Administrative decentralisation is the strategy for redistributing 
authority, responsibility and financial resources for delivering public services 
among different levels of governance. It includes deconcentration of central 
government structures and bureaucracies, delegation of authority and 
responsibilities from central government to it its agents, and decentralised 
cooperation among the agencies performing similar functions. Political 
decentralisation aims to give citizens and their local representatives more power 
in public decision making. It includes organisations and procedures for increased 
citizen participation in representative selection and in public policy making, 
the resulting change in government structure, and institutions for power 
sharing. Fiscal decentralisation aims for dispersal of financial responsibilities 
among different agencies of governance. It includes the means and mechanisms 
for fiscal cooperation in sharing public revenues, fiscal delegation in revenue 
raising and expenditure allocation. Economic decentralisation seeks to shift 
responsibilities from public to private sector. It includes market liberalisation, 
deregulation, privatisation of state enterprises, and public-private partnership 
(Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 6-7). 
These categorisations have been criticised for their broadness and 
inability to demonstrate the relationship between objectives and forms of 
decentralisation. Conyers (1999: 8) points out five different dimensions of 
decentralisation to distinguish between different forms: the types of functions 
decentralised; the types of powers decentralised in relation to those functions; 
the level to which powers are decentralised; the institutions to which they are 
decentralised; and the method of decentralisation. These five dimensions 
together determine the form decentralisation takes and the extent to which it 
achieves any particular objective. For best achievement of the objectives, 
decentralisation must match the type of functions and powers decentralised, 
the level and institutions to which they are decentralised, and the method of 
decentralisation with the objectives. 
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  Decentralisation, in essence, is a process of institution building; its 
success depends on “strengthening the managerial and technical capabilities” of 
local governance institutions (Rondinelli, 2005: 401). It not only strengthens the 
existing local institutions, but also creates new institutions to take on specific 
functions. In recent years, many community based functional institutions have 
been created to share responsibilities of public service delivery at micro level. 
The proliferation, pluralising the institutional network at grassroots, has littered 
the development landscape “with committees... mandated as ‘user groups’ to 
take on some of the functions of provisioning, regulation and management that 
previously resided with the state” (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001: 9). 
Sustainability and success of these institutions will largely depend on public 
participation in these institutions. The next section analyses the 
transformations in participation paradigm. 
  Drawing on the debate on decentralisation, as discussed above, I aim 
to find out whether decentralisation in public service can improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of service delivery, particularly in electricity service delivery. 
Does decentralised service delivery emerge as an alternative to centralised 
provisioning? Has decentralisation brought the service providers closer to 
service users? The thesis will also find out whether decentralised model 
addresses the economic inefficiencies and makes service delivery cost effective. 
As suggested by the theory, does it promote cooperative development by village 
communities? Does decentralisation provide a platform for service users’ 
participation and leadership development? The thesis aims to find answers to 
these questions by assessing certain indicators, which are discussed in chapter 
4. 
2.3 Unpacking Participation: Democratic Participation to Participatory 
Development 
During the past two decades, consensuses have emerged in both academic and 
policy arenas about the importance and desirability of participatory approaches 
for resource management and service delivery. The advocates of participatory 
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approaches form two groups: one views participation as a means to achieve 
institutional efficiency, and the other sees participation as furthering the goals of 
empowerment, equity and democratic governance (Puri, 2004). Along the 
same lines, Beresford (2002) refers to two distinct approaches to participation: 
consumerist and democratic approaches. The consumerist approach seeks to 
enhance three Es – efficiency, economy, and effectiveness – through collecting 
the external input from people, which the initiating agencies then decide how to 
use. On the other hand, the democratic approach insists that participation 
should be bestowed with the direct capacity and opportunity to effect change. 
This approach recognises the significance and the role of power in participation 
and is concerned with its equal redistribution (Beresford, 2002). While the first 
view seeks to achieve what the state and market failed to do, through 
institutionalising participation at the community level, the second view seeks to 
develop a democratic culture at the community level as well as empower the 
people, particularly the excluded, by putting them first. 
In the era of new governance, the state has been retreating, leaving 
space for citizen action. New models of governance and development focus on 
citizen participation, conferring a new meaning on participation. However, there 
is scepticism about the retreat of the state on two grounds: first, the state is 
trying to transfer its responsibilities to people by rolling itself back; second, the 
space vacated by the state for citizen action is often captured by the market, 
turning citizens into consumers. The supporters of the democratic approach are 
concerned that participation is in danger of being reduced to a technique (for 
delegating responsibilities to people) that could become separated from the 
democratic participation (Blackburn and Holland, 1998). This section, while 
analysing the broad concepts of participation and their implications, seeks to 
differentiate between democratic participation and participatory development. 
While both the approaches (democratic and developmental) towards 
participation are complementary and could co-exist, it does not necessarily 
mean that they are the same. The section also explains how they vary in 
approach, objective and outcome. 
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Before going into further detail, I will briefly outline the general 
understanding of participation. Participation is a nebulous concept and has 
different meanings and usages: at one end of the spectrum, it could simply 
mean nominal membership in a forum, and at the other end, it could delegate 
full managerial power to the participants and ensure their effective voice in 
the decision making. To the extent that the term ‘participation’ has been used 
by policy makers, developmental organisations and democrats, ‘any precise, 
meaningful content has almost disappeared: ‘participation’ is used to refer to a 
wide variety of different situations by different people’ (Pateman, 1970: 1). In 
its simplest sense, the term ‘participation’ can be defined as the “[a]ct of being 
involved in something” (Wates, 2000: 194). Verba (1967) defines participation as 
the “acts by those not formally empowered to make decisions – the acts being 
intended to influence the behaviour of those who have such decisional power. 
And successful participation refers to those acts that have (at least in part) 
the intended effects” (p. 55). Verba’s definition implies that participation is a 
process of influencing decision makers by those who do not have the formal 
power to make decisions. Central to the idea of people’s participation is the 
active involvement of the passive recipients, those affected by the decisions. In a 
classic article, Sherry R Arnstein treats ‘citizen participation’ as a synonym of 
‘citizen power’ – “the redistribution power that enables the have-not citizens, 
presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately 
included in the future…the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining 
how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are 
allocated, programmes are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronages 
are parcelled out” (Arnstein, 1969: 216). In this definition, participation is 
treated as an inclusive process of decision making where the have-nots are 
considered equal to the affluent. Thus, participation serves as an end in itself by 
inducing social reforms and contributing to individual development. Pateman 
(1970) rightly argues that the “output [of participation] includes not just policies 
(decisions) but also the development of the social and political capabilities of 
each individual, so that there is ‘feedback’ from output to input [participation]” 
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(p. 43). 
2.3.1 Democratic Theories, Participation and Citizenship 
In a democratic setup, the notion of citizenship contains the element of 
participation. With developments in democratic theory, the notions of 
citizenship and participation have been constantly changing. There has been a 
shift from the conventional idea of citizenship as a ‘universal legal status’ to a 
conception of ‘participatory citizenship’ entailing an extended notion of active 
participation beyond electoral and passive participation (Mohanty and Tondon, 
2006). The shifts can be better explained by focusing of developments in 
democratic theory and the importance of participation at each stage. In this 
section, I will briefly discuss four broad theories of democracy – classical (direct) 
democracy, contemporary (representative) democracy, participatory democracy, 
and deliberative democracy – from the perspective of citizen participation. 
The idea of people’s participation goes back to the classical democracy of 
Greek city-state Athens, which functioned as a direct democracy. The direct 
participation of the ‘citizens’ in legislative and judicial functions was integral to 
the ancient Greek polis. Citizens were treated equally “in order to be free to 
rule and to be ruled in turn” (Held, 2006: 27). All citizens had equal access to 
public offices. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of citizen – “someone 
who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office” (Aristotle, 1998: 
III 1 1275b). In contrast to the modern state, there was no distinction between 
citizens and officials. The obstacles to participation common to modern complex 
and large societies were not noticeably present. The Assembly (with a quorum 
of 6000 citizens) was the sovereign body. While unanimity of interest was 
always sought, the possibility of differences in opinion and clashes of interest 
was recognised and resolved through voting (Held, 2006: 17). Citizens were 
appointed to public offices by lot, and all offices were subject to rotation due 
to Athenians’ distrust of political professionalism. The classical democrats 
perceived knowledge and expertise as a source of power (Manin, 1997: 32). 
Although Athenian democracy emphasised active citizen participation, 
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citizenship status was limited to a very few people. Only free male adults of 
Athenian origin were entitled to citizenship. Athenian democracy in practice was 
patriarchal in nature, excluding women from political participation and limiting 
their role to the production of citizen sons. A large proportion of adult males 
were also excluded from citizenship status, and thus participation, on the basis 
of birth and freedom. Immigrants, even those whose families had settled in the 
city-state several generations earlier, and slaves were not granted citizenship, 
thus undermining equality. Held (2006) rightly claims that ‘classical 
conceptions of political equality were far removed from ideas about “equal 
power” for adults; political equality was a form of equality for those with equal 
status ([free] male and Athenian born)’ and refers to Athenian democracy as a 
‘tyranny of citizens’ (p. 19). While ensuring the citizens’ equal right to 
participate in the Assembly, to hold public offices and be heard before them, 
Athenian democracy failed to ensure equality within society by excluding many 
on the grounds of collective identities – women, slave and alien. 
In contrast to classical democracy, the proponents of contemporary 
(representative) democracy promote inclusive citizenship, irrespective of 
identity and status, through universal suffrage. While citizenship, as a legal 
status, and certain rights and duties have been extended to all the population in 
a nation state, the contemporary doctrine of democracy rejects the direct 
participation that was so central to classical democracy, labelling it unrealistic. 
The architect of representative democracy, James Madison, portrayed 
representative democracy as a superior form of government to direct 
democracy. In his view, it provides a mechanism “to refine and enlarge the 
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the 
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of people, will be more 
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, 
convened for the purpose” (Madison, 2004: 66). In his book Capitalism, 
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Socialism and Democracy, Joseph A Schumpeter, the main advocate of this 
doctrine in the twentieth century, defended the view that citizen participation is 
not essential to democracy and should be limited to electoral participation 
(voting). Considering the classical doctrine unrealisable in modern societies, he 
provided a more realistic definition of democracy: “the democratic method is 
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote.” To him, “the role of people [citizens] is to produce a 
government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national 
executive or government” (Schumpeter, 1943: 269). According to this definition, 
the essential feature of a democracy is electoral competition, both as a process 
and institution, and the only way citizens can participate in it is by voting for 
their leaders. A similar argument regarding the centrality of electoral 
competition in democratic setups is made by Robert Dahl in A Preface to 
Democratic Theory. He goes on to argue that increased participation of the 
common people could result in a declining consensus on the basic norms of 
democracy by increasing political activity and bringing in lower socio- economic 
classes who are ‘authoritarian-minded’ (Dahl, 1956: 89). Giovanni Sartori 
echoed this view on citizen participation. He asserts that active participation of 
the common people in the political process could be dangerous, as it might lead 
to totalitarianism. He suggests that the people should react, not act (Sartori, 
1965: 77). 
In a representative democracy, political authority is held by a group of 
office holders who have attained the offices through competitive election. 
They are granted the authority to make decisions by those who are to comply 
with the decisions (Kateb, 1992; Manin, 1997). Manin, going further, challenges 
the claim that in classical democracy the demos (Assembly) had the complete 
authority to make decisions: “Substantial powers – sometimes greater than 
those of the Assembly – were assigned to separate, smaller bodies” whose 
members were “mainly appointed by lot.” So, for him, the difference between 
the two forms of democracy is not the size of the sovereign body but the 
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method of selection of the members of these bodies (Manin, 1997: 41). 
Another significant difference between the two democratic forms is their 
attitude towards political professionalism: while professionalism is distrusted in 
classical democracy, in contemporary democracy, political professionalism is 
encouraged since the common citizen is regarded as incapable of taking all kinds 
of decisions. 
In 1960, a new doctrine of democratic participation emerged that 
emphasised participation and treated it as a means to the end of decision 
making and self- development. This new doctrine, referred to as participatory 
democracy, was influenced by Tocqueville’s observation of the educative effects 
of democratic participation (Mansbridge, 1999). The term ‘participatory 
democracy’ was coined by Arnold Kaufman in 1960 in a classic article, where he 
argues that “a democracy of participation may have many beneficial 
consequences, but the main justifying function is and always has been, not the 
extent to which it protects or stabilizes a community, but the contribution it 
can make to the development of human powers of thought, feeling and action” 
(Kaufman, 1960: 272). He further argued that direct participation is an ‘effective 
and indispensable’ way of reducing irrationality in decision making. The idea 
of participatory democracy was popularised through The Port Huron Statement, 
a manifesto produced by a group of students who claimed that participation 
would bring people ‘out of isolation and into community’ and would thus 
serve as a ‘means of finding meaning in personal life’ (Hayden, 1962). A decade 
later, Carole Pateman carried forward the argument in her book Participation 
and Democratic Theory. She argued that “the major function of participation in 
the theory of participatory democracy is…an educative one, educative in the 
very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of 
practice in democratic skills and procedures” (Pateman, 1970: 42). Participatory 
democracy seeks to create opportunities for citizens to make meaningful 
contributions to decision making while broadening the range of people who 
have access to such opportunities. As opposed to representative democracy, 
participatory democracy reinstates the citizenry’s capability to make decisions 
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and argues that capability is enhanced by participating. It argues that citizens 
and their institutions cannot be viewed in isolation. 
Participatory democratic theory emerged in the 1960s, flourished in the 
1970s, and began waning in the 1980s (Mansbridge, 1999), leading to another 
phase in democratic theory – deliberative democracy. The newest phase of 
transformation in democratic theory has come to be called the ‘deliberative 
turn’ (Dryzek, 2000: 1). Deliberative democracy is a system of decision making 
based on some kind of trade-off between direct participation and 
representation. “Deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions 
made by citizens and their representatives; …leaders should therefore give 
reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that citizens give in 
return” (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 3). The core focus of the doctrine lies in 
the nature and source of legitimacy in democratic decision making. In contrast 
to representative democracy, deliberative democracy argues that legitimate 
law-making can occur only through public deliberation by the citizenry. Such 
public deliberation may take place in formal, highly structured settings or in 
diffused grassroots organisations. 
Transformations in democratic theory have led to shifts in the notions of 
citizenship and participation. At each stage of democracy, citizenship and 
participation have been conferred with new meanings. The difference between 
the classical citizen and the contemporary citizen, as argued by Pocock (1998), is 
that “the former ruled and was ruled, which meant in other things that he 
was a participant in determining the laws by which he was to be bound. The 
latter…could go into court and invoke a law that granted him rights, immunities, 
privileges, and even authority, and that could not ordinarily be denied him 
once he had established his right to invoke it” (p. 40). In classical 
democracy, although direct participation of the citizens was ensured, very few 
people had access to citizenship status. In contrast, in representative 
democracy, citizenship status has been extended to everyone while limiting 
their participation. The latter two forms have demanded greater participation 
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while also providing universal access to citizenship. While political 
professionalism was distrusted in classical democracy and the capability of 
common citizens to make decisions was doubted in representative democracy, 
the latter two forms accept professionalism and reinstate the belief that 
citizens have the capability to participate. Participatory democracy argues that 
capability is enhanced by participation, and deliberative democracy argues that 
legitimate decisions can be made through participation (deliberation). 
2.3.2 Democratic Approach to Participation and Political Efficacy 
The basic idea behind the argument for citizens’ participation is that “people can 
and should govern themselves” (Pitkin and Schumer, 1982: 43). Those who 
argue for participation believe that citizens are capable of participating in 
decision making. As mentioned in the earlier section, there is a further claim 
that participation enhances that capability and makes ‘better citizens’ 
(Mansbridge, 1999) while producing better outcomes in decision making. In this 
section, I will discuss how this view was developed, how participation produces 
better citizens, and what constitutes ‘better’. 
To begin with, Aristotle’s ideas about political participation focus on the 
importance of participation to the pursuit of happiness, or human flourishing 
(eudaimonia), and ‘virtuousness’. Aristotle never claimed that participation 
develops the individual character of participants (Mansbridge, 1999; Mulgan, 
1990), although he has been interpreted as doing so by some (Duvall and 
Dotson, 1998). Mulgan (1990) goes further to claim that Aristotle was a ‘less 
than completely wholehearted’ supporter of participation. Aristotle argued that 
the polis needs a government of good men, but good men do not need a 
government to participate in. In the presence of ‘family and friends and a 
modicum of material wealth’, individuals can pursue a life of happiness and 
virtue, even in the absence of a good polis (p. 211). Aristotle differentiates 
between a good citizen and a good man: “it is possible for someone to be a 
good citizen without having acquired the virtue expressed by a good man” 
(Aristotle, 1998: III 4 1276b). As the characteristics of a good citizen change 
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depending on the constitution, a good citizen in a less virtuous polis would be a 
less virtuous man. Therefore, only in a good polis, i.e. aristocracy, will the 
good citizen be a good man (Duvall and Dotson, 1998). 
Although Aristotle talked about human virtue, he did not discuss the 
development of individual ability. Rousseau, a believer in participation, was the 
first to popularise the concept of the ‘development of human faculties’, 
although he was more concerned about moral development. To him, the 
absence of active participation meant the absence of a citizen’s freedom and 
the death of the state. However, he did not argue that participation in 
decision making with others develops human faculties (Mansbridge, 1999). 
Based on his observation of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville 
was the first to spell out the educative effects of participation. He suggested 
that the character of people, including ‘the labourers of a village’ and ‘the lower 
orders’, could be improved in a direct democracy (Tocqueville, 2003: I 269-287). 
Observing the town meetings in New England, he argued that participation can 
change a citizen’s character in two ways. Firstly, participation guarantees 
freedom to citizens and teaches them how to use it: “Town institutions are to 
freedom what primary schools are to knowledge: they bring it within people’s 
reach and give men the enjoyment and habit of using it for peaceful ends” 
(Tocqueville, 2003: I 73). Secondly, by participating in their local sphere, people 
absorb the spirit of participation, acquire ‘a taste for order’, understand “the 
balance of powers and [have] clear, practical ideas on the nature of…[their] 
duties and the extent of…[their] rights” (Tocqueville, 2003: I 82). 
Influenced by Tocqueville’s work, John Stuart Mill was first to argue for 
democracy based on the effects of participation on individual character. He 
argued that people should participate in decision making to achieve better 
outcomes as well as to promote self-development. He specified three forms of 
self-development that people can achieve through political participation: 
virtue, intellectual stimulation and activity. He advocated participation and its 
effect on individual development primarily for their contribution to the larger 
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polity rather than for the good it might bring to individuals. However, he did 
not advocate the participation of individuals as equals; he argued for a voice in 
decision making, not an equal voice (Mansbridge, 1999: 306-310). 
A century later, Arnold Kaufman presented a similar view on the 
educative effects of participation when he introduced the doctrine of 
participatory democracy. To him, “participation essentially involves actual 
preliminary deliberation (conversations, debate, and discussion) and that in 
the final decision each participant has a roughly equal formal say” (Kaufman, 
1960: 281). He argued that “the main justifying function of participation is 
development of man’s essential powers- inducing human dignity and respect, 
and making men responsible by developing their powers of deliberative action” 
(p. 289). Mill’s goal of developing individuals’ powers was echoed by Kaufman 
when he argued for development of the powers of ‘thought’, ‘feeling’, and 
‘action’. However, he cautioned that more empirical study was required to 
prove the educational benefits of participation and to devise ways to implement 
participation in specific social spheres. 
Carole Pateman extends the argument in Participation and Democratic 
Theory: “The major function of participation in the theory of participatory 
democracy is…an educative one, educative in very widest sense, including both 
the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and 
procedures” (Pateman, 1970: 42). She emphasises the ‘psychological or 
characterological’ benefits of participation. She also argues that participatory 
systems will be stable and self-sustaining because of their educative effects: 
“…there is no special problem about the stability of a participatory system; it is 
self-sustaining through the educative impact of the participatory process. 
Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more 
individuals participate the better able they become to do so” (Pateman, 1970: 
42-43). In her analysis of participatory democracy, Pateman stresses the 
importance of “confidence in one’s ability to participate responsibly and 
effectively, and to control one’s life and environment”, which she refers as 
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‘political efficacy’ (pp. 45-46). She goes beyond political participation to include 
participation in the workplace as an educative process. Pateman identifies, in 
the spillover thesis, a direct link between workplace participation, political 
efficacy, and political participation. She claims that participation in workplace 
decision-making will spill over into wider society by increasing participation in 
political activities beyond the workplace. Pateman points out four potential 
benefits from participation: political efficacy, the sense of cooperation, 
commitment to collective decisions, and democratic character. All these have 
value as they help democracy to function (Mansbridge, 1999: 314). 
Although similar arguments have been made in later writings (Peterson, 
1992b; Peterson, 1992a; Verba et al., 1995; Mansbridge, 1999; Luskin and 
Fishkin, 2004), the ideas on participation (both political and beyond) and its 
spillover effects still remains a theory, with little empirical evidence to support 
it. In recent years, the spillover thesis has been criticised for being too simplistic, 
and opponents have argued that it is in need of re-evaluation or revision. The 
revisionists claim that participation may not always have a positive impact and 
participation may only contribute to political efficacy in specific ‘contexts’ 
(Ayala, 2000; Carter, 2006; Greenberg et al., 1996). From this discussion, it is 
evident that the debate on participation and its effects has been expanding 
alongside developments in democratic theory. As the concept of participation 
has broadened, so has its expected outcome grown. 
2.3.3 Developmental Approach to Participation and Efficiency 
In the post-World War II period, the state became the primary agent of 
development and people became passive recipients. The prevalent notion of 
state-centric development linked the state’s ability to operate autonomously of 
socially dominant classes, forces and interests to its ability to formulate and 
pursue ‘collective goals’ in order to provide collective goods (Evans, 1995). 
The underlying assumption was that the greater the autonomy, the stronger 
the state, and a strong state was better able to transcend aggregate interests 
in the promotion of economic growth. States with a ‘centralised and 
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purposive authority structure’, a ‘competent bureaucracy’ and effective coercive 
institutions were considered conducive to development (Kohli, 2004: 10). After 
two decades of experience, state-led development proved unable to improve 
living conditions, particularly of the poor, in the Third World. A combined effect 
of the global economic crisis of the late 1970s and neoclassical economics led 
Western development institutions to endorse sweeping neoliberal policies that 
minimised the state’s role in development, leaving in effect a ‘hollowed out’ 
state. The Washington Consensus conferred legitimacy upon these neoliberal 
policies and proposed a set of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) to 
address state inefficiency, which minimised the direct role of the state in 
development. However, SAPs have also failed to address the problem of Third 
World development due to their overemphasis on market fundamentalism as 
opposed to state centrism. 
As a response to the same problem, another set of theories on 
development, which emphasised ‘participation in development’ or ‘participatory 
development’, emerged during this period. Participatory development, as 
perceived by its advocates, is a strategy to include the ‘beneficiaries’ in the 
planning, implementation and evaluation of development projects. With regard 
to rural development, Cohen and Uphoff (1977) define participation as 
“people’s involvement in decision-making processes, in implementing 
programmes, their sharing in the benefits of development programmes and 
their involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes” (p. 7). The origin of 
participatory development can be traced back to the US Foreign Assistance Act 
1966, which amended the original 1961 Act by adding Title IX, entitled 
‘Utilisation of Democratic Institutions in Development’. The new section stated 
that “emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of 
economic development on part of the people of the developing countries, 
through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental 
institutions” (as cited in Cornwall, 2006: 70). 
In the 1970s, a host of United Nations’ publications heralded the 
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practicability and value of participation and refined its parameters. It proposed 
“popular participation as an integral part of the development process” 
(Cornwall, 2006: 70). In 1979, the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development launched an inquiry into participation and defined it as “the 
organised efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions 
in given social situations, on the part of groups and movements of those 
hitherto excluded from such control” (Pearse and Stiefel, 1979; Stiefel and 
Wolfe, 1994: 5). In the 1980s, the debate became complicated by the 
divergence in focus between neoliberalism and participatory development. 
The focus on neoliberal policies replaced state centralism with market 
fundamentalism, leaving little space for participation. Furthermore, while 
participatory development proposed a bottom-up planning system, the 
neoliberal reforms followed a top-down approach. The neoliberal reforms were 
mostly designed at the top level (by development organisations in developed 
countries) and imposed at the bottom level in developing countries. However, 
these same development organisations fostered participation during this period 
precisely to gain legitimacy and counter grassroots resistance to the reforms 
(Rahman, 1995). 
A study by Samuel Paul on the World Bank’s experience in community 
participation in development projects defines participation as “an active process 
by which beneficiary or client groups influence the direction and execution of a 
development project with a view of enhancing their well-being in terms of 
income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values they cherish” (Paul, 1987: 
2). The study finds that participation was a means to achieve better project 
results, which satisfy both the community and the authority. It was, as he 
argues, also a means to facilitate project execution. The study reveals that the 
World Bank has emphasised cost-sharing and co-production of services as 
dominant modes of participation, while barely any attention has been given to 
capacity-building and empowerment (Paul, 1987). Drawing on a workshop on 
participatory development organised by the World Bank in 1992, Picciotto 
(1992) challenges the claim made in democratic theory that ‘participation is an 
 38 
end in itself’. He claims that “emphasis on the intrinsic value of participation 
often dampens the appetite for results. When all is said and done, participation 
should be judged in terms of its contribution to substantive goals” (p. 2). 
In the 1990s, the international development organisations made serious 
attempts to scale up popular participation in ‘project design and financing’. 
Several workshops were organised and brought together development scholars 
and practitioners, non-governmental organisations, multilateral banks and non-
economists. The development organisations publicised their views on 
participation. The World Bank defines participation in development as “a 
process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” 
(World Bank, 1994: 1-2; World Bank, 1996: 3). The Asian Development Bank 
echoed this definition of participatory development (ADB, 1996: 1). 
It was during the 1990s that the development organisations started 
engaging in the debate on empowerment. This is reflected in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) view on participation: 
“participatory development stands for partnership which it will built upon the 
basis of dialogue among the various actors, during which the agenda is jointly 
sent, and local views and indigenous knowledge are deliberately sought and 
respected. This implies negotiation rather than the dominance of an externally 
set project agenda. Thus people become actors instead of being beneficiaries” 
(Schneider and Libercier, 1994: 3). The United Nations Development Programme 
also provides an extended interpretation: “Participation in development means 
more than participation in economic benefits; it is a process which can range 
from information, consultation to local people assuming ownership and 
responsibility of the development initiative” (UNDP, 1998). Cornwall (2006) 
claims that towards end of the decade, the notion of empowerment was well 
established within participatory development. 
Although in recent years, the concept of participatory development has 
broadened to include notions of ‘empowerment, ‘democratic governance’, 
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‘right-based approach’ and ‘social accountability’ (Cornwall, 2006), the approach 
still remains limited. Participation in development, although one of the most 
overused concepts in the past two decades, still remains one of the least 
understood. Its advocates probably deliberately lack clarity on its approach and 
methods so as to institutionalise participation in development projects. While 
there is agreement on the desirability of participation in development, there is 
no consensus among the promoting agencies on the level, nature and context 
of participation. The promoting agencies often target ‘stakeholders’, 
‘beneficiaries’, or ‘consumers’ of public services. This approach to inclusion in 
participatory development often excludes a section of society who might have 
an indirect stake in the development. Inclusion of people on the basis of one 
overarching identity often undermines other identities they have and becomes 
an imposition, thus obstructing participation. Making participation inclusive and 
active requires recognising and striking a fine balance between homogeneity 
and diversity of identities. ‘Bottom-up’ planning is one of the recurring themes 
used in participatory development literature and is central to models proposed 
by participatory advocates. However, ‘top-down’ practices still predominate in 
most of the large development organisations (Corneille and Shiffman, 2004), 
and this makes it difficult to ensure bottom-up practice in development projects. 
2.3.4 Democracy versus Development: Approach and Objective 
From the above discussion, it is evident that we can separate the concepts of 
democratic participation and participatory development based on their origins 
and growth. However, they can coexist, and this is desirable. In this section, I will 
draw out the major points of difference between the two paradigms. 
The first point of difference is lies in the approaches to participation in 
both paradigms. Who participates? How are they asked to participate? What 
are they asked to do? Whose interests do they represent? As is evident from the 
earlier discussion, citizens participate in the democratic paradigm, and 
‘stakeholders’ or ‘beneficiaries’ participate in the development paradigm. The 
latter disadvantages a section of society on the grounds that they do not have a 
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direct stake in the particular project or other commitments and responsibilities. 
For example, Agarwal (2001) shows how women are excluded from community 
forestry due to social norms that define domestic work and child care as their 
responsibility and social perceptions that discount their abilities and opinions. 
This problem could be addressed if the approach to participation were to shift 
towards the political notion of ‘citizenship’ and translate the social practice of 
participation in projects into democratic political activity (Joseph, 2000). Along 
the same lines, Shapiro (2003) argues that a ‘citizenship’ approach will be more 
useful and less controversial because it will provide an opportunity to everyone 
in society to participate in the process and decide the course of development. 
Another important aspect is the nature of the origin of the participation. 
Barnes et al. (2003) argue that people may participate because they have 
volunteered to do so or because they have been ‘invited, exhorted or coerced’. 
In the democratic paradigm, participation is a voluntary activity, while in the 
case of development, participation is a state or NGO-promoted (some would 
argue ‘coerced’) activity. Cooke and Kothari (2004) argue that the latter may 
become tyrannical for participants, as the transferred or implanted methods 
may not fit into the socio-political culture of participants. What the participants 
are asked for is also quite important: are they asked for individual inputs, 
thus uncovering individual preferences, or are they asked as a community or 
group, which involves deliberating and reaching collective agreements? In the 
first case, which falls into the development paradigm, it may take a long 
time to arrive at a decision as to the common good because individual 
preferences will vary. The second case, which falls into the democratic 
paradigm, limits this problem by presenting a group preference. As regards 
whose interest the participants represent, in the democratic paradigm, the 
participants will deliberate to reach a collective interest for the good of 
society, while in the development paradigm, the participants will represent the 
interests of a target group. 
The second point of variance is the level of participation. Following 
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Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’, participation in the democratic 
paradigm stands on the two upper rungs of ‘citizen power’ and ‘delegated 
power’. In these two cases, participants have the authority to make decisions. 
In the case of the development paradigm, participation could mean anything 
from manipulation to partnership, from nominal membership to co-production. 
In these cases, the authority to make a final decision lies with someone else; the 
role of participants is set by the authority. The participants are involved in 
providing the information that the authority acts upon. 
The third point of variance between the two paradigms is the objectives 
that they seek to achieve. While the democratic paradigm seeks to achieve 
better decisions or policies and the development of the individual character of 
the participants, the development paradigm seeks to achieve better project 
outcomes. The outcomes expected from democratic participation, to follow 
Pateman (1970), are political efficacy, a sense of cooperation or trust, a 
democratic character (better citizenship) and commitment to collective 
decisions. On the other hand, the potential outcomes of participatory 
development are better design and implementation of development projects 
and thus better and sustainable outcomes. The development paradigm seeks 
to achieve efficiency, effectiveness and economy in development. However, 
both the paradigms seek to gain legitimacy – to decisions in the democratic 
paradigm and to projects in the development paradigm – through participation. 
Although separable, both democratic and development paradigms of 
participation can coexist in the same way as Aristotle’s ‘good citizen’ and ‘good 
man’. This requires a good ‘constitution’, an enabling environment. It must be 
noted that the development paradigm draws its philosophical roots from the 
political paradigm. So in the presence of certain contextual factors, effective 
participation can produce both democratic and developmental outcomes. The 
next chapter deals in detail with the contexts under which democratic 
participation could be institutionalised in development projects. 
In recent years, there seems to have been some convergence between the two 
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paradigms, leading to the idea of ‘participatory citizenship’ (see Mohanty and 
Tondon, 2006). This has been facilitated by two related developments: Firstly, 
following Sen’s (2000) argument, the concept of development has been 
expanded to include development of human capabilities. In this case, 
development becomes inseparable from democracy (Dreze and Sen, 2002). 
Secondly, there has been a shift in focus from target groups to citizens in 
participatory development, although this has been limited to academic 
discourse. 
However, there is no doubt that participation is a necessity in the 
modern world, not only for substantial democracy but also for sustainable and 
equitable development. For the adherents of market-oriented development, 
participation is alien and utopian. They appear convinced that participation is 
dangerous because it promotes the organisation of the excluded in order to 
attain control over resources and institutions. By contrast, the critics of market-
oriented development claim that participation is something achievable, and it 
is the only way to cope with inequalities and redistribute the benefits of 
development. In this context, an answer to this debate can be obtained from 
(excluded) people through empirical research. 
Participation theories and their normative claims, as discussed in this 
section, are central to the analysis. Drawing on participatory development 
theories, the thesis aims to find out how users’ participation in management 
of service affects service delivery system. Does users’ participation address 
existing inefficiencies in the system and contribute to improvement in efficiency 
and effectiveness? Does the new system make the service providers more 
accountable and responsive to service users? Though the study focuses on 
electricity service delivery for analysis, it aims to draw insights for other similar 
public services. Similarly, drawing on participatory democracy theories, the 
thesis aims to demonstrate how participation in users’ association affects 
participants’ (or users’) participation and democratic skills. Another set of 
indicators has been identified (and discussed in detail in Chapter 4) to assess 
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outcomes of users’ participation in electricity service delivery system. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Though decentralisation and participation are two different concepts, often 
used for different objectives and in different context, in recent years, they have 
been used for public service improvement. Recent researches argue that 
decentralisation and users’ participation in service delivery significantly 
enhances efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery system. When 
implemented for public service improvement, decentralisation and participation 
can facilitate local responsiveness and encourage accountability. 
Decentralisation reduces the gap between service providers and users by 
bringing them closer. Participation empowers the users to hold the service 
providers accountable. At the same time, both decentralisation and 
participation have been promoted for the empowering impacts they have for 
the participants or service users. 
Building on these normative claims around decentralisation and 
participation in general, and around public service delivery, and accounting for 
the existing inefficiencies in Indian electricity supply system (see chapter 3), I 
have identified a number of indicators to assess the impacts of decentralisation 
and users’ participation on service delivery. To assess improvements in 
efficiency in electricity supply, I look at major existing inefficiencies like rampant 
theft, low end-use efficiency, poor revenue realisation, high technical loss and 
poor quality of supply. In Chapter 5, I discuss how decentralisation and users’ 
participation have addressed these inefficiencies in conventional centralised 
electricity delivery and contributed to electricity service improvement. While 
efficiency gain is necessary, it does not mean effectiveness of the service 
delivery system. To understand effectiveness of the decentralised and 
participatory electricity supply system, I look at major loopholes like lack of 
transparency and high corruption, lack of accountability, poor quality of service 
and low & unequal access. In chapter 6, I analyse the contributions of 
decentralisation and users participation to effectiveness of electricity supply 
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system. At the same time, to understand empowering effects of decentralisation 
and participation, I have looked at enhancement in human dignity and self-
respect, construction of citizen consumers, promotion of leadership, group 
solidarity and collective action, declining faith in government and increasing 
political participation. In chapter 7, I discuss these effects of participation in 
users’ association, with empirical evidences; how participation has contributed 
to political efficacy and civic values of the participants. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Politics of Electricity Delivery in India 
Beyond State and Market 
 
Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the entire country. 
Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 1920 (Lenin, 1960: 516) 
Brothers and sisters, I want to tell you this. The greatest thing on earth is to have 
the love of God in your heart, and the next greatest thing is to have electricity in 
your house. 
Farmer giving witness in a rural Tennessee church in the early 1940s (Pence, 
1984) 
To implement the goal accepted by the international community to halve the 
proportion of people living on less than US$ 1 per day by 2015, access to 
affordable energy services is a prerequisite. (UNCSD, 2001) 
3.1 Introduction 
The three quotes above show the importance given to electrification at 
different points of the twentieth century and under different regimes. In the 
first quote, Vladimir Lenin meant that electrification of the countryside was a 
means to end the division between town and country. It would ‘raise the level 
of culture in the countryside and…overcome, even in the most remote corners 
of land, backwardness, ignorance, poverty, disease, and barbarism’ (Lenin, 
1960: 335), and would thus establish communism in the Soviet Union. The 
second quote, from an American countryman, shows the importance accorded 
to electricity service by rural people. It should be noted that during the mid-
1930s, most of rural America did not have access to electricity, a situation very 
similar to present day India. The Roosevelt administration, with its social 
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democratic perspective, established the Rural Electrification Administration 
(REA) to provide technical support and public funding for rural electrification. 
Its primary objective was to improve living standards in rural areas, with 
secondary objectives of food security, military security, and checking migration 
and separatist movements (Wolman, 2007). These were deemed essential to 
protect the democratic regime in the country. The third quote represents the 
view of an international institution, the United Nations Commission on 
Sustainable Development, which again views electricity service provision as 
necessary to reduce poverty and thus to improve living standards. 
There is no doubt that electricity is a basic necessity in the modern 
world. It is essential for human development and to improve the living standard 
of the poor, to ensure a just society, and probably, to protect the political 
regime. According to Amartya Sen’s capability framework (cf.Sen, 1993, Sen, 
1997), electricity service can be understood as a commodity or input factor 
that frames an individual’s capability and thus enables his functioning in 
society. However, it has always been difficult to deliver electricity in 
geographically large and dispersed countries because of the high cost to serve 
remote locations and low returns. It becomes more difficult when the real cost 
of the service is unaffordable for many people, as is the case in India. 
Electrification, especially in rural areas, requires state intervention 
through institution building and some sort of public funding. Different countries 
have devised different methods for electrification: centralised five-year plans 
in the USSR; public funding through the REA and cooperative electrification in 
the United States; and nationalised electrification in the United Kingdom. As a 
late electrifying country, India has repeatedly made all efforts to draw on the 
experiences of early electrified countries. As a consequence, over the past six 
decades, the Indian electricity sector has passed through several phases of 
development, in line with shifts in the global electricity supply industry.  
This chapter partly draws from and builds on my MPhil research on 
Political Economy of Public Policy Making in the Indian Electricity Sector (Swain, 
 47 
2006). The study analysed the policy process in Indian electricity, with focus on 
national level and two subnational states (Orissa and Andhra Pradesh), during 
the period from 1948 to 2003. It aimed to identify the drivers of policy change, 
key actors and interests in the process, how they control over the process 
(policy making and implementation), and how policy making in the electricity 
sector is correlated with overall policy making in the country. 
The study concluded that policy making in India is an outcome of 
interaction between the state, the government and the society. The policies 
adopted are guided by prevailing economic ideologies, held in India as well as 
globally. Yet, domestic energy security concerns and developmental aspirations 
had far more (and direct) influence than the international agencies or external 
environment. Consequently, policy process in Indian electricity has clearly 
reflected political and economic shifts in the country. While much of the policy 
making has taken place at federal level, actual implementation was carried out 
by the subnational agencies, owing to the concurrent status of electricity. 
Analysing subnational process in two states, the study found that, undermining 
economic rationales, electricity has increasingly been used by political parties 
and politicians to secure public support and appease their constituencies. Over-
politicisation of the policy process and rent-seeking in Indian electricity, 
particularly at local level, has resulted in failure of public electrification over 
decades and attempts to introduce market in 1990s (Swain, 2006). The finding 
of the study are summarised in this chapter (in Section 3.2 & 3.3). 
In that backdrop, citing the failure of state and market, international 
development agencies have been proposing a new approach to electricity 
service governance that seeks to engage the public- actively and directly- in the 
process. The current research is an attempt to understand whether public 
engagement in electricity service delivery can address the inefficiencies that 
state and market institutions could not address. That way, current research will 
complement my past research by finding out what works better for electricity 
service delivery. While the past research helped me to identify inefficiencies in 
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Indian electricity delivery system, current research seeks to find how those 
inefficiencies can be overcome through public participation and 
decentralisation. The earlier research was based policy analysis, analysis of 
political debates and interviews with policy makers and other stakeholders as 
opposed to the current research that is heavily based on interviews and 
observations with electricity consumers. That way also both the studies 
complement each other by providing a holistic picture.  
The current chapter aims to critically examine the institution building 
and the policy processes in the Indian electricity sector. The objective is to 
identify institutional and policy shifts leading to users’ engagement in electricity 
delivery, their underlying rationale, and their outcomes. It also aims to point out 
the major inefficiencies in the conventional centralised model of electricity 
delivery in India, which the decentralised and participatory model is meant to 
address. Chapter 5 and 6 discuss in detail how these inefficiencies are 
addressed in the decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery. The 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the current state of the 
electricity supply industry in India as compared to the pre-independence period. 
Section 3.3 analyses the major policy shifts in the Indian electricity sector. 
Section 3.4 deals with the electrification programmes that were undertaken and 
the approach that they followed. In section 3.5, I discuss the new paradigm for 
extending electricity access. In the conclusion, I provide a summary of the 
politics of electricity service delivery in India and identify the major inefficiencies 
of the Indian electricity service delivery mechanism. 
3.2 The State of the Electricity Service in India 
In the pre-independence period, electricity in India was governed by the Indian 
Electricity Act 1910. This Act set out the rules by which private firms were 
granted licences by the state to supply power. At that time, the electricity sector 
in India was composed of hundreds of private companies and a very few 
government-owned utilities, located almost exclusively in cities and larger towns 
and in the industrial regions surrounding them. While most of the generation 
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business (74 per cent of total generation) was controlled by government, the 
distribution business (80 per cent) was largely in private hands (GoI, 1948). 
Government-owned generating stations (primarily coal-based thermal plants 
and hydroelectric stations) were large, while relatively small private players 
generated electricity from diesel generators. The majority of these companies 
were British owned, but there were a few prominent Indian players, notably, the 
Tata conglomerate, BSES, CESC, and Nixons. 
The first legislation in India to regulate the generation, supply and use of 
electricity came in the form of the Electricity Act of 1887, which provided for the 
protection of persons and property from injury and risks, attendant to the 
supply and use of electricity for lighting and other purposes. The Act was 
repealed and replaced by the Indian Electricity Act 1903. However, following the 
formulation of this Act, many practical, electro-technical and commercial 
difficulties came to light during the 1903 to 1909 period. To deal with these 
difficulties, the Indian Electricity Bill was introduced in the Central Legislature to 
amend the law relating to the supply and use of electrical energy. The Indian 
Electricity Bill was passed by the Legislative Council on 18th March 1910 and 
became the Indian Electricity Act 1910, which came into force with effect 
from 1st January 1911.7  
The Indian Electricity Act 1910 was ‘an Act to amend the law relating to 
the supply and use of electrical energy’ (GoI, 1910). In addition to dealing with 
the supply and use of electricity, the Act also set out the rights and 
obligations of the licensees. The key issues addressed in the Act were licences, 
regulatory and safety aspects, rules for non-licensees, guidelines for electrical 
works, and guidelines for the determination of purchase price and charges. 
                                                          
7 When the Indian Electricity Act 1903 was passed, it was clearly recognised as a 
somewhat tentative measure, and it was anticipated that amending legislation would 
be required at an early date. From the experience gained in the practical working of 
the Act, the Government of India came to the conclusion in 1907 that the time had 
arrived to undertake this amending legislation. 
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Administration of the Act was vested in local governments, with whom rested 
the power to grant licences, but the authority or prior sanction of the Governor-
General in Council was required in regard to so many matters8 that the practical 
result was a dual administration. The rule-making powers, and the delegation of 
the powers of the telegraph-authority to licensees, were reserved for the 
Governor-General in Council. This historical division seems to have influenced 
the concurrent status9 of electricity in India. 
Between 1910 and 1940, under the guidance of this Act, many generating 
stations10 were set up, mostly by provincial governments. While electricity 
generation was taken care of by provincial governments, most distribution 
licences went to private companies. From the 1910s to the 1940s, while cities 
and larger towns were becoming increasingly well electrified, smaller towns 
and villages were largely untouched by this new technology. The disparity 
                                                          
8 For example, in the case of cantonments and similar ‘places in the occupation of 
Government for naval or military purposes’, the administration of the Act was in the 
hands of the Governor - General in Council, but these places were situated within larger 
areas, in respect to which the local government was empowered to grant licences. It 
required separate, and not necessarily consistent, licences to be granted by the 
Governor-General in Council and the local government, respectively, to the same 
licensee for the same purpose, in one and the same place (GoI, 1910). 
9 The Constitution of India has put electricity under the ‘concurrent list’ of issues for 
which responsibility is shared between the centre and states. Under entry 38, both 
Parliament and the state legislatures have been empowered to make laws on the 
subject of ‘electricity’. The constitution has, however, given supremacy to central 
legislation, meaning thereby that if there is a direct conflict or inconsistency between a 
central Act and the provisions of state legislation, then the law made by Parliament 
shall prevail and the inconsistent provisions of the state legislation shall be void (GoI, 
2003a). 
10 Khopoli, Maharashtra (set up by the Tatas to supply Bombay), Sivasamundram, 
Mysore (power to Kolar gold fields), Mettur dam, and Madras (power to Madras city) 
are some prominent examples. 
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between urban and rural areas was partly a consequence of the low revenue 
potential of rural areas and partly because of the urban-centric development 
strategy of the British government in India. 
At the time of independence, India inherited an electricity sector with a 
total installed capacity of 1,363 megawatts (MW) and only 1,500 villages (0.25 
per cent of villages in India) electrified (PEG, 2004). Per capita electricity 
consumption in the country was 14 units (MoP, 2005), while the corresponding 
figures were 806 for the United Kingdom, 1540 for the United States, and 300 
for the USSR (GoI, 1948). Of the very little electricity produced, 44 per cent of 
the entire electricity supply and 46 per cent of the generation was confined to 
three big urban areas, namely, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. As one of the 
members of the Constituent Assembly put it, the entire country was “a virgin 
field for electrification” (GoI, 1948). 
Immediately after independence, electricity provisioning became a major 
concern for development in India. In keeping with global thinking at the time on 
the primacy of the state in development and drawing on the experience of 
state-led electrification in the USSR, America and the United Kingdom, India 
began public sector- led electrification. The objective was to power 
industrialisation, deliver electricity to the common people and address regional 
disparities in access to electricity services. 
Over the post-independence period, the total installed capacity in the 
country has grown to 169,749 MW, the number of electrified villages has 
increased to 531,425 (89.5 per cent) and per capita electricity consumption 
has risen to 733.5 units (CEA, 2010). However, the state of India’s electricity 
sector is very poor compared with many other countries. Although most 
villages are electrified, more than one-third of the population still do not have 
access to the service. Despite repeated efforts, 56.6 per cent of rural 
households and 12 per cent of urban households do not have access to 
electricity (Bhattacharyya, 2006). There is a wide disparity among the 
states: while seven states claim to have achieved 100 per cent village 
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electrification, six states are below 60 per cent; only three states have 85 per 
cent household electrification, while five states are still below 20 per cent (CEA 
2010). Southern states are doing better than highly populated states in northern 
and central India. While states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Haryana and Punjab 
completed electrification of all villages before 1980, the electrification 
programme in states like Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and Assam 
stagnated in the 1990s before being completed (Andreas, 2006: 3). 
As per the Indian constitution, the electricity sector is the joint 
responsibility of the central and state governments. A set of institutions 
(mostly public, with a few private utilities) govern the sector in India. Until 
2003, the sector was governed by three principal Acts, namely, the Indian 
Electricity Act 1910, the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, and the Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions Act 1998. The Electricity Act 2003 has repealed all the 
previous Acts and established a new era of restructured governance in which all 
the utilities are corporatised and freed from government control. 
The Indian electricity sector has four different categories of consumers – 
industrial, commercial, domestic, and agricultural, with the industrial consumers 
using the largest amount of power. Among these consumers, the industrial and 
agricultural consumers form the strongest lobby in the policy-making process, 
while domestic and commercial consumers are quite fragmented. However, 
domestic and agricultural consumers’ interest is given primacy in electrical 
developments, as they constitute the largest vote bank. Over time, with 
increased demand for the service, electricity has become an electoral 
commodity.11 In contrast to international practices12 and the economics of 
                                                          
11 During the past couple of decades, promises of access to electricity at an artificially 
low price or free of cost for some, have attained an important place in political 
parties’ manifestos; elections are being won and lost on the basis of electricity 
provision. In Andhra Pradesh’s State Assembly election in 2004, the Congress party 
promised to provide free power to farmers, and since being elected, it has kept its 
promise. Pachauri (2004) argues that if this policy was to be pursued to the same level 
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distribution costs, industrial consumers in India pay the highest tariff, followed 
by commercial consumers. Agricultural consumers pay the lowest tariff, and 
domestic consumers pay a little more. While the tariffs for domestic and 
agricultural consumers are far below the cost to serve, the high price paid by 
industrial and commercial consumers provides a cross-subsidy to fill the gap. 
This phenomenon of cross-subsidisation emerged much later in the post-
independence period. I will discuss this later in this chapter.13 
From the beginning, the sector has faced a challenge in balancing its 
social and economic obligations. The sector has to provide electricity for 
industrial development while providing electricity to the masses in a fissiparous 
and diverse country like India. Until the late 1960s, the balance was tilted in 
favour of industries, as power developments during the period were taking place 
in industrial regions and the industrial tariffs were set significantly lower than 
for other consumers. By the late 1960s, with the emergence of competitive 
populism, the balance shifted in favour of social obligation – providing electricity 
for domestic and agricultural purposes. However, since the 1990s, the sector has 
                                                                                                                                                             
by some other states such as Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, then an additional burden of around Rs 45 
billion would be imposed on state governments. Currently, for these selected states, 
agricultural tariff-related losses are in the order of Rs 140 billion. A further increase 
of Rs 45 billion would seriously impair the ability of these utilities to provide power in 
the future to those very sections of consumers that they are pandering to today 
(Pachauri, 2004). 
12 Gilbert et al. (1996) studying the international experience in the electricity sector 
claim that in most countries, the financial burden of investment in electricity is 
typically carried by the commercial class. While industrial rates are kept relatively close 
to marginal costs, residential customers are provided some subsidy. This leaves the 
financial burden with commercial customers (p. 15). 
13 In the pre-independence period, domestic consumers paid a high tariff, while 
industrial and agricultural consumers paid less. 
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been attempting to restore the balance in favour of industries while protecting 
the interests of domestic and agricultural consumers. This has left the sector in a 
difficult position. 
The sector is in dire straits, plagued with chronic inefficiencies. While 
more than one-third of the population is still not connected, the country is faced 
with a severe power crisis. The gap between demand and supply hovers 
around 10 per cent, but losses are around 35 per cent. Consumers have to face 
power cuts ranging from four hours to 18 hours a day during peak summer and 
winter months. The utilities are in financial crisis due to poor revenue collection 
and heavy subsidies. It may be practically and politically impossible to 
rationalise tariffs, which would require a 400 per cent hike in domestic and 
agricultural tariffs, without addressing loss and other problems. Corruption is so 
high that Transparency International claims that in 2005, Indians paid $480 
million in bribes to receive connections (as cited in Sengupta, 2007). This partly 
negates the claim that domestic and agricultural consumers are getting 
cheap/free power. Heavy cross-subsidisation from industrial consumers has 
forced them to move to captive power generation, leaving the utilities in further 
financial straits. Restructuring has hardly improved governance in the sector. 
Mismanagement, lack of transparency and accountability, and corruption are 
the major problems that plague the sector’s performance. While much of the 
policy debate so far has been focused on capacity addition and restructuring, 
hardly any attention has been paid to end-use efficiency. As it is rightly said that 
‘every unit of electricity saved is equivalent to producing two extra units’, end-
use efficiency could save much of the electricity consumed. 
3.3 Politics of the Policy Shifts in Indian Electricity 
In this section, I analyse the policy process in the Indian electricity sector to 
identify the major policy and institutional shifts, why they occurred and how 
they have led to the current crisis in the sector. During the past six decades, the 
sector has passed through four phases of major policy shifts: the first, following 
independence in 1947, led to the consolidation of public power in the sector; 
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the second, from the late 1960s through the 1980s, was characterised by 
political interference and led to the emergence of a populist paradox in the 
sector; the third, beginning in the early 1990s, laid the groundwork for the shift 
to market orientation by opening up the sector to private players and structural 
reforms; and the fourth phase began with the enactment of the Electricity Act 
2003, marking a new beginning and seeking to strike a balance between the 
economic and social objectives. 
At the time of independence, the existing electricity market in India was 
neither capable of lighting the country nor powering its industrial development. 
In response to the situation, the Constituent Assembly of India14 set out to 
create public institutions that would expand electricity generation and access in 
                                                          
14 The Constituent Assembly of India was the apex legislative body of India at the time 
of independence, which tried to maximise the inclusion of various interests in the key 
legislations for independent India. However, the Constituent Assembly was dominated 
by one party in a country dominated by one party. As Austin (2003) has put it, “the 
Assembly was the Congress and the Congress was India”. Although the Congress Party 
ensured that members from all ethnic communities were represented in the Assembly, 
there were no criteria for representing members from different classes and 
occupational communities. While some agree that the Constituent Assembly was 
representative of all kinds of opinion (Austin, 2003), some challenge this. The latter 
argue that the Congress was an organisation dominated by a ‘social elite’ group and it 
was not notably democratic in its own working (Corbridge and Harriss, 2004). In regard 
to the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948, although the Constituent Assembly represented all 
kinds of public opinion, the opinion of farmers was represented less than other groups. 
The industrial stakeholders were consulted at the Simla conference during the 
drafting of the Bill, but there was no such consultation with agricultural stakeholders. 
Some members of the Assembly emphasised the necessity to supply electricity to 
farmers, while others emphasised the need for a subsidised tariff for agricultural 
consumption. But there was no special representation of farmers, which has resulted in 
the lack of innovative ideas for efficient electricity consumption in the agricultural 
sector (Swain, 2006). 
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India. Along with this, they introduced the Electricity (supply) Act 1948, which 
guided these public institutions. The Electricity (Supply) Bill 1948 was originally 
prepared in 1945 by the then Labour Department of the Government of India, 
and from then until 1948, it was under continuous revision by different 
committees. Important recommendations came from the Power and Fuel 
Committee of the National Planning Committee. Before presentation in the 
Constituent Assembly, a number of important amendments were made to the 
draft Bill by the Legislative Drafting Committee. In August 1948, the Bill was 
debated in the Assembly and was passed with certain amendments. The stated 
objective of the Act was to orient the sector to “provide for rationalisation of 
the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures 
conducive to [electrical development15].” The Act established two sets of public 
institutions, the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) at the central level and State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs) at the state level, and these became the nodal agencies 
in the sector. 
Two important issues that were raised and discussed in the Constituent 
Assembly were the proposed nationalisation of the electricity sector and the 
autonomy of the proposed State Electricity Boards. While there were some 
members who supported nationalisation of the sector, others opposed it on 
various grounds. The supporters of nationalisation argued that a ‘uniform 
system of administration’ in the sector was necessary in order to solve the 
problem of regional disparity in access to electricity. On the other hand, some 
members argued for autonomous SEBs, while others favoured the 
establishment of an electricity department attached to the Energy Ministry in 
the state governments. Supporters of independent SEBs anticipated the 
problems of increasing interference by elected leaders, presciently envisioning a 
time when electricity would come to be a tool wielded to fashion and sustain 
political constituencies. In many ways, the discussion around these two issues 
anticipated the contemporary debates around the crisis in the Indian electricity 
                                                          
15 Substituted by A.O. 1950, for “the electrical development of the provinces of India”. 
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sector. Ultimately, the Constituent Assembly agreed on a nationalised electricity 
sector and independent SEBs (Swain, 2006). However, SEBs were structured 
through state government loans and operated as extensions of the states’ 
energy ministries. As a consequence, their autonomy was undermined, and 
they remained ‘indebted in perpetuity’ to the state governments (Dubash and 
Rajan, 2001). Successive amendments to the Act further eroded the SEBs’ 
autonomy and opened the door for electoral considerations by imposing greater 
political oversight of human resource developments and tariff setting (Kale, 
2004). However, most of the newly created SEBs were doing well. Although the 
electrification rate was not as high as it became in the next phase, the SEBs were 
financially viable. 
From the late 1960s to the 1980s, the SEBs’ autonomy was further 
eroded, increasing the scope for political interference.16 Beginning from the late 
1960s, political interference in the sector intensified, and as a consequence of 
the developments in Indian politics, the electricity service was increasingly used 
for electoral considerations. The 1967 elections marked the beginning of the 
reconfiguration of political forces in India; Congress’s hegemony was 
challenged in parts of India. The period experienced the emergence and rise 
of regional parties with a strong base among the peasantry, who demanded 
subsidised agricultural inputs including electricity for irrigation (Swain, 2006). 
Subsidised electricity for farmers had broad appeal as it seemed to be achieving 
food security while increasing the income of farmers, who could thereby be 
                                                          
16 Political interference in the sector was a two-part process: first, through ‘policy 
directives’ from the government that are allowed under Section 78A of the 1948 
Act; second, through ‘executive instructions’ that work through an informal nexus 
between the politicians and the employees of SEBs (Ruet, 2005). Executive 
instructions, mostly targeted at implementation, were the real menace and often 
went against the policy directives from the same people in government. While the 
policy directive called for village electrification to follow the criterion of population 
(1,000 or more), politicians instructed that their constituencies were electrified first, 
irrespective of population (Swain, 2006). 
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organised into large vote banks (Dubash and Rajan, 2001). All political parties 
used electricity to lure voters by artificially lowering the tariff for agricultural 
and domestic consumers. 
The failure of the SEBs can be attributed to two developments during 
the period: first, subsidisation of agricultural consumption17; second, unplanned 
(politically induced) electrification and irrational tariff setting. The creation of 
the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) in 1969, which provided soft loans 
guaranteed by state governments, reduced funding constraints. The criteria for 
selecting the villages for electrification were more political and populist than 
economic. While rural electrification increased domestic and agricultural 
consumption, the subsidisation of agricultural consumption and stagnating 
domestic tariffs led to a wide gap between cost and revenue. The stretching 
of lines to remote rural areas, in many cases without enough consumers, 
resulted in increased transmission losses and increased the scope for theft. In 
addition, theft by non-consumers enticed consumers to tamper with meters and 
abstain from payment. However, the SEBs did not report losses until the 
early 1980s (Swain, 2006). Later, when the SEBs started reporting transmission 
and distribution (T&D) losses, it is claimed that most of the loss was written off 
under the category of agricultural consumption, as agricultural metering had by 
then been removed (World Bank, 2001). 
Taken together, the subsidised agricultural supply, unplanned 
electrification, increased power theft and losses, and irrational tariffs led to a 
                                                          
17 The structure of agricultural subsidy in Indian electricity is not uniform, owing to the 
concurrent status of electricity. Most states follow a flat-rate tariff based on the 
capacity of the pumpset rather than consumption, while some provide free electricity 
to farmers. In a very few cases, farmers are metered, although the tariff is artificially 
lowered. The states have pursued a non-discriminatory electricity subsidy policy that 
allows the rich to gain more. 
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wide gap between cost and revenue.18 By the late 1980s, the SEBs were going 
through a severe crisis of finance, capacity and management. Furthermore, 
consumers were highly dissatisfied with the poor quality of the service: 
domestic consumers with frequent load-shedding, agricultural consumers with 
limited hours of supply, and industrial consumers with the high tariff. There 
emerged a consensus that the problem was due to a lack of sufficient 
generation capacity in India, ignoring the high T&D losses and governance 
problems. The government therefore resolved to abandon the public monopoly 
system and set in motion fundamental changes in the sector, in line with global 
thinking at the time. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, there was a broad consensus that the 
Indian power sector was in dire straits, and major policy changes were required 
to change its management structures. Given the broad consensus on the 
problem, policy makers could have simply prepared a new course of action with 
the existing institutions. This would have been possible through management 
reform in the sector, an approach that had a group of supporters in the policy 
arena. According to Dubash and Rajan (2001), re-regulation of the sector to 
reassert the independence of SEBs from their political masters and devising 
effective accountability mechanisms to ensure this independence would have 
produced a much better result. 
However, in the face of the severe crisis in the sector, the central 
government announced in 1991 that it would encourage private investment in 
the sector. This development marked the beginning of the third phase, i.e. 
electricity reforms. The reforms in the Indian electricity sector took place in two 
phases: the first phase introduced private players into generation; the second 
phase initiated structural reforms in the SEBs, privatisation of distribution in 
some cases, and established independent regulators at both the centre and 
                                                          
18 The state governments provided subventions to meet the gap and encouraged the 
SEBs to overcharge industrial and commercial consumers. This led to the emergence 
of cross -subsidy (Swain, 2006). 
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state level. 
Reforms in the electricity sector began in October 1991, when the Power 
Ministry of the Government of India began to publish a series of 
notifications that sought to encourage the entry of privately owned generating 
companies into the electricity sector. Some of these government orders were 
later enacted in Parliament to become the Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act 
1991. It radically revised the existing legislation by permitting private entities to 
establish, operate and maintain generating stations of virtually any size and to 
enter into long-term power purchase agreement with SEBs. This Act, by 
amending all previous Acts, made provision for the following: allowing the 
private sector to set up local gas or liquid fuel-based thermal projects and hydro 
projects and wind or solar projects of any size; allowing foreign investors up 
to 100 per cent ownership of power projects subject to government approval; 
setting a new price structure; making new power projects eligible for a five-year 
tax holiday; and reducing duties on the import of equipment for power projects 
considerably (GoI, 1991). 
To attract private investors, Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were 
offered a guaranteed return and incentives. To further hasten implementation, 
the central government subsequently declared eight of the most promising 
projects ‘fast track’ projects with expedited clearance procedures. Since the 
buyer SEBs were not financially sound and the IPPs needed to secure a revenue 
stream, the IPPs were provided government counter-guarantees and escrow 
accounts against non-payment of dues by SEBs. These incentives had the 
desired effect. By mid-1995, project developers and financiers had put forward 
189 project offers totalling over U.S. $100 billion, which would have 
increased capacity by 75 gigawatts. 
The government initiative to introduce private players in electricity 
generation was welcomed by all. By this time, the Indian business class was well 
developed. Indian capitalists could foresee an opportunity to enter the 
electricity business with the entry of private capital in the sector. Middle-class 
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consumer groups, for whom electricity is a basic necessity, welcomed the 
promise of efficient power delivery. The industrialists expected a reliable power 
supply. Although the masses were generally unaware of the developments, the 
few who were welcomed the move in anticipation of better supply. There was 
hardly any opposition to the policy. The only interest that could have opposed 
the policies was the sector’s labour unions. Although the public utilities 
constitute one of India’s largest employers, labour unions in the sector had not 
yet organised effectively to oppose privatisation (Kale, 2004). 
Within a few years of its implementation, however, the IPP policy turned 
out to be a nightmare. The World Bank played a ‘curious dual role’ in the IPP 
policy. While welcoming private electricity initiatives in principle, the World 
Bank delivered a strong critique of the highest profile IPP, the Enron project, in a 
confidential memo to the Government of India. The memo stated that the 
project was “not economically viable, and thus could not be financed by the 
Bank,” but urged the government to “explore ways to sustain the interest of 
the project sponsors” (as cited in Dubash and Rajan, 2001: 3374). 
The IPP policy had several diverse impacts, well- illustrated by the 
infamous Enron case. Firstly, it weakened the key institutions responsible for 
long-term planning and technical and economic clearances. The IPP policy 
created an uneven playing field in favour of private players, particularly foreign 
investors. Secondly, its concentrated focus on capacity expansion excluded 
consideration of a more ‘rational cost-based planning’ approach to electrical 
development. Thirdly, the conception and implementation of the IPP policy 
offered opportunities for graft and malfeasance. Projects were selected through 
memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between state governments and private 
players rather than via competitive bidding, and Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPAs) were kept secret even though they contained ‘take-or- pay’ contracts 
involving public financial obligations for years to come (Dubash and Rajan, 
2001). Fourthly, results from PPAs have shown that the high guarantees 
offered to the private generators negatively affected generation in terms of 
 62 
reduced utilisation of both the existing and new public capacity. Finally, another 
major impact of the IPP policy could be in terms of significant increase in 
expected tariffs (Balachandra, 2006). 
Over a period of five years, the government learned lessons from the 
practical implementation of the IPP policy and announced several changes in 
policy. Firstly, counter guarantees were stopped after the first few projects. 
Secondly, the MoU approach was abandoned and replaced by compulsory 
competitive bidding for PPAs. Thirdly, price-based bidding was considered 
instead of cost-based bidding. Finally, the ‘two-part tariff’ was re-examined 
(Ranganathan, 1996). 
The IPP programme had significantly underperformed. By the mid-1990s, 
it was clear that a focus on private investment in generation was an insufficient 
and possibly counterproductive policy. Although not all PPAs proved 
controversial or ended in failure like Enron, the Enron case clearly demonstrated 
the shortcomings of the idea that IPPs were the solution to the crisis in the 
Indian electricity sector. As long as private generating firms had to sell their 
power to insolvent SEBs, the financial risks would remain intolerably high. 
The second phase of reform thus sought to address the problem of 
political interference in the SEBs, which kept subsidies too high and collections 
too low for the SEBs to pay their bills. A two-layered solution that incorporated 
restructuring and the introduction of a regulatory framework was proposed in 
order to improve the performance and finances of SEBs (Carstairs and Ehrhardt, 
1995). The purpose of unbundling the monolithic SEBs and privatising the 
resultant units was to improve management in the sector and to introduce a 
commercial culture. The main purpose of establishing independent regulatory 
bodies was to ‘depoliticise’ the sector. These policy reforms were intended to 
alter the relationship between public utilities, consumers, and state 
governments by delinking utilities from the governments. 
As it has been argued, these reforms quite clearly drew upon the World 
Bank policies on private participation in the electricity sector, which were 
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rewritten in 1993. Its global reach and cheap capital made the Bank the 
primary vehicle for propagating the new privatisation paradigm (Kale, 2004). In 
response to these ideas, various states began experimenting with reforms after 
the mid-1990s. While most of the states have unbundled the sector, only two 
states (viz. Orissa and Delhi) have privatised the distribution business. In large 
measure, these differences across Indian states reflect the variations in the 
balance of power among different social and economic actors in the state. 
While the early reformers like Orissa and Delhi have gone a long way 
towards completing the process of privatising their distribution companies, the 
late reformers have halted the process mid-way.19 This is due to the 
emergence of opposition to the reforms, particularly opposition to 
privatisation. When Orissa began reforms and privatised the distribution 
companies, there was hardly any awareness about the reform process. By the 
time other states started the process, the Orissa model had started to bear fruit, 
and its result was not positive. This led to strong opposition to privatisation in 
other states. 
It should be stressed that the opposition was specifically against the 
privatisation process, not against other reform measures. This was because 
consumers were suspicious that privatisation would result in tariff hikes. 
Farmers, who benefited from artificially low tariffs, were more engaged and 
vocal in the opposition to the privatisation process. Civil society organisations 
played an active role in the opposition to privatisation. Many organisations 
focused on the social and economic impacts of privatisation and joined together 
to gain public support for their cause. The presence of these organisations 
generated awareness among the masses about the reforms, particularly about 
their negative implications, and in so doing, they bridged the gap between ‘elite 
politics’ and ‘mass politics’ in the power sector by involving the masses in the 
                                                          
19 It should be noted that almost all states have unbundled their SEBs according to the 
mandatory provision of the Electricity Act 2003. However, none of them has privatised 
the distribution segment nor have any plans to do so. 
 64 
process. 
This account suggests that the presence or absence of competent and 
organised consumer groups is a key variable in determining the success of 
electricity reforms. Nevertheless, the reform measures initiated at state level 
were doomed to failure from the outset. Although the states attempted to focus 
on the core problems of distribution and losses, this resulted in far from 
satisfactory outcomes, largely because the states’ attempts were characterised 
by political hesitancy. Although all state governments agreed that there was a 
need to reform the sector, they placed limitations on reforms in areas that 
would cost them politically. 
As part of the reform strategy, the central government passed the 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act in 1998, which made provisions for the 
establishment of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) in each state 
and a Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) at the centre. The 
differences in the legal frameworks governing the various SERCs are minimal, 
but their operations vary from state to state, in some cases including generation 
licensing and tariff setting for particular categories.20 
The main objective of the regulatory bodies was to free the sector from 
governmental control. However, the independence of these regulatory bodies 
was questioned from the very beginning. Their independent status is challenged 
by the fact that the final selection of the regulators is carried out by state 
governments and the regulators are financially dependent on the governments. 
In some cases, the regulatory bodies are faced with a lack of adequate finance 
and human resources (Swain, 2006). Nevertheless, the regulatory bodies have 
                                                          
20 Some observers complain about a nexus between the regulators and the 
government. As the government conducts the final selection and the regulators are not 
financially independent enough to manage their business, they are inclined towards 
the government’s line. Another reason mentioned by experts is that the regulators are 
heavily drawn from the bureaucracy, and having worked so long for the government, 
the regulators are obliged to the government, and their thinking is in line with it. 
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proved successful in providing a public space in which to debate issues relevant 
to the sector, and stakeholder participation has increased over time. Further 
strengthening of the regulatory regime may bear positive results. 
In response to the sluggish pace of reform at state level, the 
Government of India passed the Electricity Act 2003, following two years of 
debate among policy makers. The passing of the Act marked the beginning of 
the fourth phase in the Indian electricity sector. In contrast to the World Bank-
led state reforms, the new Act represented the internalisation of the new global 
ideology of electricity at the central government level (Kale, 2004). The new Act 
replaced all the existing Acts governing the sector and prepared the ground for 
fundamental restructuring of the sector. 
The Ministry of Power submitted a draft of the Electricity Bill to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy in August 2001; the Committee 
debated the Bill for 15 months. A number of changes were suggested in order to 
strengthen competition within electricity supply. For example, the revised 
legislation stipulated a firm timetable for the implementation of open access. 
After being passed by the Committee, with notes of dissent from the communist 
parties, the Bill returned to the Ministry of Power in December 2002. The 
Ministry accepted only some of the Parliamentary Committee’s suggested 
changes. Notably, the timetable for the introduction of open access was again 
omitted in the Bill. The new version of the Bill was passed by the Indian 
Parliament on 25th May 2003. In contrast to the debate on the 1948 Act five 
decades earlier, the debate in the lower house was brief – just over one hour – 
and sparsely attended (Swain, 2006). 
The Act made several new provisions in order to strike a balance 
between the economic and social objectives of the sector. Under the Act, any 
generating company can set up a power station without obtaining clearance 
from the CEA. Only hydroelectric stations are required to obtain CEA clearance. 
It permits the setting up of captive generating plants and dedicated transmission 
lines. It further gives the generator the right of ‘open access’ to the destination 
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of its user. It creates the possibility of large industrial consumers switching over 
to captive generators located anywhere in the country, which would lead the 
distribution utilities into accelerated bankruptcy. In cases where an industrial 
consumer opts to purchase power from any generator through ‘open access’, 
he is required to pay a ‘subsidy surcharge’. However, in the case of captive 
generators, there is no provision to pay a subsidy surcharge. In other words, 
the captive generators are given the freedom to use the state utility 
transmission system to deprive the state utility of its high-revenue consumers 
as the Act makes it obligatory to provide ‘non-discriminatory open access’. 
The Act provides the legal framework for unbundling of SEBs and 
privatisation of resulting units. In that case, the SEBs will be deemed a state 
transmission utility and a licensee. Clearly, Section 44 has been added as a result 
of experiences from the Orissa cyclone and removes the onus to restore the 
power supply from the distribution licence holder. Under this section, once the 
power supply is disrupted due to a cyclone, flood, storm, etc., the licensee is 
given the freedom not to restore the power supply. This section is drafted to 
protect the licensee while totally ignoring the consumers whose power supply is 
disrupted. The Act provides for the formation of an appellate Tribunal 
composed of a chairman and three members. The Act allows for multiple 
licensing in distribution and mandatory metering of electricity supplies. Another 
important provision of the Act concerns adoption of multi-year tariff principles. 
The Act permits standalone systems for generation and distribution in rural and 
remote areas. It also makes provision for decentralised management of 
distribution through Panchayats, users associations, cooperatives or franchises 
in rural areas (GoI, 2003c). 
Critics of the Act argue that its focus on private participation and open 
access in the sector creates a condition in which electricity is dealt with as a 
commodity rather than as a social good that the state is obliged to provide to its 
citizens. Many argue that the Act will ultimately create a situation like that 
which existed in the pre-independence period and that it undermines the 
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objectives set by the Constituent Assembly of India and the objective for which 
the SEBs were created. While the Act has been welcomed by the business 
community, it has been opposed by some intellectuals and civil society 
organisations for its bias towards industrial consumers. By removing clearances, 
it makes it easier for the business class to set up generation businesses in India. 
Those states that have higher numbers of industrial consumers are pressing 
forward with the introduction of the core provisions of competition, while the 
others are moving more slowly in this direction. 
The 2003 Act reflects, to a certain extent, professionalism in decision 
making. The Act was initially drafted by a group of professionals and included a 
number of provisions to make the sector commercially active and to address the 
sector’s failings. The Act mainly focused on introducing competition in the 
sector and providing a choice to those consumers who are able to pay 
regularly. As open competition is not possible in the Indian electricity sector, 
the ‘open access’ provision will facilitate only industrial consumers, not 
residential consumers. Although the Act was drafted by professionals in the 
sector, it has been manipulated, and the final version adopted by the 
government is the result of the ample opportunity given to policy makers to 
make additions and deletions to the original draft. Some of the professionally 
formulated strict provisions in the Bill were removed to make the Act politically 
acceptable to state governments. The strict rules on introducing competition in 
the sector have been moderated. For example, an important issue, the 
timetable for implementation of open access, has been deleted so as to 
provide states with the choice of implementing it promptly or slowly. 
Furthermore, in comparison to the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, the 
new Act makes the regulators weaker by putting many of the controls over the 
regulators in the hands of government. 
Implementation of the Act has been very slow in Indian states. As the Act 
provided a specific timetable for unbundling, almost all states have unbundled 
their electricity sectors and created a transmission corporation. However, 
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critical provisions like ‘open access’ have scarcely been implemented. Recently, 
a number of states have started debating the issue of open access, but, as 
happened at the time of the creation of the SEBs, it may take years to 
implement these provisions and introduce competition in the sector. The 
provision regarding multi-year tariffs is yet to be implemented at state level, 
although a few states have begun the process. Another provision of the Act is 
the establishment of systems for distributed decentralised generation and 
decentralised generation. The central government is undertaking initiatives to 
implement these provisions at state level, and many states have started 
working to this end. Taking into account the failure to promote rural 
electrification during the reforms period, the new Act emphasised rural 
electrification. To make the rural electrification programmes commercially 
viable, the Act has made the above provisions. 
The Act no doubt represents a concerted effort to address the core 
issues of the distribution sector and its management, subsidies and metering 
problems. It also makes efforts to address broader public concerns such as rural 
electrification and consumer protection. The Act if properly implemented is 
expected to bring about revolutionary changes in the Indian power sector. It is 
also expected that the Act will provide the much-needed environment for 
ensuring huge investments in the sector. Large consumers might benefit in the 
new era, but low-tension consumers will lose in the short term as the Act 
prioritises the phasing out of cross-subsidies. The practical implications of the 
Act are yet to emerge, but the Act’s core provisions, such as open access, 
phasing out of cross-subsidies and the fiscal burden on states, have introduced 
political tensions. 
Though neo-liberal reforms in electricity supply industry have been really 
sluggish or abandoned throughout India, Orissa and Delhi have successfully 
implemented all the phases of electricity restructuring and privatisation. 
Why Orissa and Delhi were able to implement restructuring policies, 
while other could not? It is often cited that electricity restructuring in India is 
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driven by the World Bank through its lending policies. It is partly true; the 
World Bank certainly provided an impetus through its global restructuring 
programme. But the level of restructuring across states varied according to 
the local political and economic context. A major driving factor was the size of 
agricultural consumers. States with higher agricultural consumers could not 
proceed much on restructuring, which would have meant immediate revise 
(raising) of tariffs.21 However, both Orissa and Delhi do not have much 
agricultural demand and are free from such political anomalies. Absence 
farmers lobby opposing privatisation of electricity utilities helped both the 
states. At the same time, then political leadership and government in both the 
states were somewhat favourable to neoliberal policies and open to 
experiments in public service delivery. It is also perceived that Orissa was 
compelled to be the first taker of restructuring policy as it was in desperate 
need for financial support for electricity sector. It can be traced to the fact 
that a World Bank funded hydro project in the state was stalled in the early 
1990s owing to rehabilitation issues. It is claimed that the bank in conjunction 
with the state government converted the loan into a reform-linked one to 
meet the financial needs for completing the project (Mahalingam, 2002).  
However, the privatisation did not produce much result; the new private 
owners of utilities were struggling to recover their cost.22 Private utilities were in 
desperate search for innovative management tools to improve revenue 
generation. At that point of time, a local team of management consultants came 
                                                          
21 Agricultural electricity pricing has been a major deciding factor of elections in 
agriculture dependent states like Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab, 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (Swain, 2006) ). Farmers constitute such a strong vote bank 
that elections are won or lost in these states on basis of electricity pricing for 
agricultural consumers. 
22 Financial strains were so high that AES Corporation, USA-based multinational power 
company, abandoned ownership of central electric utility in Orissa without any prior 
notice. 
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up with the micro-privatisation concept, which was adopted by one of utilities 
on an experiment basis. Here again strong leadership of the utility- led by Mr R V 
Sahi- was the key driving factor. After a year of successful experimentation in 
across 100 villages, the model was backed by DFID and extended to other 
utilities in the state.  
The micro-privatisation model sought to further decentralise electricity 
supply by introducing micro-entrepreneurs as local electricity supply franchisee 
and making them accountable to village electricity committees. When Mr Sahi 
left the utility, the model was abandoned abruptly, even though it seemed to 
have produced positive outcomes. However, when appointed as federal 
Secretary of Power, Mr Sahi attempted to introduce the model at national level 
through the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (discussed later in the 
chapter). 
3.4 Rural Electrification Programmes: Biased Design, Slow Implementation, 
Poor Outcome 
Immediately after independence, India chose to go for a nationalised electricity 
sector with shared responsibilities between the national government and sub-
national governments. The purpose was to avoid regional disparity in 
electrification and meet the energy demand for industrial development. 
However, the nationalised electricity sector has failed to meet these objectives, 
even after six decades. A mixed presence of public and private agencies could 
perhaps have produced better result. While the private agencies would have 
electrified the economically profitable consumers in towns and cities and the 
industrial consumers, the public agencies could have focused on extending the 
supply to economically less attractive rural consumers. Putting the electrification 
of a virtually unelectrified country of India’s size under government 
responsibility has partly delayed the process of electrification.23 Yet, the 
                                                          
23 Countries like England (source of inspiration for India) nationalised their electricity 
sector only when most of the country (more than 90 per cent) was electrified. 
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national government has made several efforts to electrify the country. In this 
section, I discuss various schemes implemented and approaches followed during 
different phases of development. Rural electrification comprises different 
aspects including electrification for irrigation and commercial activities in rural 
areas. However, the study is focused on electrification of villages and rural 
households for domestic use. 
During the first phase, rural electrification did not receive due 
importance in India. It was considered a by-product of conventional electrical 
development; villages were expected to be connected in the process of 
connecting urban areas, which undermined the social objective set by the 1948 
Act. Whatever little emphasis was placed on rural electrification, it was on 
supplying electricity for irrigation as opposed to household electrification.24 The 
objective was to supply electricity for productive use, while more 
developmental and social benefits could have been accrued by emphasising 
village and household electrification. Thus, villages and households were 
electrified only when it was easy and inexpensive to do so. 
During the second phase, with the establishment of the REC, the 
situation changed. More funds were made available to electrify rural areas 
                                                          
24 The bias towards irrigation centric rural electrification was protected by and 
reflected in the definition of rural electrification – ‘A village should be classified as 
electrified if electricity is being used within its revenue area for any purpose 
whatsoever.’ In 1997, the definition was modified to emphasise the use of electricity in 
village habitations – ‘A village will be deemed to be electrified if the electricity is used 
in the inhabited locality, within the revenue boundary of the village, for any purpose 
whatsoever.’ In 2004, the definition became more encompassing and specific – ‘A 
village would be declared electrified if: (i) Basic infrastructure such as distribution 
transfer and distribution lines are provided in the inhabited locality as well as the dalit 
basti/hamlet where it exists; (ii) Electricity is provided to public places like schools, 
panchayat offices, health centres, dispensaries, community centres etc.; and (iii) The 
number of households electrified should be at least 10 % of the total number of 
households in the village’ (MoP, 2005). 
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resulting in massive electrification. The Minimum Needs Programme (MNP) was 
launched during the fifth five-year plan in 1974, which provided 100 per cent 
loans for last mile connectivity. It targeted states with less than 65 per cent rural 
electrification and drew resources from the central plan assistance. The scheme 
continued for a long period, but discontinued in 2004-05 due to lack of response 
from the states towards end. However, the electrification that took place during 
the period was unplanned and politically induced (refer to the second phase 
of policy shifts, which promoted populism in electricity delivery). To obtain 
REC loans as well as loans under the MNP, the SEBs, under the guidance of 
state governments, connected as many villages as they could, with increases in 
the figures for village electrification being taken as a sign of achievement. As 
mentioned earlier, if any criterion was followed, it was political (my constituency 
first!), and the villages were connected regardless of the level of demand at the 
point of delivery.25 Although there was massive electrification during this 
period, the focus was on the village, not the household. Towards the end of the 
phase in 1988-89, the Kutir Jyoti Yojana (Lighting Hut Scheme) was launched to 
provide single point light connections to all Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
households. The scheme provided 100 per cent grants for internal wiring and 
service connection. To date, 5.8 million households have benefited from it, at a 
cost of Rs 4.5 billion. 
During the third phase, there was a shift in focus towards the economic 
objective. The 1990s marked a decade of inattention to rural electrification. 
Within the process of reforms aimed at improving economy and efficiency, rural 
electrification was probably considered a non-economic and efficiency-
hampering business. Furthermore, based on the old definition of rural 
electrification, the number of villages already adjudged to have been electrified 
                                                          
25 Electricity as a monetised good will be demanded when people perceive monetary 
benefit from its use. However, there was no such awareness among the people, and 
providers did nothing to inform the people about the economic/monetary benefits of 
electricity use. 
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was high. This provided little incentive for further electrification; as a result, 
only 40,000 villages were electrified in the 1990s as against 220,000 in the 
1980s. 
The next phase has seen a gradual rise in emphasis on rural 
electrification culminating in a national target for universal electrification by 
2012. During the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), several schemes were 
launched to accelerate rural electrification with the objective of achieving 
universal electrification. Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (Prime Minister 
Village Upliftment Scheme) was a scheme for rural development, implemented 
by the Planning Commission. Though the scheme was launched in 2000-2001, 
rural electrification was integrated with the scheme in the year 2001-02. The 
scheme provided financial assistance (in the form of additional central 
allocation) for six basic services, including electricity, to states on a 90 per cent 
loan and 10 per cent grant basis, and states were granted the discretion to 
reallocate the funds among the basic services. Some states have taken up 
the opportunity to accelerate rural electrification. However, the scheme was 
discontinued in 2005 due to implementation problems, particularly non-
utilisation of funds. In 2002, the Accelerated Rural Electrification Programme 
was introduced which provided an interest subsidy of four per cent to states for 
rural electrification. The scheme was open to the states and electricity utilities 
on loans availed from approved financial institutions. In 2004, the scheme was 
merged with the Kutir Jyoti Yojana to introduce a new scheme called 
Accelerated Electrification of One Lakh [100,000] Villages and One Crore [10 
million] Households programme. The new programme provided funds on a 40 
per cent grant and 60 per cent soft loan basis for rural electrification-related 
projects. 
In 2002, Rural Electricity Supply Technology (REST) Mission was 
launched with the objective to accelerate electrification of all villages and 
households progressively by 2012 through local renewable energy sources 
and decentralised technologies, along with conventional grid connection. The 
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mission aims to identify and adopt technological solutions, review the current 
legal and institutional framework and make changes when necessary, promote, 
fund, finance and facilitate alternative approaches in rural electrification, and 
coordinate with various ministries, apex institutions and research organisations 
to facilitate meeting national objectives. The mission was meant to facilitate the 
implementation of existing programmes/schemes to accelerate rural 
electrification. The mission was responsible for overall planning and monitoring 
from conceptualisation to implementation of rural electrification schemes. 
However, the functioning and outcomes of the mission are very unclear. There is 
no evidence available on success or failure of the mission. 
There is a clear shift in approach to rural electrification in India. 
Beginning with development centric electrification in the first phase to populist 
electrification in the second phase, and negligence in the third phase, it has 
taken a new turn in the current phase where universal electrification is 
emphasised. Although the state has been providing massive public funding 
throughout, targets have rarely been met, probably owing to the approach 
itself. Moreover we can see a shift in central government assistance to state 
governments for rural electrification, which started on the basis of 100 per 
cent loan in initial years shifting to grants of up to 90 per cent in recent years. 
The shift towards a higher grant component has taken place largely because 
of the state governments’ reluctance to take up additional loans for rural 
electrification in recent years.26 The state governments have been aggressive in 
acquiring central assistance, but implementation is either stalled or partial just 
to convince the central government. Until the current phase, the focus of 
rural electrification (often called village electrification in policy documents) 
                                                          
26 The state governments have been providing subventions to the utilities to meet 
their revenue gap and sustain electricity supply. The amount of subvention has been 
growing with the growth of the electricity supply industry and contributing to the 
gross fiscal deficit of the states (Sankar, 2004). In that context any additional loan for 
rural electrification would be a burden on the states. 
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was on the village as a unit, not the household. At the same time, the 
implementing agencies have not tried to make the electrification programmes 
financially sustainable. As a result, the outcome is partial. 
3.5 Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana27: A New Paradigm for Rural 
Electrification 
In 2005, the Ministry of Power launched a new rural electrification scheme 
called the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY). The scheme 
that assimilates all the existing rural electrification schemes is a programme of 
‘rural electricity infrastructure and household electrification’ to provide 
electricity access to all the households by 2012. The scheme provides a subsidy 
for the establishment of a rural electricity distribution backbone, creation of a 
village electrification infrastructure, and promotes decentralised distributed 
generation where grid connectivity is either not feasible or not cost effective. 
The scheme retains the goals set by the constitution makers of India to bridge 
the urban-rural gap in electricity supply28 and provide reliable and quality 
power to rural areas. Building on the experience of previous schemes, 
RGGVY follows a new approach to rural electrification and seeks to address the 
problems experienced in rural electrification. 
Several provisions of the scheme make it different from its predecessors. 
First, the scheme sets a target of universal electrification and for the first time, it 
has a timeframe for achieving the target. RGGVY ambitiously aims to achieve all 
village electrification by 2010 and all household electrification by 2012. Second, 
unlike previous schemes, RGGVY emphasises on household electrification. It 
shows the realisation that achieving electrification of all villages is not enough to 
achieve universal access to electricity. Third, the scheme also emphasises 
                                                          
27 Rajiv Gandhi Rural Electrification Scheme. 
28 This goal was set in the former USSR during the 1920s and in the USA during the 
1930s and was achieved over the following couple of decades. Although the same goal 
was set in India immediately after independence, it is yet to be achieved. 
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financial sustainability in order to maintain the infrastructure being created and 
provide uninterrupted quality power. The scheme realises that “electricity 
supplied must be paid for” and that the willingness of rural people to pay a 
reasonable price had been underestimated. Fourth, the scheme has boosted the 
role of the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) beyond financing. Besides 
performing the usual role of financing the project, REC would be the nodal 
agency for the implementation of the programme. It would be responsible for 
complete oversight of the programme from conception to completion. Fifth, 
understanding the reluctance and inability of state governments to take on 
additional loans for electrification, RGGVY makes provision for 90 per cent 
capital subsidy from the central government. Remaining 10 per cent of the 
expenditure can be drawn from the state budgets or taken up as soft loans 
from designated financing agencies. Finally, for the sustainability and 
effectiveness of the programme, RGGVY promotes the decentralised 
management of local electricity supply through franchisees (MoP, 2005). 
Among these provisions of RGGVY, the decentralised management of 
local electricity supply is important for this study. The study’s findings 
demonstrate the potential benefits of the decentralised model of electricity 
supply as well as scope for improvement. Though the model of decentralised 
supply promoted under RGGVY is not identical to the Orissa model, it is 
informally drawn from Orissa experience.29 While RGGVY makes mandatory 
                                                          
29 Though it not formally acknowledged, there is a consensus that the franchisee 
model in RGGVY draws on the micro-privatisation model in Orissa. It is a story of 
informal influence or motivation. The Secretary of Power (the top most bureaucrat) in 
the Ministry of Power during the conceptualisation and launch of RGGVY had 
previously served as the Managing Director of BSES, the utility company providing 
electricity service in three quarters of Orissa. He headed BSES at the time when 
micro-privatisation was implemented and supported the model. In his capacity as the 
Secretary of Power and as a key designer of RGGVY, he has promoted the franchisee 
model as part of the scheme. So it is believed that the franchisee model in RGGVY 
builds on the micro-privatisation model in Orissa. 
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provisions for decentralised electricity supply, the debate over the issue had 
started with the Electricity Act, 2003. The Act recommended that “the Central 
Government shall also formulate a national policy, in consultation with the State 
Governments and the State Commissions, for rural electrification and for bulk 
purchase of power and management of local distribution in rural areas through 
Panchayat Institutions, users’ associations, co-operative societies, non-
governmental organisations or franchisees” (GoI, 2003b). Similarly, the National 
Electricity Policy has stated that the “[n]ecessary institutional framework would 
need to be put in place not only to ensure creation of rural electrification 
infrastructure but also to operate and maintain supply system for securing 
reliable power supply to consumers. Responsibility of operation & maintenance 
and cost recovery could be discharged by utilities through appropriate 
arrangements with Panchayats, local authorities, NGOs and other franchisees, 
etc” (GoI, 2005). In response, the Rural Electrification Policy was framed in 2006 
through extensive consultation with state governments, regulatory 
commissions, utilities and other non-state stakeholders. The policy aims at 
universal access to electricity, quality and reliable supply and “minimum lifeline 
consumption of 1 unit [KWh] per household per day as a merit good by year 
2012”. The policy aims to achieve the involvement of local communities by 
engaging the institutions of local government in the process. Panchyati Raj 
Institutions were assigned a ‘supervisory/advisory’ role in rural electrification 
and supply. The policy mandates that “deployment of franchisees for 
management of local distribution in rural areas is considered necessary in order 
to ensure revenue sustainability and improve services to the consumers...[these 
franchisees] could be non-governmental organisations (NGOs), users’ 
associations, cooperatives or individual entrepreneurs” (MoP, 2006). Under the 
policy, involvement of the users (or local community) is limited to advisory 
functions and is indirect as it is mediated through the institutions of Panchayati 
Raj: “Panchayati Raj institutions will have an important role of overseeing, in 
advisory capacity, the delivery of service by the franchisees according to their 
identified responsibilities” (MoP, 2006). 
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Although the provision for decentralised delivery has significant 
implications for rural electrification in India, the legal and policy documents lack 
clarity on the issue. During its initial years, the Rural Electrification Corporation, 
along with the Ministry of Power, initiated debates on the issue with help from 
several consultants. However, no standard model emerged out of the debate. 
Various models have been put forward, and it is up to the states which one 
they choose. In practice, private companies are getting the franchisee contract, 
while the panchayats are only encouraged to play their role in very few cases. So 
far, 587 projects have been sanctioned under RGGVY, covering 473,466 villages, 
41.52 million households, and 24.65 million BPL households, at a cost of Rs 
319.2 billion. Of these, 573 projects are currently being executed. 259,694 
villages, 15.46 million households, and 14 million BPL households have been 
electrified and Rs 235.64 billion has been disbursed. In per centage terms, 
during the last five years, 73.8 per cent of the sanctioned funds have been 
released, 75.7 per cent of the villages identified have been electrified, 47.9 per 
cent of the villages identified for intensive electrification, 37.2 per cent of 
households (including BPL households) and 57.1 per cent of the BPL 
households have been covered.30 Despite these achievements, the task of 
universal electrification within a limited timeframe of less than two years 
remains a gigantic undertaking. Though the scheme aimed for electrification of 
all villages by 2010, more than 10 per cent of villages were yet to be electrified 
at the end of 2010. The gap between the sanctioned cost and the funds 
disbursed could be interpreted as an indicator of the possible delay in the 
execution of projects. 
RGGVY has set a new paradigm for rural electrification by addressing 
many of the problems faced in the implementation of earlier schemes. The 
achievements during last five years are commendable, even though a lot is to be 
                                                          
30 Physical & Financial Progress of RGGVY Projects under Implementation, available 
at RGGVY Website, http://rggvy.gov.in/rggvy/rggvyportal/plgsheet_frame3.jsp, 
accessed on January 13, 2011. 
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done in the next two years suggesting there is likely to be a delay in achieving 
the target. While the decentralised supply approach to electrification implicitly 
draws from the current debates on participatory development and ’putting the 
people at centre of service delivery’, the approach is not participatory by design. 
While there is emphasis on decentralisation, there is no provision to ensure 
participation. It seems that the policy makers have assumed that 
decentralisation is enough in itself or that it will lead to participation. There is 
no doubt that decentralisation can be a means to ensure participation, but it 
does not necessarily lead to participation. Decentralisation, in the absence of 
participation, might reinforce the power relations that we want to alter through 
decentralisation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
During last six decades, the Indian electricity sector has moved from a mixed 
presence of state and market players in the pre-independence period to 
concentrated public control over the sector during the first four decades of 
independence, followed by an opening for market players in the 1990s, and 
finally, towards a policy that opened the field for literally everyone (at least in 
policy) to conduct business. The policy shifts in the Indian electricity sector over 
the period have reflected political and economic developments in India, 
dominant interests and prevailing development ideologies. During the initial 
phase, the dominant interest in India was that of industrialists, who supported 
public control of the sector31 and whose views were guided by the prevailing 
                                                          
31 The industrialist class, under the leadership of some of the top business families from 
Western India, was reasonably strong at the time of independence. It supported the 
government policy of running a large public sector providing capital goods, immediate 
products and infrastructural facilities for private industry, often at artificially low prices. 
In 1944, a group of industrialists produced ‘A Plan of Economic Development for India’, 
which is popularly known as the Bombay Plan. In this document, the industrialists 
argued that, ‘in the initial stages [of industrial development] attention should be 
directed to the creation of industries for production of power and capital goods’ 
(Thakurdas et al., 1944: 3). They believed that ‘development of our [Indian] industries, 
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ideology in developed countries of state-directed development. This resulted in 
the sector being placed under public control. In the second phase, India 
experienced the emergence of various new interests and their gradual growth. 
The new interests, particularly those of the peasantry, demanded subsidies and 
other social benefits from the state, demands that were responded to by the 
states, resulting in the emergence of a populist paradox. The third phase saw a 
radical policy change in the sector with the introduction of private players 
and was mostly guided by the presence of external players, particularly 
international development institutions. This phase reflected certain confusions 
in the policy-making process. The policies of reform were adopted wholesale 
from the developed world with little regard for the distinctiveness of the Indian 
context. The process was mostly guided by the World Bank and the IMF. This 
phase marked a return to the technocratic model of policy making while keeping 
intact the populist measures. The fourth phase of policy making has returned 
to the professional model, but the implementation of these policies has been 
halted owing to the nature of the policies and political conditions at the state 
level. While the policy choice level shows relative professionalism, the 
implementation level is kept at a crawl so as to ensure populism. 
Policy making in the Indian electricity sector has traditionally been overly 
influenced by the prevailing global ideologies of a given time and has very often 
been carried out perfunctorily and without much consideration of the Indian 
context. Although India has been adopting development policies from 
developed countries, it has rarely examined how the developed countries 
implemented these policies. For example, in 1947, the major sources of 
inspiration for independent India’s energy policy were the USSR, the USA and 
the UK, as evident in the Constituent Assembly debates. However, there was no 
                                                                                                                                                             
both large and small scale, as also of agriculture and transport will be determined to a 
large extent by the development of electricity’ (Thakurdas et al., 1944: 21).They 
classified electricity as the paramount item in the category of basic industries and 
wanted to put it in the public domain. 
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discussion of how and in what context these countries nationalised their 
electricity sector or how the public spending for electrification was utilised. This 
resulted in the failure of nationalisation in the Indian electricity sector, which 
was so successful in other countries. During each of the policy shifts outlined 
above, a set of new institutions were created to implement these policies, which 
has resulted in institutional layering and pluralism in the sector. Like other public 
institutions in India, these institutions seem to be designed in such a way 
that they foster perverse incentives. In the absence of clarity about their 
responsibilities, autonomy and the devolution of authority in order to maintain 
political control over them, the institutions have performed poorly, leading to 
chronic inefficiencies in the sector. 
From the discussion in this chapter, it is evident that the Indian 
electricity sector has developed several inefficiencies over the past six decades 
that impede its performance. First, technical and commercial loss in Indian 
electricity is as high as 35 per cent, while the loss for a standard efficient 
system is below 10 per cent. Second, the high level of theft is a unique feature 
of Indian electricity and is almost non-existent in efficient electricity delivery 
systems. Third, poor revenue realisation due to non- payment by users induced 
by theft and political protection and ineffective revenue collection mechanism 
has contributed to the financial crisis of the utilities. Fourth, lack of 
transparency, resulting in high levels of corruption, and lack of accountability 
has contributed to the poor quality of the service. Fifth, the Indian electricity 
sector has underestimated the potential of end-use efficiency, which has 
resulted in unethical use and overuse of the service. Lack of end-use efficiency 
coupled with the other problems discussed has contributed to a poor quality 
of supply which is evident in low voltage and frequent blackouts. Finally, all 
these problems together have seriously impeded access to the service for the 
poor, undermining the social objective set at the time of independence to 
bridge the gap between urban and rural areas and between rich and poor in 
terms of access to the service. The current paradigm for electrical development 
in India has taken a two pronged approach- one based on market competition 
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and the other based on the decentralised management of supply- to address 
these inefficiencies and improve electricity supply. This study analyses the 
potential benefits of this relatively new focus on the decentralised management 
of electricity supply based on the experiences of two cases of decentralised 
participatory electricity distribution in Eastern India.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Research Methodology and 
Selection of Cases 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Research is not just a process of gathering information, as it is sometimes 
suggested. Rather, it also involves evaluation of those information, answering 
unanswered questions and knowing the unknown. In many ways, it could be 
seen as a process of expanding boundaries of our ignorance. To be focused 
in the process, to get right answer for specific questions, we need a clear 
research methodology and specific cases/context to study. Research 
methodology is a highly intellectual human activity used in the investigation of 
society and deals specifically with the manner in which data is collected, 
analysed and interpreted, while context is central to the findings. 
The current chapter outlines the research methodology and case studies 
of the research project. It explains the focus of research by shaping research 
questions based on the theoretical frameworks used in the study (See 
Chapter 2 ), identifies specific cases to be studied to answer the questions, 
outlines various research methods used for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation and limitations of the study. The chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 4.2 outlines research questions and hypothesis addressed in the study, 
why they are relevant and the expected answers to these questions. Section 4.3 
discusses the research methodology and provides justification for the adopted 
methodology. The two cases selected for analysis are explained in the following 
section (4.4). Section 4 .5 elaborates various research methods adopted for 
data collection and reasons for adopting them. Finally, Section 4.6 details the 
limitations of the study. 
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4.2 Research Questions 
Following the debate over the importance and desirability of participatory 
approaches, several decentralised participatory institutional innovations have 
been made at the micro-level during the past decade to improve service delivery 
provision in India and globally. My research seeks to examine two such 
institutional innovations in Eastern India, one in Orissa and another in West 
Bengal, to discover the potential of decentralised users’ participation in 
electricity service delivery. For this purpose, I aim to analyse the relationship 
between decentralised users’ participation (process) and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery and the political efficacy of the participants 
(effects), and how the process and the effects are affected by the context under 
which the former takes place. 
The primary objective of decentralised participatory approaches has 
been efficiency enhancement. Does decentralisation and greater participation in 
electricity delivery contribute to efficient electricity provision? Does the level of 
participation affect the level of effectiveness? While contributing to the primary 
objective, participation in users’ associations is expected, drawing on 
participatory democracy, to produce some democratic outcomes – political 
efficacy and civic values. The study also seeks to find out if participation in these 
micro-institutions has such democratic effects. While participation as a process 
is expected to have efficiency, effectiveness, political efficacy and democratic 
values as effects, it is important to examine the context under which the process 
takes place and what impact this has on the process as well as the effects. 
Current research proposes following three working hypotheses, partly 
built on the existing theories of participatory development and participatory 
democracy and partly on the expectations from the case studies. Firstly, 
decentralisation and increased users’ participation in electricity delivery will 
contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the service. As stated earlier 
(and explained in the following chapter), electricity service provision in India is 
plagued with chronic inefficiencies, largely at the delivery end, and weak 
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accountability mechanisms. It is increasingly argued that these inefficiencies 
could be addressed and accountability between the providers and the users 
could be restored by involving the latter in the delivery process, by empowering 
them to plan, manage, monitor and own the local delivery mechanism. 
Secondly, participation in users’ associations will enhance the political efficacy of 
the participants and foster the civic values they hold. The rural population in 
India has little or no say in decision making, lacks any political activism beyond 
voting, and, consequently, they are taken for granted. This has resulted in a low 
level of political efficacy and civic consciousness. It is expected, based on the 
spillover thesis (Pateman, 1970), that by participating in group activities (within 
users’ associations more specifically) and sharing responsibilities, rural people 
will exhibit greater political efficacy and civic consciousness. Thirdly, the process 
of users’ participation and its effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery and the political efficacy and civic consciousness of the participants will 
be affected by the context under which participation takes place. How a political 
process works and what outcomes it produces depend to a large extent on the 
context in which it occurs (Goodin and Tilly, 2006). Thus, it is expected that 
users’ participation in the process of electricity service delivery and its effects 
will be affected by the context under which users participate. 
In this study, participation is interpreted as user involvement in the 
delivery process in any form. This could range from nominal membership of 
users’ associations to active participation in planning, management, monitoring 
and even ownership. The objective of the study is to find out if the level of 
participation affects the expected outcomes and to what extent it has been 
affected by the context. Decentralisation, in this study, means having a local 
service provider with all the responsibilities related to electricity delivery or 
sharing some of the responsibilities with the utility. The study aims to find 
out whether presence of a local service provider improves efficiency and 
effectiveness of electricity delivery. In the following sections, I discuss the 
various indicators that I have used to examine the outcomes of decentralisation 
and participation and how these indicators are identified and assessed. 
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By efficiency in electricity service delivery, I refer to efficiency on the part 
of the providers as well as the consumers. The study primarily investigates the 
improvements in operative and allocative efficiency, the developments that 
contribute to even distribution of the costs and benefits of the electricity 
service. The study assumes users’ participation has a positive and direct impact 
on operative and allocative efficiency, and it thus indirectly contributes to 
productive efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. To measure the 
improvements in operative and allocative efficiency in the sector, the study has 
identified five indicators, drawing on the existing inefficiencies in the electricity 
sector and the challenges of electricity delivery in rural India, as discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 Reduction in Theft (Part of commercial loss): Aggregate technical and 
commercial (At & C) loss in the Indian electricity sector is as high as 40 per cent, 
which is too high by any standard.32 Theft, which is rampant in rural areas due 
to lack of monitoring, comprises a major part of this loss. Establishing 
participatory micro-institutions and empowering them to monitor the delivery 
process is expected to check theft. Has the presence and functioning of users’ 
associations contributed to a reduction in unaccounted consumption of 
electricity in the region? It is expected that an indirect outcome of a reduction in 
theft will be an increase in legal connections. Have legal connections in the 
region increased after users’ involvement? 
 Improvement in End-use Efficiency: The absence of end-use efficiency is 
another, although less debated33, problem in the sector. Due to the absence of 
                                                          
32 The international standard for loss in efficient electricity sectors is below 10 per cent. 
33 End-use efficiency is a less debated issue within the debate on improving electricity 
service delivery. It is so because the emphasis has been on improving the supply side 
(generation) to improve delivery rather than improving demand-side management 
(See Chapter 3 for details). However, in past few years, there is a growing emphasis 
on end-use efficiency or demand-side management to achieve climate mitigation. 
But the new efforts for end-use efficiency (or ‘energy efficiency’, as it is called) are 
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proper metering and their lack of understanding, users often consume 
electricity in an inefficient and unethical way. Participatory micro-institutions 
are expected to educate the users on efficient use of electricity. This should 
result in a reduction in the quantity of electricity consumed and thus contribute 
positively to the electricity crisis. Has the load declined since the establishment 
of these institutions? It must be considered, however, that there may be a load 
increase owing to an increase in legal connections. 
 Improvement in Revenue Realisation: Rural areas have a poor revenue record 
due to the lack of cooperation from consumers and political protection from 
disconnection. At the same time, inflated and intermittent billing and collection, 
resulting in high accumulated arrear, has contributed to non-payment. 
Collaborative efforts by community members and regularised billing and 
collection are expected to motivate users to pay their bills on time. Has this 
contributed to improvements in revenue collection? 
 Reduction in Technical Loss: Distribution networks in rural areas lack proper 
maintenance due to their large geographical area and the lack of sufficient 
human resources. With the formation of users’ associations, it is expected that 
minor maintenance work will be undertaken by the local community with help 
from providers. This is expected to contribute to a reduction in technical loss. 
Has the users’ association taken up any maintenance work? Due to the lack of 
proper maintenance and heavy load (because of illegal consumption), the 
quality of electricity is poor in rural areas. Does the quality improve when other 
problems are addressed? 
 Improvement in Quality of Supply: Quality of supply is another indicator of 
efficiency in electricity supply industry. It has two components: continuity of 
supply and reasonable voltage level. Supply interruptions, affecting continuity, 
and voltage fluctuation is very common in rural electricity delivery. Rural 
                                                                                                                                                             
concentrated in the industrial sector; there is much to be done in the domestic sector 
to achieve end-use efficiency. 
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consumers are given low priority when it comes to quality of supply due to 
low revenue realisation in rural areas, weak political muscle of rural consumers 
and lack of sensitivity to their issues. When the above problems leading to 
inefficiency in electricity delivery are addressed, the quality of supply is expected 
to improve. While maintenance of distribution network and reduction of peak 
load is expected to reduce the chances of breakdowns, increased revenue 
realisation is expected to make the utility attentive towards users’ interest. On 
the other hand, the users’ associations are expected to provide a platform for 
the rural users to air their voice, unitedly and strongly and enter into bargains 
for better supply. Has the quality of supply improved in the study areas, which 
should be reflected in stable voltage and continuous supply? 
When these problems are addressed, it is expected that the productive 
efficiency of the sector will increase as service provision becomes economically 
viable, and access to the service will be extended to other areas. However, I do 
not deal with productive efficiency in this work. 
Though the literature on public service delivery is full of debates over 
effectiveness in service provision, there is less clarity on what effectiveness 
means. In case of electricity service, effectiveness has repeatedly been used 
simultaneously with and as a synonym of efficiency and from a quantitative 
perspective. Efficiency gain in service delivery does not necessarily mean 
effective service provision. While efficiency gain refers to improvements in 
capability to deliver, effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness with 
which service is delivered. A service provision is considered effective when 
service users are satisfied with the service and service has resulted in beneficial 
outcomes for the service users. To understand effectiveness of electricity 
service in general, we need to understand how it is used and what beneficial 
outcomes it produces for the electricity users. However, the study does not seek 
to assess effectiveness of electricity service. Rather it aims to analyse 
effectiveness of a particular model of electricity service delivery, based on 
decentralisation and users’ participation, in achieving the desired objectives and 
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allocative efficiency. In case of Indian electricity, the objective is not just 
efficient service delivery, but a socialist goal set by the constitution makers of 
India- providing universal access to electricity, as a right, at affordable rate, and 
at least, to the level essential for secure and adequate livelihoods as well as 
dignified life (Swain, 2006). Improved effectiveness will be reflected in increased 
transparency and reduced corruption, ease of access to service providers, 
improved quality of service, and equity of access and value for money. To 
understand how far decentralisation and users’ participation has contributed to 
effectiveness of electricity delivery system, the study has assessed the following 
four indictors of effective service delivery: 
 Improvement in Transparency and Reduction in Corruption: In the absence of 
transparency, corruption has emerged as a chronic problem in electricity 
provision challenging effectiveness of the service delivery. Corruption in 
electricity provision is rampant and practised at various levels through informal 
nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, utility staff and muscular user groups. 
At macro level, corruption has taken the form of patronage in human resource 
management, location of generation plant and distribution network, while at 
micro level it has often taken the form of bribe. Users’ participation is expected 
to reduce the level of corruption by improving transparency in the process of 
electricity delivery. Considering the micro nature of institutional innovation for 
decentralisation and users’ participation as well as limited coverage, the study 
analyses its contribution to improvements in transparency and reduction in 
corruption at micro level. 
 Improvement in Accountability: Holding the service provider accountable 
requires that there is transparency. But transparency is not enough to ensure 
effectiveness in service delivery; there is a need for accountability between the 
service provider and users, which has been missing in Indian electricity. The 
conventional model of electricity delivery, where the bureaucrats responsible 
for service delivery are supposed to be responsive to the users and 
accountable to the government, has failed to build a relationship between the 
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service providers and users in most developing countries, and more so in India. 
The method has not only failed to produce top-down accountability from the 
service provider to the users, it has also failed to bring about bottom-up 
accountability from users to the service provider. The solution to the problem 
is sought in bringing the provider closer to users (through decentralisation) and 
involving users in the delivery process (through users’ participation). Has 
decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery improved 
accountability between the service provider and the users? 
 Improvement in Quality of Service: Poor service quality is another problem 
that affects effectiveness in electricity service delivery. Service quality here 
indicates the quality of various interactions between the users and the service 
provider, which includes regularity and accuracy in meter reading, billing and bill 
collection, repairing faulty meters, and handling complaints. Poor service 
quality, in the form of inattention, extortion and humiliation, is often the 
single reason for low access to the service among the poor. Has the presence 
of a decentralised service provider addressed the problem of poor quality of 
service? Has the quality of interaction between the service provider and the user 
improved? 
 Improvement in Access to Service: While India has achieved 85 per cent 
village electrification, only 44 per cent of rural households have electricity. 
Most poor households do not have access to the service for two reasons. Firstly, 
in a centralised delivery system managed by bureaucrats, access to service 
requires the payment of bribes, which the poor cannot afford. This results in 
differentiated service delivery based on the willingness and capability to bribe 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Secondly, electricity is a monetised 
commodity, and the poor are often unable to meet the cost. The demand 
for electricity among the poor will increase if they perceive the monetary 
benefits of the service and if the cost can be reduced to meet their means. The 
latter will require some kind of state subvention. Although the state has 
been subsidising electricity costs for the poor, it is not properly targeted. The 
 91 
participatory model is expected to reduce the bribery that occurs in the process 
of getting a connection through ensuring transparency in the process and 
empowering the users’ to bargain on the size of bribe. On the other hand, 
participation in a users’ association is expected to make people aware of the 
monetary benefits of an electricity service. Finally, the users’ associations are 
expected to serve as an agency for identifying the beneficiaries of subsidies. To 
what extent are these developments taking place? Has it contributed to 
improving access to the service? It is assumed that further household 
electrification will include poor households, if not the poorest among them. 
The second aim of the study is to detect the macro-political implications 
of the model. By macro-political implications, I refer to the outcomes that 
enhance the political efficacy and civic values of the participants. Pateman 
(1970) defines political efficacy as “the confidence in one’s ability to 
participate responsibly and effectively, and to control one’s life and 
environment” (pp. 45-46). In its simplest form, political efficacy is the belief that 
citizens can affect the political system of which they are a member. In its earlier 
form, political efficacy was used as a predictor of political behaviour, but 
recently it has evolved into an indicator of democratic systems (Sullivana and 
Riedela, 2001). There are two types of political efficacy: firstly, internal 
political efficacy refers to the belief that citizens can understand and influence 
decision making; secondly, external political efficacy refers to the belief that 
decision makers will respond to the demands of citizens (Sullivana and Riedela, 
2001). Internal political efficacy is more a psychological feeling on the part of 
citizens, of having a voice and being empowered to make decisions, while 
external political efficacy requires substantial accountability from decision 
makers. The literature on democratic theory claims that participation in non-
political organisations has a positive effect on individuals’ level of political 
activism and activism in wider society (Pateman, 1970; Verba et al., 1995). 
This is known as the ‘spillover thesis’. Carole Pateman, the main proponent of 
the thesis, claims that there is a direct link between workplace participation, 
political efficacy, and political participation: participation in workplace decision 
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making will spill over into wider society and lead to increasing participation in 
political activities beyond the workplace. Pateman also claims that people “learn 
to participate by participating and that feelings of political efficacy are more 
likely to be developed in a participatory environment” (Pateman, 1970: 105). 
Building on the spillover thesis, the study seeks to discover whether 
users’ participation in electricity delivery contributes to the political efficacy and 
civic values of the participants and what is its implication for democratic 
practice. To identify the spillover effect of participation in service delivery, the 
study proposes five indicators that show improvements in political efficacy and 
civic values. In an ideal case of participation, the study assumes that these 
indicators will demonstrate the extent of the improvement in political 
efficacy and democratic values – a greater presence of these indicators will 
show greater improvements in political efficacy and civic values. 
 Enhancement of Human Dignity and Self-Respect: Human dignity and self-
respect, as sources of freedoms and rights, have an important role in 
democracy. Though they are inherent and inviolable rights of every individual, 
human dignity and self-respect are frequently violated and compromised in 
unequal societies like India, through norms of inferior and superior status. This is 
very much visible in the relationship between service users and service 
providers, where the latter gets an undue superior status than the former. 
Participation in users’ associations is expected to improve human dignity and 
self-respect of the electricity users. This development would be visible in rising 
consciousness on rights, demand for them and sense of equality in dealing with 
service providers. 
 Construction of Citizen Consumers: Participatory forums are expected to 
provide information to the participants and improve their awareness about 
developments. This will contribute to creating an informed citizenry and 
introducing transparency into service delivery. Rural households usually lack 
awareness about electrical developments and the costs and benefits of the 
service. The study seeks to discover if awareness has increased in the areas 
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where users have a participatory association. This would lead to construction of 
a new identity for the service users, i.e. citizen consumer, who is aware of his 
rights and obligations. 
 Promotion of Leadership, Group Solidarity and Collective Action: Due to their 
lower exposure to formal decision making, rural people are often reluctant to 
take leadership roles. This has resulted in a status quo in the power relations 
in rural areas; the same people hold power for a long time. The enhancement of 
political efficacy is expected to generate a willingness to take on leadership. It is 
expected to lead to representation for members in other forums, decision-
making bodies or local government institutions. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, 
9,500 women from self- help groups and their federations have been elected to 
various local government positions.34 Solidarity and mutual support is central to 
rural societies. With increased participation in users’ associations, this solidarity 
is expected to grow, contributing to democratic values. This growth in solidarity 
within the community/group is expected to extend to inter-community/group 
solidarity. Rural areas comprise several intersecting groups based on social, 
economic and political status. Do these groups have solidarity with each other? 
Do they support each other in their operations? Improvement in political 
efficacy will be reflected in the increasing ability of the community to propose 
and undertake actions for development. With all these developments, the 
community forum should grow to take up other related activities. For example, 
Sivani, a self-help group in Orissa, has popularised iodised salts in some tribal 
villages. Members of this group have persuaded hundreds of tribal women to 
include iodised salt in the daily diet of their families to fight iodine deficiency 
disorders.35 Have any such developmental activities, beyond the core activity, 
                                                          
34 India: Women’s Empowerment, World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/8Z3GHYVJU0 
accessed on March 23, 2009. 
35 Self-Help Groups Popularise Iodised Salt in Orissa Rural Homes, available at 
http://www.andhranews.net/India/2007/May/14-Self-help-group-1295.asp accessed 
on March 
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been taken up by the electricity users’ associations? 
 Declining Faith in Government: While participation strengthens and fosters 
democratic practices, it may also lead to negative assertions. One such negative 
assertion is declining trust in the government, often noticed in developed 
countries where the state has been withering (Nye, 1997). Among other facts, 
the key reasons for this assertion are the contradictions between assurances 
given and action taken by the government and emergence of non-state 
institutions to take up actions crucial to well-being of citizens. As people engage 
in deliberation, it is assumed, they will be become aware about the failure of the 
state in keeping up its assurances and efficiency of non-state institutions, which 
may lead to declining faith in government efficiency. Is there any such assertion 
visible among the electricity users? 
 Increasing Participation: One of the indicators of rising political efficacy and 
democratic values is increased participation not only within the electricity users’ 
associations but also beyond it, in other grassroots organisations. It will result in 
an organised voice for the rural poor. Have these developments taken place 
in the cases under study? Here, participation is not only limited to membership 
and presence in the meetings but also includes active involvement in debates, 
deliberations and questioning. Electricity users’ associations are expected to be 
more participatory in this sense because the users pay a direct cost in bills 
for service access, and thus, they have a direct stake in the process. But does it 
translate to higher participation in other local forums in their areas? Here, 
the focus is on participation in local government. The study aims to find out if 
participation rate is higher among electricity users in local government 
meetings? 
In recent years, it has been argued that the spillover thesis is overly 
simplistic, and there have been calls for its revision. The revisionists claim that 
participation may not always have a positive impact, and participation may only 
                                                                                                                                                             
23, 2009. 
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contribute to political efficacy in specific ‘contexts’ (Greenberg et al., 1996; 
Ayala, 2000; Carter, 2006). Similar arguments can be made about the impact of 
participatory approaches on efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. This 
brings us to the third aspect of the study: the importance of context as a 
variable in political analysis. Social and political processes are deeply 
embedded in the contexts that produce and are produced by them (Pettigrew, 
1997; Goodin and Tilly, 2006). Be it the impact on efficiency and effectiveness of 
service delivery or political efficacy, I assume that the context in which users 
participate matters. The study has identified five contextual factors that 
may affect the performance of the participatory groups. 
 The effects of participation are affected by the mode and intensity of 
participation – how and to what extent people participate in these forums. For 
example, direct participation is expected to have different effects to a 
representative form of participation. More intense participation, where people 
share responsibilities and powers or have full control, is expected to have 
greater empowering effects (Arnstein, 1969). Two other variables – the origin 
and size of the participatory groups – shape the effects of participation by 
influencing the level of participation (Carter, 2006). People may take part in 
participatory forums because they have volunteered to do so or because they 
have been invited, exhorted or coerced (Barnes et al., 2003). In each case, the 
level of participation will be different and is thus expected to have varying 
effects. The size of the group also influences the intensity of participation and 
thus the outcomes of participatory forums. While face- to-face interaction is 
possible in small forums, the larger forums usually depend on representative 
participation. The smaller the size of the group, the better the outcomes (Dahl 
and Tufte, 1973; Finsterbusch and III, 1989; Carter, 2006). 
 The objective of these participatory groups is also expected to influence their 
outcomes. What people seek to achieve through participating and what the 
promoting organisations seek are both important in shaping the outcomes. For 
example, the outcomes will be different in cases where people seek to uncover 
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their individual preferences compared to cases where people seek to deliberate 
and create a collective agreement. 
 In the case of the service delivery systems, ownership of the delivery mechanism 
is also an important factor in determining the outcome. Ownership of the 
delivery mechanism instils a sense of responsibility and empowerment among 
members, and full control over management and planning may lead to better 
outcomes. However, it requires some expertise, which could be provided by a 
guiding organisation or federation of the groups. 
 The institutional settings under which the participatory groups operate have a 
direct impact on the functioning of the latter. Prevailing institutions may bar 
or facilitate the development of democratic citizenship (Hadenuis, 2001) and 
other efficiency- related outcomes. Institutional settings that are prone to 
capture by elites and highly centralised and non-responsive structures may turn 
participation into a negative experience for members. 
 Finally, the wider social and political environment has great impact on the 
participatory experience. For example, Agarwal (2001) shows how women are 
excluded from community forestry in India because the social norms define 
domestic work and childcare as their responsibility, and social perceptions 
discount their abilities and opinions. In different case, the Indian states of Kerala 
and West Bengal, which have been governed by leftist political parties, have 
done better in setting up Panchayat Raj institutions and ensuring grassroots 
participation. The willingness of the governing political parties to promote 
participatory systems and the political ideologies they hold also matters. 
The first three of these contexts are inner contexts of the decentralised 
and participatory model of electricity delivery, while the last two are outer 
contexts. The cases studied in this research project vary across these five inner 
and outer contexts. I assume that the impacts or outcomes of decentralisation 
and users’ participation in electricity delivery are mediated through these 
contexts. The study seeks to find out if and how these contextual factors shape 
the participation process and its outcomes. 
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4.3 Research Methodology 
The research follows the interpretivist research paradigm. The core idea of 
interpretivism is that the world does not exist independently of our knowledge 
of it. Social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of 
them and these interpretations affect outcomes. So the interpretivists are 
concerned with ‘subjectivity’, ‘understandings’, ‘agency’ and the way people 
construct their social world. Though it brings in clarity in explanation, on the flip 
side, it introduces complexities that involve elements of uncertainty. There is 
even the possibility of contradictions and internal inconsistencies arising as part 
of the explanations produced by interpretivists (Denscombe, 2002: 21-22). 
Interpretivists’ explanation does not sit comfortably with the scientific 
research for universal laws or certainty about how things work. However, the 
interpretivists do not aim to present a metatheory, rather they aim to produce 
middle-range theories or grounded theories on how things work within specific 
context. As opposed to the positivists who tend to model their research on the 
natural sciences, the interpretivists believe that “there is a clear distinction to be 
made between the natural and the social world, and therefore we need a 
methodology and methods of gathering data that are more in tune with the 
subjects we are studying” (Grix, 2004: 82). This study aims to analyse the 
potential of a specific model of service delivery under specific contexts fits 
well within interpretivist paradigm. 
The interpretivist research paradigm is closely linked to qualitative 
research methodology. Generally qualitative researchers place their research 
within the interpretivist paradigm by using methods for data collection and 
analysis which are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which the data is 
produced. Such research involves interpretation of data, and analysis of cases in 
their social and cultural context over a period of time. It emphasises tracing the 
process and sequence of events in a specific setting (Holloway, 1997). The 
current study is an observation and interpretation of decentralised and 
participatory electricity delivery that analyses two cases from Eastern India over 
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a period of time by tracing the process and sequence of events related to 
electricity delivery within specific social context. 
Theory has an important role in research. Interpretivists believe that 
theory helps in understanding the social world by describing and interpreting 
how people conduct their daily lives. They see theory as deriving from data 
collection, but not as the driving force of research. Many interpretivists would 
not test a theory in the field, rather would build theory from the data (Grix, 
2004:108). The current research, however, uses theory to shape the research 
and working hypotheses. But it goes beyond testing the theory by expanding the 
theory based on the data. It aims to build a middle-range theory by integrating 
theory and empirical data. 
The objective of this study is to map the participatory process in 
electricity users’ associations, its effects, and how the process and its outcomes 
are influenced by the context under which the process takes place. For this 
purpose, I follow the approach of processual analysis that seeks to account for 
and explain the what, why and how of the links between context, processes 
and outcomes. Here, the process means “a sequence of individual and collective 
events, actions and activities unfolding over time in context” (Pettigrew, 1997: 
338) . In processual analysis, a process is often used in three ways: (i) as a 
logic used to explain a causal relationship in a variance theory; (ii) as a 
category of concepts that refer to the activities of individuals and organisations; 
and (iii) as a sequence of events that describes how things change over time 
(Ven, 1992: 169). Among these three approaches, the third explicitly and 
directly observes the process; thereby, it is able to describe and account for the 
changes happening over time and how they happen. Building on this approach, 
the thesis examines decentralised electricity delivery process as a sequence of 
individual and collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time within 
the electricity delivery system and their effects on electricity service delivery. 
Actions, both individual and collective, are key in processual analysis as 
they drive the processes. However, processes cannot be explained by just 
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referring to actions. Actions are embedded in contexts which limit their 
information, insight and influence. Both actions and contexts have a dual 
quality which needs to be recognised in the analysis. “Contexts are shaping and 
shaped. Actors are producers and products” (Pettigrew, 1997: 338). 
There are several methods of conducting social science research, 
including surveys, experiments, histories, analysis of archival information and 
case studies. Actual suitability of a research method derives from the nature of 
social phenomena to be explored (Morgan and SmIrcich, 1980). The choice of 
method for a given study is determined by three factors: (i) the type of 
research questions; (ii) the control an investigator has over actual events; and 
(iii) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena. Case 
studies are the preferred strategy for explanatory studies where the researcher 
has little control over events and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
(Yin, 1994: 1). Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence. It is focused on how and why things happen and differences between 
what was planned and what actually occurred. Case study approach has been 
criticised for lack of scientific rigour, reliability and generalisability. However, 
the strength of the approach lies in the fact that it enables the researchers to 
gain an holistic view of a particular phenomenon or series of events and can 
provide a round picture since many sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1994). 
This strategy fits the current research well as it aims for an in-depth 
examination of a contemporary phenomenon and focuses on understanding 
the dynamics present within a particular setting. 
The study primarily uses a qualitative approach for data collection and 
analysis. In social science research, qualitative research does not measure 
processes, in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency. It focuses on 
insights, discovery and interpretation rather than mere hypothesis testing 
(Noor, 2008: 1602). Qualitative research practice is sometimes criticised for 
being non-scientific and thus invalid. However, the alternative, i.e. quantitative 
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practices, has a probability factor inherent which affects the accuracy of 
findings. Moreover, all social aspects are not quantifiable. That requires 
observation and interpretation to draw conclusions. “Qualitative research 
properly seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and the 
individuals who inhabit these settings. Qualitative researchers, then, are most 
interested in how humans arrange themselves and their settings and how 
inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, 
rituals, social structures, social roles and so forth” (Berg, 2007: 8). 
As the model of decentralisation and users’ participation studied is being 
tested at the micro level, there is no statistical data available on the cases. At 
the same time, it is hard to quantify the implications for political efficacy by the 
indicators that I have identified. Although attendance in these forums is 
quantifiable, real participation and its effects need qualitative observation. For 
the analysis of the political implications (the contributions to the political 
efficacy) of the process I will use interpretative and qualitative methods. 
Wherever statistical data is available, I have performed quantitative analysis. 
However, much of the information collected through the fieldwork is qualitative 
in nature as it was obtained through personal interviews, focus group discussion 
and observation in the field. 
4.4 Selection of Cases 
This research follows a ‘multiple case holistic design’ approach for case 
selection. The study focuses on two cases of decentralised participatory 
electricity delivery in eastern India- Orissa and West Bengal- for in-depth 
analysis. In a multiple case study, the case should be selected so that it either 
“predicts similar results” or “produces contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons” (Yin 1994: 46). The cases selected in my research are expected to 
produce similar result, but in varying degree for predictable reasons (context). 
Pettigrew (1990) suggests those cases should be selected that represent 
extreme situations and critical incidents, polar types, and have a greater 
probability of obtaining access to the data. The cases focused in this research 
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represent a critical issue of innovation in electricity service delivery and 
represent different context. The case studies address a social and 
developmental problem, i.e. limited access to electricity service, through a new 
mode of governance. At the same time, it follows my personal research interest 
in electricity service and my past research on politics of electricity service 
delivery in India. These particular cases are selected partly because of the 
limited number of cases available for the phenomenon and partly because of 
accessibility to information. While the common factor in all the cases is 
decentralisation and users’ involvement, they have different contexts and 
different levels and forms of decentralisation and participation; and are thus 
expected to present varied level of outcomes. Discussion of the individual cases 
follows. 
4.4.1 Micro-Privatisation of Electricity Delivery in Orissa 
In 2001, as a follow up to the larger electricity restructuring process, Orissa 
introduced a model of micro-privatisation in electricity supply in some rural 
areas. Micro-privatisation was a strategy to bring in efficiency and 
effectiveness in the existing electricity supply system through 
decentralisation and users’ participation. The first step of the model is 
creation of Village Electricity Committees (VECs), which are essentially 
electricity users’ association. The next step planned in the blueprint of the 
model is putting in a local micro-entrepreneur (i.e. franchisee) between the 
utility and the users. Presence of the franchisee ensures decentralisation of 
service delivery, while the VECs ensure users’ participation in the delivery 
process. 
Under a project called ‘Orissa Rural community Electricity Supplies’, 
supported by DFID and implemented by Xavier Institute of Management, 
Bhubaneswar, three thousand VECs were created and trained across Orissa. 
In order to make the VECs sustainable, they were either directly integrated 
with the utility or were integrated through franchisees. With the initial success 
of the model, the utilities and the state government have promoted 
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establishment of VECs, resulting in thousands of VECs all over Orissa. Most of 
these VECs are functional now, though in a limited way than planned. 
However, few franchises were established under the project and some of them 
are still continuing to operate. 
VECs are democratic associations of electricity users, with a 
responsibility to make the service provider accountable, solve local issues 
through coordination among users and look after the interests of both 
consumers and the provider. The VECs have taken up functions such as 
curtailing electricity theft, promoting and recommending new connections, 
helping in meter reading and bill collection, and many other functions. In 
return for the reduced loss and improved revenue collection as a consequence 
of the above functions of the VECs, the providers are committed to improving 
the quality of the supply and service. The VECs also receive complaints 
from the users which they redirect to respective authorities. In the model, the 
VEC is a village level institution and all legal electricity users in the village are 
member of the VEC. The committee is usually headed by a small governing 
body that is selected by the members. The committee normally meets every 
month and additional meetings are held whenever required. However, there is 
no rigid format for its organisation and functioning. The VECs perform like 
deliberative forums in which the members together decide on new 
connections, disconnection of defaulters, planning extensions and the activities 
of the committee. In so doing, the VECs bring together the villagers at one 
forum, irrespective of their social status. 
The franchisee is a local entrepreneur, who is appointed by the utility to 
perform most of the functions of the utility. The functions of the franchisee 
largely involve interacting with the users, such as meter reading, billing, 
revenue collection, local maintenance, receiving complaints from users and 
addressing the complains when possible. The franchisee works as an agent of 
the utility and paid by the utility based on its economic performance. The 
purpose of having a franchisee (or local service provider) is to bring the service 
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provider closer to the users and get cooperation of users by using local human 
resource. The size of the franchisee varies from 30 to 100 villages. The 
franchisee studied in the research serves to 90 villages and has 28 regular 
staff. 
Micro-Privatisation was a strategy promoted by development 
consultants to protect the interests of users (better quality and a more reliable 
service) and providers (revenue collection and loss reduction) as well as to 
establish an accountability mechanism between them (Author interview with 
one of the designers of micro-privatisation model). On the other hand, it 
provides an opportunity for direct participation to rural people, who have 
traditionally been excluded from mainstream politics and development. Both 
the VECs and the franchisee work under large distribution companies, with the 
objective of enhancing efficiency in service delivery in rural areas. Their role is 
limited and defined by the distribution companies, and the latter decides what 
to do with the information provided by them. If they make any suggestions for 
electrical development, it is the distribution company who decides whether to 
consider it. The entire distribution network is owned by the distribution 
companies. 
The complete model of micro-privatisation has a three-tier 
institutional structure: first, at the top, there is the electricity utility with 
large geographical coverage (Orissa has only four utilities serving the whole 
state); second, there is a franchisee covering a number of villages (up to 
one hundred) who serves as an agent of the utility with some 
decentralisation of responsibilities; and third, there is a VEC at the village 
level. Although the utility remains the ultimate authority, some functions 
are decentralised to the franchisees and VECs. The VECs are primarily 
responsible for village -level planning, facilitating the service provider’s 
activities and generating users’ awareness and activism. The franchisee looks 
after the activities of the service provider in his coverage area; howe ver, 
he does not have much say in planning. Complete models of micro -
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privatisation exist in a few western districts of Orissa. In effect, there are 
two forms of decentralised participatory electricity distribution system: in 
the first case, all three insti tutions are present (complete micro-
privatisation), and in the second case, the utility and the VECs are present. I 
have covered three villages from both cases. In the analysis, I refer to the 
first case as ‘franchisee -served villages’ and the second case as ‘utility-
served villages’. All these villages are located in the Bargarh district in Orissa 
(See the map below). 
Map 4.1: Location of Fieldwork in Orissa 
 
It is important to understand the larger socio-political environment and 
institutional settings under which the delivery system works. The level of 
political engagement has been very low in Orissa compared to other Indian 
states. In places where class consciousness has permeated the political 
process in India, it is usually based on a consciousness of caste-class overlap. 
However, this is absent in Orissa because of the high degree of economic and 
cultural fragmentation within castes and is further undermined by the well-
established practice of fielding co-opted candidates from intermediate and 
low caste groups. The absence of a middle class in much of Orissa results in 
the absence of demand-based politics and also in the lack of a challenge to the 
dominance of a small number of upper caste (and class) elites in the political 
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system. Orissa missed the momentum of land reforms, the Green Revolution 
and Mandal, which acted as mobilising factors for many other Indian states. The 
benefits of the new post-liberalisation economy are concentrated among the 
elites as few outside the elites have the requisite level of educational and socio-
economic advancement. In comparison to other Indian states, Orissa’s political 
and class structure has been characterised as a relatively stable two-party 
system in which the upper castes and class dominate. Orissa has continued to be 
viewed as a state in which the politics of traditional dominance’ rather than 
accommodation reign with regard to the lower castes and classes. 
Formally, since independence, Orissa has been relatively active in 
creating a system of local government and decentralisation, starting with 
legislation creating Gram Panchayats in 1948. However, the results have been 
very poor in practice. Orissa, although the performance of these institutions 
has not as yet documented, would be on the lowest rung in terms of grassroots 
participation, mobilisation and functioning of Panchayati Raj institutions. Gram 
Sabhas (village committees), the lowest tier of local government and a forum for 
direct participation, have not been created in Orissa. Little importance has been 
attached to the development of an effective decentralised governance system in 
Orissa. In fact, in my view, it has been used as a tool for ‘traditional dominance’ 
and reinforces the existing power structure. In this context, the experience 
derived from participatory users’ associations could prove to be an opportunity 
to break through the existing power structure and promote grassroots 
mobilisation. However, on the other hand, it could reinforce existing pattern of 
dominance, turning participation into a negative experience. 
4.4.2 Rural Electric Cooperatives in the Sundarbans, West Bengal 
Due to its geographical terrain, the Sundarbans in West Bengal lacks access 
to the electric grid connection. Until the mid-1990s, very few people had access 
to electricity, which was generated via diesel generators. With the involvement 
of the West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA), the 
Sundarbans now has solar photovoltaic generating stations, which provide 
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electricity service to more than 41,000 households (half a million people) on the 
islands in the area. Under the model implemented by WBREDA, both the 
generating stations and the distribution of electricity are operated collectively 
by the local community. Local management committees oversee the day-to-day 
management of the mini grid and are responsible for accepting consumers, 
choosing the routes for distribution lines, setting the tariff in consultation with 
WBREDA, collection of payments from users and dealing with non- payment 
problems. The tariff, which includes the cost of services and funds for 
development, is set in discussion with local users. WBREDA supports the users’ 
associations, advising them on administrative and financial matters, and 
provides technical input. WBREDA and the local committees make efforts to 
educate people about efficient use of electricity. To date, investment has been 
made by the state through WBREDA and ownership is indirectly held by the 
users. Recently, however, the success of the model has attracted private 
players’ interest in investing in electricity generation from renewable sources.36 
The model of distributed generation and rural electrification in the Sundarbans 
has a three-tier institutional structure: beneficiary committees, cooperatives and 
WBREDA. Each solar plant, serving one or two villages, has a beneficiary 
committee that performs similar functions to the VECs in Orissa. The beneficiary 
committee’s membership comprises all users and the local representatives of 
local government. All such beneficiary committees, coming under one 
administrative block, form a rural electricity cooperative. The cooperative is the 
owner of all the solar plants within the same administrative block and is 
responsible for the overall management of the plants and delivery of the 
electricity service. Finally, WBREDA serves as a guiding body for all the 
cooperatives and provides technical support to them. There are three such 
cooperatives operating in the Sundarbans area. In my research, I have examined 
                                                          
36 Moreover, the government, in collaboration with private players, is aggressively 
planning for and investing in renewable energy generation, particularly solar energy, to 
achieve the objective of rural electrification and climate mitigation. 
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the functioning of Sagar Dweep Rural Electricity Cooperative and have focused 
on three beneficiary committees within the cooperative. 
Map 4.2: Location of Fieldwork in West Bengal 
 
Distributed generation and rural electrification in the Sundarbans is 
significantly different from the micro-privatisation in Orissa. It is a stand-alone 
system of electricity delivery separated from the state grid, small in size and 
owned by the users. In the Sundarbans, local government is involved in the rural 
electricity cooperative; all the elected representatives are members of the 
cooperative by design. However, local government is not involved in micro-
privatisation in Orissa. In the case of the Sundarbans, local people were involved 
in building a system for electricity delivery and in managing it, whereas in 
Orissa, people were involved in improving the efficiency of an existing system. 
The presence of a guiding body (WBREDA) that provides sustained technical 
support is an advantage of this model. It is expected that these factors will 
contribute to a higher level of users’ participation and better outcomes for the 
model. 
Political culture in West Bengal is also significantly different from Orissa. 
West Bengal is one of the oldest states in India, with greater political 
engagement, and where the politics of accommodation for lower class groups 
has tended to work more effectively. Political representation of the lower castes 
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and classes has been higher compared to other states, as class affiliations have 
been effectively exerted within the context of Communist party allegiance. It 
has led to political mobilisation of a wide alliance of the poor and intermediate 
castes (Echeverri-Gent, 1992). The origin of grassroots democracy in West 
Bengal lies in late nineteenth century colonial India, when the British-Indian 
government introduced village self-government through several pieces of 
legislation, for example, the 1882 Ripon Resolutions, the 1885 Bengal Local 
Self-Government Act, and the 1919 Bengal Village Self-Government Act 
(Bhattacharyya, 2007). Thus, the state has a rich experience of decentralised 
governance and grassroots participation. The local government system was 
reorganised in 1978 to advance participatory rural development in the state. 
Since then, the Communist Party-run government’s commitment to 
decentralised development accompanied by substantial devolution has resulted 
in strong grassroots mobilisation in the state. The state has been successful 
in creating all institutions of local government, including the Gram Sabhas, and 
has ensured their effective operation. Most of the rural development projects 
are characterised by substantial devolution and have been implemented by the 
Panchayati Raj institutions. This has resulted in a relatively high level of political 
awareness and activism in rural West Bengal (Bardhan, Unpublished). The 
political environment in the state is expected to facilitate users’ participation in 
electricity delivery and produce better outcomes. The differences between 
the political culture and institutional settings in West Bengal and Orissa are 
expected to be reflected in the outcomes of users’ participation in electricity 
delivery. 
Both the case studies taken up for this study are atypical cases that 
represent innovation in electricity supply system. Though users’ participation 
and decentralised governance of public service delivery was strongly 
advocated by international development organisation, particularly in late 
1990s and early 2000s, the idea did not find many takers within the electricity 
sector. Yet again, Orissa was the first state to adopt the model. Inability of 
newly privatised utilities (deprived of any form of state subvention) to recover 
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the cost of supply and even maintain the supply system in the rural areas 
required devolution and governance innovations. On the other hand, 
Sundarbans being a geographically disconnected area was not easily 
connectible to the electric grid. It was perceived to be suitable for community 
managed off-grid electrification system. After initial success of both the cases, 
few other states pursued the model for rural electricity supply.  
However, these other cases had limited experience, partial 
decentralisation and limited consumer participation at the time of this field 
research. To better understand the political, economic and social dimensions, I 
chose to take cases with maximum experience. Moreover, prior experience of 
conducting research in both the states was a motivating factor. While Orissa 
had three functioning electric franchisees, the particular franchisee was 
chosen because it was most accessible and agreed to cooperate.37 Utility 
served area was deliberately chosen close to the franchisee area so that the 
fieldwork can be completed in the limited available time. It also helped to 
makes a good analysis of how presence of a decentralised franchisee affects 
service quality in same utility served area with similar political, economic and 
social context. In Sundarbans, Sagar Dweep Electric Cooperative was chosen 
because it is the only existing cooperative. However, the particular villages 
were selected randomly, with only consideration of accessibility (in terms of 
transportation and accommodation). 
Though both the models have been abandoned (not pursued further) 
over time, especially after this study was initiated, the study aims to 
demonstrate what could be achieved through these models. Here, the goal is 
not to claim what is typical in decentralised electricity supply systems, rather I 
aim to show the outcomes of existing Indian models and make a case why they 
may be scaled up.  
                                                          
37 During initial telephonic conversation, the other two franchisees did not agree to 
cooperate for the study. 
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Table: 4.1 Decentralised and Participatory Electricity Service Delivery: A Three Layered 
Institutional Structure 
   Orissa I 
Franchisee Served 
Orissa II 
Utility Served 
West Bengal 
Cooperative 
Served 
 Central Agency  Utility 
(Western Electricity 
Supply Company of 
Orissa Ltd.) 
Utility 
(Western 
Electricity Supply 
Company of 
Orissa Ltd.) 
 
West Bengal 
Renewable Energy 
Development 
Agency 
 Decentralisation  Franchise/Micro-
Entrepreneur 
(Sri Sai Laxmi 
Enterprises Ltd.) 
 
--- 
Cooperative 
(Sagar Dweep 
Rural Electric 
Cooperative) 
 Participation  Village Electricity 
Committees 
(Lahanda, Jugipali, 
Hirlipali) 
Village Electricity 
Committees 
(Sahara Tikra, 
Lachida, 
Katabaga) 
Beneficiary 
Committees 
(Mrityunjay Nagar, 
Kamalpur, 
Koilapada) 
 
The two cases of decentralised and participatory electricity delivery 
taken up in the study represent a three-layered institutional structure. The 
bottom layer of the institutions, electricity users’ associations, is established to 
ensure users participation in service delivery. The middle layer of institutions 
represents decentralisation in service delivery and was established to bring 
the service provider closer to the service users. The study aims to find out how 
far creation of these two layers of institutions has improved electricity service 
delivery. The study also includes a case from Orissa, where the bottom layer of 
institutions has been established without the presence of the middle layer of 
institutions. It enriches the analysis by finding out effectiveness of users’ 
participation in service delivery without decentralisation of the service delivery 
mechanism. The key difference between the cases from Orissa and West Bengal 
is the Orissa model is a grid-based model, while the West Bengal model is an 
off-grid model. The objective of introducing decentralisation and participation in 
the Orissa case was to improve efficiency and effectiveness in an existing 
system of electricity delivery, while in the West Bengal case the objective was 
to build an efficient and effective electricity delivery system outside the grid. 
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The primary aim of the study is to find out how far these objectives are met. 
4.5 Research Methods 
The study primarily uses qualitative research methods for data collection. As the 
model of decentralisation and users’ participation studied exist in rural areas, 
the interviewees would not answer straight forward questions due to lack of 
receptiveness. Studying rural societies or any process based in rural societies 
requires qualitative methods of data collection. Qualitative methods are more 
relevant when the study involves understanding and analysis of behavioural 
change, local activities and events. Qualitative methods were helpful in gaining 
confidence and receptiveness of the interviewees. This section provides an 
overview of the different methods used for data collection, justification and the 
order of their use. 
Empirical data was collected in four steps. The cases under study had not 
been previously researched, so there was no existing database of statistical 
information and geographical spread of decentralised participatory electricity 
delivery model. To select samples for observation, I had to collect basic 
information on the participatory model employed in the areas studied. The 
purpose of the first step was collection of such information, sample selection 
and preparation of a note on the origin and organisation of the model. My first 
point of contact was the people who were engaged in designing and 
implementing the model. I then conducted semi-structured interviews with 
guiding bodies, service providers in the region, and local officials. In this phase, I 
also analysed the available relevant government documents and annual reports 
to understand the history of the model in India. As these two models have been 
implemented at a very small scale, the number of people engaged in designing 
and implementing are very few. I have tried and successfully interviewed all of 
them during the fieldwork. 
In the second step, I focused on individual semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with participants (or users), committee heads, guiding bodies and 
service providers to examine how they perceive the benefits of the model and to 
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get individual viewpoints. I also visited the departments concerned to obtain 
statistical data on the efficiency indicators. The third step was intended for 
cross-verification of the collected information. It included further interviewing of 
the same people and focus group meetings. As expected, many people did not 
open up in individual meetings, as they had never been interviewed before or 
asked questions on the electricity service. The focus group meetings provided a 
platform for these people to share their experiences and allowed me to observe 
the developments in their group capacity. The fourth step involved in-meeting 
observations and personal contacts with local people, which was done from the 
beginning of field work, to record the skills of participants, working of the 
committees and changes in individual capacity. I also visited almost every 
household using the electricity service in the company of service providers in 
order to observe the interaction between service providers and users. I spent 
seven months in the field: five months in Orissa and two months in West 
Bengal. Over the period, I have consulted 283 electricity users and 29 staffs of 
electricity provider in Orissa, 127 electricity users and 11 staffs of service 
provider in the Sundarbans, and four persons engaged in design of the 
decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery. 
Here my objective was to cover all the users within the selected villages. 
However, I was able to cover about half of the users, as others were not 
available and few users I have met did not have anything to say. However, socio-
economic background was not considered for selecting interviewees for two 
reasons. First, electricity users’ associations are male arenas- do not have any 
female member. So, gender was not a consideration. Second, villages in 
eastern India are usually inhabited by same (or close caste) members; there 
was no strong caste differentiation within the villages. Village-wise breakdown 
of interviewees is presented in the table 2.2. I have interviewed all the 
electricity staffs directly responsible for these villages. For better accessibility 
and observation, I have stayed within some of the study villages for the entire 
duration of fieldwork. In Orissa, I have stayed in Lahanda and Katabaga, and in 
West Bengal I have stayed in Koilapada. Apart from informal group discussions, I 
 113 
have organised two focus groups in each of the villages studied. I have also 
attended one meeting of each of the users’ associations. 
Table 4.2: Number of Interviewees (Village-Wise) 
Orissa I 
Franchisee Served 
Orissa II 
Utility Served 
West Bengal 
Cooperative Served 
Lahanda 62 Sahara Tikra 66 Kamalpur 50 
Jugipali 43 Lachida 34 Koilapada 39 
Hirlipali 47 Katabaga 31 Mrityunjay Nagar 38 
The most important tool for data collection in this study was in-depth 
interviews with all stakeholders. This type of interview is often unstructured or 
semi- structured and therefore permits the interviewer to encourage an 
informant to talk at length about the topic of interest. Even though it is one of 
the most common qualitative methods, the reason for choosing the method is 
specific. First, as suggested earlier, the rural people lack receptiveness; asking 
them structured question would not fetch much information. Secondly, the 
study aims to unfold the process (of electricity service delivery) the way users 
perceive it. The questions asked were meant to explain the reasons underlying 
the problem or practice. The method of data collection works well partly 
because the respondents often find it flattering to discuss their ideas and 
experiences. However, a list of important issues was prepared to discuss with 
the interviewees (See Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Important Issues Discussed with the Interviewees 
Service Users Service Providers 
o Electricity Theft 
o Prevalence of theft 
o Social Opposition to 
theft 
o Utility action 
o End-use Efficiency 
o Use of CFL 
o Demand–side 
management 
o Revenue Realisation 
o Metering 
o Billing 
o Collection frequency and 
procedure 
o Technical Loss 
o Maintenance of lines and 
transformer 
o Electricity Theft 
o Prevalence of theft 
o Social Opposition to theft 
o Disciplinary action 
o End-use Efficiency 
o Use of CFL 
o Demand–side management 
o Revenue Realisation 
o Metering 
o Billing 
o Collection frequency and 
procedure 
o Improvement in revenue 
o Technical Loss 
o Maintenance of lines and 
transformer 
o Quality of Supply 
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o Quality of Supply 
o Load shedding 
o Breakdown 
o Voltage fluctuation 
o Transparency & Corruption 
o Awareness of cost & 
benefits 
o Bribe and other 
associated costs 
o Accountability & Quality of 
Service 
o Accessibility of service 
provider 
o Complaint redressal 
o Response to problems 
o Access to Service 
o Getting new connection 
o Rise in new consumers 
o Load shedding 
o Breakdown 
o Voltage fluctuation 
o Transparency & Corruption 
o Information on cost & 
benefits 
o Communication with 
consumers 
o Bribe  
o Accountability & Quality of Service 
o Accessibility to consumers 
o Complaint redressal 
o Response to problems 
o Access to Service 
o Getting new connection 
o Demand for new 
connection 
Second important tool for data collection was participant observation. It 
is a widely used method in many social science disciplines, particularly when the 
study involves examination of a social problem or social process. The primary 
aim of using the method is to gain a close and intimate familiarity with the 
electricity users and their practices through an intensive involvement with them 
in their natural environment. The observation could be used in two ways- 
structured and unstructured. As my research project falls into the interpretivist 
paradigm, I chose to use unstructured observation. Unstructured observation is 
very useful in understanding and interpreting cultural and social behaviour. 
Observers using unstructured methods usually enter ‘the field’ with no 
predetermined notions as to the discrete behaviours that they might observe. 
In this study, I have used observation as a tool to understand operations 
of users groups and interaction between the users and service providers. To 
achieve the objective I have followed three steps. First, I have attended at least 
one meeting of each of the user groups, without any active participation, to 
understand how groups operate, what kind of things are discussed and how 
they reach at a decision. Second, I have travelled to each user household with 
the revenue collectors to see how people react to the bills, how they interact 
with the revenue collector and what kind of clarifications they seek. Finally, I 
have visited service provider offices on several occasions, during the period of 
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field work, to understand how they respond to consumer complaints. This has 
helped to me to gather first-hand information on operation of user groups and 
interaction between users and service providers. 
The third key method used for data collection was focus group 
discussion. Focus group discussion is a tool for asking a group of people about 
their perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes towards a product, service, 
concept or idea. In this study, the respondents were asked about their 
perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes towards electricity service delivery 
process. The questions were asked in an interactive group setting where 
participants were free to talk with and comment on the views of other group 
members. 
I have used focus groups to note community perception on electricity 
service provision and to understand if people share these views with their 
community members. For this study, I have conducted two focus group 
discussions in each of the villages studied. For that purpose, I would divide each 
village into two geographical blocks and call all the people interviewed from 
each block for a group discussion. In usual case, I had a turn up of around 50 per 
cent of invited people; Thus, I had focus groups of around 10-15 members. I 
encouraged them to discuss about their perceptions and beliefs around 
electricity service. I also sought reaction of group members on each of the 
opinion raised. This helped me to notice where the community members have 
agreement or disagreement. At the same time, I got answer to some questions, 
which were not answered in individual interviews. 
Along with these methods of data collection, documentary analysis is 
used as a source of data collection. Most of the documents used in this study 
were primary sources, which include several policy documents, records of the 
utility, franchisee or cooperative and users’ associations. The registers 
maintained by the users associations were most useful in identifying the 
involvement of users. 
In any research involving qualitative methods of data collection, 
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particularly observation, there are several concerns regarding access, informed 
consent or deception and field notes. Access was not problem in both the cases. 
Due to my past research experience in electricity service delivery, I have access 
to a network of people engaged in the sector, especially the people engaged in 
the policy making and management of electricity service. Being a native of 
Orissa, I have knowledge of the language, cultural and social context not only in 
Orissa but also in neighbouring West Bengal. This proved an asset in accessing 
respondents. Moreover, I made efforts to be part of their social life by living 
with them. This has helped to bring out an insider view. All the respondents 
were informed about the purpose of the study. All the information collected is 
used anonymously without using the name of individual respondents. 
A major challenge in data collection was taking field notes. After a few 
initial interviews, it was realised that rural people are not comfortable to 
speak when notes are taken in front of them, though they did not object to it 
directly. They did not speak openly, if I tried to write their response. To make 
them comfortable and speak openly, I therefore avoided taking notes while 
interviewing. Notes were instead written up after each interview. 
Though most of the respondents were happy and excited to discuss and 
answer questions regarding electricity service, there were a few who questioned 
the outcome and benefit of the research. As one of them put it, “what would be 
the benefit of this research for us? You will earn money and get PhD. But what 
do we get?” (Author interview). This raises a much larger question on the 
significance of social science research. How do social science researches 
benefit the society? Probably, the best answer would be that social research 
shapes or feeds into policy-making. In that case, there is a need for better links 
between social research and policy-making. 
4.6 Limitations of the Study 
Considering reliability of a research is important for evaluating its worth. The 
‘trustworthiness’ of any research depends on ‘what counts as knowledge’ 
(Lincon and Guba, 1985). My research aims to produce both applied knowledge 
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and process knowledge. Applied knowledge is context-specific, useful for 
solution of practical problems, while process knowledge is usually specified in 
terms of models. The study aims to find solutions for a practical problem of how 
best to provide electricity access in rural India by looking at a specific model of 
electricity service delivery, i.e. decentralised participatory electricity delivery. In 
the process of producing knowledge, like many qualitative studies, the current 
research has certain limitations. It is worth mentioning these caveats to 
facilitate evaluation of the research. The caveats of the research are first 
addressed by discussing the purpose of the research, then discussing the 
limitations of data and analysis, and the validity of the analysis. 
The purpose of the research is to analyse the potentials of decentralised 
participatory model of electricity delivery in the Indian rural context. The key 
question is whether decentralisation and users’ participation address the 
problems in conventional (centralised) model of electricity delivery. However, 
the study does not aim to produce universal laws or meta-theories. Rather, it 
aims to suggest middle-range theories on how decentralisation and users’ 
participation can affect or improve efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery within specific context. It does not suggest generalisation of the 
findings. “The trouble with generalizations is that they don’t apply to 
particulars” (Lincon and Guba, 1985: 110). So, the study aims to make 
recommendations, based on the findings, for improving the model of service 
delivery and scaling up the model across regions and sectors. 
This caution about making generalisations comes from the data source 
and analysis. The study to achieve its purpose focuses on data from two cases of 
decentralised participatory electricity delivery in Eastern India. The cases were 
selected primarily on the basis of ease of access. Though a few cases of 
decentralised participatory electricity delivery exist across India, the particular 
cases were selected for several reasons. First, these two cases are the oldest 
having existed for almost a decade. Secondly, the cases are located in Eastern 
India, where I grew up; so I have the knowledge of social context and language, 
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which is an asset for qualitative research. Thirdly, the two cases represent a 
good variation of on grid and off grid electricity delivery. 
Though the study has two case studies and makes a comparison between 
them, there is a greater focus on Orissa. Out of seven months spent in 
fieldwork, five months were spent in Orissa and two months in the Sundarbans 
in West Bengal. As fieldwork was conducted first in Orissa, it took longer, 
particularly to shape the methodology and questions based on initial findings. At 
the same time, Orissa took longer because of the focus on six VECs (three with a 
decentralised service provider and three directly served by the utility), while in 
the Sundarbans only three beneficiary committees were studied. As a 
consequence, I have more evidence from Orissa than Sundarbans. Moreover, 
because I have spent a substantial part of my life in Orissa, I have direct 
experience of conventional electricity delivery and social and cultural life in 
Orissa. I have at some points drawn on these experiences in the analysis. This 
has enabled me to make better comparison with the new model of service 
delivery and identify the benefits or improvements in the new model. As a 
result, Orissa is presented as my primary case with the Sundarbans providing 
an additional case. 
My ethnic identity of being a native of the region has been useful for 
accessibility. I was able to integrate with the local people easily and adopt their 
way of life. Knowledge of both the languages was another asset for me. I believe 
people were open to me while discussing about their experiences. A mix of 
various qualitative research tools and better accessibility to local people, I 
consider, I have come out with original insights from the field. 
In the analysis part I concentrate on presenting and emphasising the 
positive outcomes of decentralisation and users’ participation. The study does 
not aim to make a scientific assessment of the decentralised participatory 
model of electricity delivery. Rather it aims to identify the potentials of the 
model in Indian rural context, based on the experience in the two cases. So, the 
study tends to highlight the positive outcomes of decentralisation and users’ 
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participation in electricity delivery. However, it also identifies the explanation 
for such positive outcomes and the potential areas for improvement within the 
model of service delivery. 
The analytic cycle for this research has moved between conceptual 
framework, case study analysis, and being clear as to the purpose of the 
research. Although a clear purpose of the research is required preferably before 
constructing a methodology, such purposes are not always clear based on the 
complexity of the processes to be studied, uncertainty about data availability, 
and personal observation over time. Such an analytic cycle often raises concern 
about the validity of findings and analysis. The concern is more valid when the 
research involves observations as a method of data collection, which has the 
fear of highlighting particular incidents while ignoring others. Validity of findings 
and analysis is important in any research paradigm. However, the concept of 
validity cannot be used in the interpretivist paradigm the way it is used in the 
positivist paradigm. Reliability and validity are conceptualized as 
trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative research. The purpose of 
trustworthiness in qualitative research is to eliminate bias and increase the 
researcher’s truthfulness of a proposition about some social phenomenon 
(Denzin, 1978) through various validity procedures. To address these concerns, 
the current research has used multiple strategies. First, the research has used 
various data sources (interviews, focus group, observations, and documentary 
analysis) for triangulation to achieve an agreement on one data source with 
another. Triangulation is defined to be “a validity procedure where researchers 
search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to 
form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 126). Secondly, 
the research has relied on ‘disconfirming evidence’ procedure to avoid negative 
information. In some cases, repeated interview and focus group discussion has 
been used as a tool to check validity of preliminary findings. Third validity 
procedure used in the study is ‘researcher reflexivity’. I have self-disclosed my 
assumptions, beliefs and biases which I have acquired through my experience 
of living in the field during the fieldwork and prior to it. Finally, the study 
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provides rich and thick description of the cases (cf. Creswell and Miller, 2000). 
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Chapter 5 
Decentralisation and Users’ 
Participation 
In Pursuit of Efficient Electricity Provision in India 
 
5.1 Introduction 
With the failure of state run utilities and market-oriented reforms to deliver 
electricity to half of the population, the future of electricity service delivery- 
particularly to the poor- has become an issue of contention in India. The 
contention is so intense that, in recent years, we are experiencing a major shift 
in policy paradigm for electricity service delivery. Keeping with the global 
debate, the shift seeks to democratise governance of the delivery mechanism 
through decentralisation and users’ participation. The quest has been 
improving efficiency and effectiveness of electricity service delivery, so that 
the remaining half of the Indian population can get access to electricity service, 
at an affordable cost, and to the level required for ensuring secure and 
adequate livelihoods. The current and following chapter aims to assess the 
potentials of the new governance paradigm in achieving the objectives. How far 
the current paradigm, which relies on the users and their democratic 
capabilities, is capable of bringing in efficiency and effectiveness in electricity 
provision- something the state and the market failed to achieve. 
In this chapter, I question the normative claims around efficiency gain in 
democratised governance of service delivery drawing on experiences of 
participatory and decentralised electricity distribution in parts of Eastern India. 
The cases under study represent some level of decentralisation and users’ 
participation in electricity delivery with the objective of efficiency 
enhancement. In case of Orissa, decentralisation and participation was 
introduced to squeeze efficiency out of an incompetent electricity delivery 
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mechanism, while in Sundarbans (West Bengal) it was used to build an efficient 
delivery mechanism. By analysing the outcomes in both the cases, the chapter 
concludes that decentralisation and users’ participation have potential to 
improve operational efficiency in electricity delivery system. The emerging 
model of service delivery can efficiently address the problems in conventional 
service delivery mechanism, especially for electricity provision in rural areas. The 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 contextualises efficiency gain in 
electricity service delivery and identifies indicators of performance in Indian 
context. Following five sections (Section 5.3 – 5.7) analyse performance 
improvement under individual indicators. The conclusion provides a 
comparative review of the findings and specifies methods and approaches by 
which the model could be made more efficient and improve quality of electricity 
provision in rural India. 
5.2 Efficiency in Electricity Provision: What does it mean? 
The literature on public service delivery is full of ideas and innovation for 
efficiency gain. Efficiency enhancement in public service delivery, more 
specifically in electricity provision, is an objective that has been chased under 
various regimes with varied results. There is, however, lack of clarity on what is 
meant by efficiency in public service delivery and more particularly in electricity 
provision. The concept of efficiency has usually been used with a narrow 
meaning- the ability to undertake an activity at the minimum cost possible. 
Various stakeholders demonstrate different, alternative understanding of and 
solutions for a single problem; thus, there cannot be a single standard of 
efficiency. Shubik (1978: 121) points out four broad viewpoints, with 
considerable overlapping, from which efficiency is judged: i) State 
(Administrators, bureaucrats and politicians), ii) physical scientists, iii) social 
scientists, and iv) the public. From one viewpoint it may be efficient to carry on 
with what appear to be inefficient activity from another viewpoint. The desired 
efficiency in public service delivery aims to accommodate all the four 
viewpoints. At the same time, efficiency has different but complementary 
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dimensions, e.g. productive, operative and allocative. The debate on efficiency 
in service provision is more focused on operative and allocative dimension; 
however, achieving operative and allocative efficiency would require productive 
efficiency and contribute to it. What constitutes efficiency, to a great extent, is 
determined by the specific context and strategic objectives of the sector. To 
identify the indicators of efficiency in electricity supply in India, we need to 
consider the context and the strategic objectives, the sector seeks to achieve. 
Perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public electricity provision 
in India opened the doors for market reforms in 1990s that have been driven by 
“the vision of increasing competition and choice” as the solution (Dubash and 
Singh 2005: 5249). The advocates of competition see it as a tool for efficiency 
enhancement and price reduction along with quality improvement. They argue 
that competition ensures operative as well as allocative efficiency in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors. They very often refer to the classical 
economic argument that sees competition as a process of rivalry between 
players in the market who compete by changing prices in response to the 
market conditions, thereby eliminating excessive profits and unsatisfied 
demand. However, global experiences suggest that the benefits of restructuring 
and competition in electricity supply are unevenly distributed where the large 
consumers have gained, often at the cost of small consumers (Newbery and 
Pollitt 1997; Thomas 2002; Dubash and Singh 2005). 
Under the current state of Indian electricity, where half of the 
population do not have access to the service, the cost is unaffordable for many 
even though the price is subsidised, the loss is too high, and governance of the 
sector has hardly improved, it will not be easy and rational to introduce 
competition and provide choice to half of the population. At present, the 
challenge for India is not to design and establish a competitive electricity 
market, rather to have such an electricity market which is affordable and 
accessible to all, at the same time competitive and financially sustainable, 
distributes the costs and benefits evenly among the consumers and takes care 
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of the small consumers keeping with the social objective (Swain 2009). So the 
central objective for Indian electricity sector is to develop a governance 
structure that can address the prevailing problems and inefficiencies, improve 
the service provision for existing customers and extend the service to other half 
of the population. At the same time, with increasing concern over climate 
change, the electricity sector is under pressure to go clean. The National Action 
Plan on Climate Change has set eight national missions to tackle the challenges 
of climate change; the first two of these missions- national solar mission and 
national mission for enhanced energy efficiency- stress the need to make 
electricity provision cleaner and emission free through increased solar power 
generation and energy efficiency (GoI 2008). It sets another objective for Indian 
electricity sector- to bring in energy efficiency and improve demand side 
management. 
In this chapter, I aim to assess the potential of democratised governance 
and participatory micro-institutions in meeting these objectives. Can 
decentralisation and users’ participation address the existing problems in Indian 
electricity and improve service provision? Can it contribute to making electricity 
provision less emitting? Drawing on the present context of Indian electricity 
supply industry and its strategic objectives, there is a need for better 
performance in following areas to improve electricity service delivery in India: i) 
reduction in theft, ii) improvement in end-use efficiency, iii) improvement in 
revenue realisation, iv) loss reduction, and v) improvement in quality of supply 
(See Chapter 3 for detail discussion of historical context). Improvement in 
performance in these areas would improve operational efficiency of the service 
delivery system. By doing so, it will not only bring in improvements in electricity 
provision- better quality of supply and service expansion- but also will 
contribute to make electricity provision less emitting. The following sections 
assess improvements in these areas in the selected cases. The assessment of 
these indicators is primarily based on qualitative observations and 
interpretations (a stand justified in Chapter 4). 
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5.3 Reduction in Theft 
Electricity theft has almost been a way of life in India. Of late, it has been 
realised that theft is a bane for the electricity supply industry as it contributes to 
high loss in the business. While the fact that distribution losses are high in India 
is well known, the magnitude of losses being incurred in LT (low transmission) 
supply (e.g. 64.5 per cent in Orissa38) is a revelation. Theft at the end of supply 
chain constitutes a large portion of this loss. It has been possible through an 
informal nexus between interest groups (e.g. rural elites and farmers), utility 
employees and local politicians (Katiyar 2005; Swain 2006). The problem lies 
in rampant corruption and vested electoral interest in turning a blind eye 
towards the issue (Gregory 2006), which cannot be addressed effectively 
through pure technical approach (Katiyar 2005). It requires institutional reforms 
or innovations that can represent public interest breaking through the nexus. 
Persistent practice of theft points out absence or failure of monitoring 
mechanism and poor consumer values. It underlies the mindset (predominantly 
in rural areas) that public provisioning of services (like public health service and 
education) is free of cost to users; a mind-set that has been promoted by local 
politicians over years.39 Consumer education and awareness is essential to bring 
                                                          
38 Information collected from the utility field office, by the author. 
39 What makes the mind-set wrong is the nature of electricity service and the way it is 
used. As an input service electricity is used to get access to other basic services and 
luxuries. The amount of consumption varies among the users- while the rich consumes 
more of the service with access to more end-use equipment, the poor consume less 
amount. Making electricity service free as a right, which would require state 
subvention cutting resources from other basic services, would be an irrational and 
anti-poor measure. It would benefit the rich (high-end users) and harm the poor by 
cutting their share of public resources and degrading quality of other service. There is a 
huge unresolved debate on whether electricity service should be treated as a right or 
as a commodity. From the political perspective it is treated as a right, while the 
economic perspective sees it as a commodity. The former seeks to provide electricity to 
all, to the level demanded, and at an affordable rate, which would require the utilities 
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in change in this mindset; something that is expected to be better achieved 
through participatory micro-institutions. In this section, I will analyse how far 
the electricity users’ associations have been effective in promoting the 
awareness and education and physical check on theft. 
Theft in electricity supply can take different forms: stealing through 
illegal connection or hooking; fraud or meter tampering; billing irregularities; 
and non- payment of bills (Smith 2004: 2067). This section focuses on the first 
three forms; non- payment is discussed in Section 6.5. While cases of theft (in 
terms of number) may be higher among the poor, the amount of 
unaccounted consumption is higher for the more affluent users. Existence of 
theft in electricity supply industry has a compounding impact on the users and 
on the poor more particularly. As the costs of unaccounted consumption is 
added to cost of supply, more unaccounted consumption leads to higher cost of 
supply. That makes electricity service unaffordable to the poor and forces them 
to steal. Lost earnings due to theft have also resulted in lack of funds for 
investment in system improvement and service expansion. On other hand, 
theft is hardly a free access to the service as it involves a significant cost- bribe 
to local utility staff.40 Altogether these facts make electricity theft problematic 
throughout. Let us see how participatory micro-institutions (i.e. Electricity Users’ 
Committees) help in addressing the problem- in reducing electricity theft. Firstly, 
these committees act as a forum, where the users, through participation and 
                                                                                                                                                             
to charge below the cost to serve. The latter seeks to recover the full cost incurred in 
delivering the service (Rochlin 2002). 
40 Many of the users interviewed in Orissa were engaged in some form of electricity 
theft, prior to formation of the users’ associations. They claimed to have paid regular 
bribe to utility staff to escape from legal action and to continue electricity access. They 
also claim that the utility staffs have encouraged them to indulge in electricity theft in 
exchange for bribe. An interview recalled, “First time I applied for a legal connection, it 
was turned down without any reason. Then I was offered an illegal connection by the 
local electrician for a price equal to the fixed rate [prevailing then].” (Author Interview) 
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discussion, gain awareness on the demerits of electricity theft. Information 
provided to these committees, usually by the service provider, is discussed in 
the meeting, where the users get chance to question the information and agree 
or disagree to it. This awareness leads to a consensus among the users that 
electricity theft is a ‘social crime’41 as it harms their community members. The 
information leading to awareness on impacts of electricity theft and then to 
consensus on prohibiting it is pooled out ‘discursively’ (cf. Goodin 2008: 95-
106) in these committees. It makes the awareness and consensus more 
authoritative and binding, which every user member has to abide by. Secondly, 
these committees and their members act as watchdogs to keep a check on 
electricity theft. They not only check the illegal connections but also visit 
premises to check meter tampering. A committee member in Orissa claimed: 
“We have a general idea about electricity consumption of each household in our 
village. [The users associations keep a record of the consumption of each 
household.] When we find the electricity bill is lower than the expected 
consumption, that particular household becomes a suspect. In that case, we 
keep watch on them and check their electrical wiring and gadgets. We also 
organise checking of premises for all households in regular interval. These 
checking are done without any prior notice and at any time. This has created a 
fear among people. So they abstain from stealing electricity.”42 (Author 
                                                          
41 Social crime is an act that challenges ‘prevailing social order and its values’ and often, 
it is not regarded as blameworthy neither by those commit it nor by the community 
they belong to (Scott and Marshal 2005). The regulations related to electricity theft 
have not been stringent in India. However, the Electricity Act 2003 tags it as a criminal 
offence. Special police stations and courts have been set up to deal with electricity 
theft cases. But the result is unsatisfactory (Hindu 2008). As long as theft is not 
considered an offence within the society or community, it will be hard to check it. 
42 It was also noticed that people have started using the word ‘theft’ for illegal use of 
electricity. When growing up in Orissa, I had observed that people never refer illegal 
consumption of electricity as ‘theft’ or ‘stealing’. At best, they would refer it as 
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Interview) 
Disciplinary action taken against electricity theft, however, varies from 
committee to committee. While some committees report to concerned 
authority, other committees penalise the guilty at village level, often through 
the support of traditional village committee or gramsabha. In the former case, 
the users argue that disciplinary action taken by utility is not stringent, thus 
does not prohibit further pilferage. When the committees deal with theft cases, 
they confiscate the electrical instruments used by the illegal user for hooking 
and impose a cash fine. In case of meter tampering, electricity supply is 
immediately disconnected and reconnection is provided only when the offender 
pays a cash fine and makes a commitment, to the committee, not to 
engage in fraud again. I have witnessed such a case in Orissa during my 
field work, where a user was caught bypassing the meter to use cooking heater. 
The concerned users’ committee confiscated the cooking heater and wire and 
imposed a cash fine of Rs 500. The offender had to make a written declaration 
that he will not be involved in such activity in future. If he is found repeating the 
‘crime’, he (and his family) will be deprived of not only electricity supply but also 
all other community facilities (Author observation, June 2008). It happens to be 
an effective and speedier judgement on such a case. The legal procedural 
arrangement involves various actors- the utility, local police and judiciary- 
making the judgement process slow and giving opportunity to the offender to 
escape from punishment by tampering evidence. 
Billing irregularities, third category of theft, is done possible through the 
help of utility staff, usually the meter reader. In such cases, meter reading is 
deflated to reduce the bill. When such irregularities are noticed, accumulated 
surplus consumption is often blamed to faulty meters and the cost is waved off. 
To deal with such cases, the committees often send a member with the meter 
reader and maintain a register of meter reading for each consumer to check 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘hooking’ or ‘meter by-pass’ (meaning meter tampering). This implies a change 
behaviour of electricity users. 
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manipulation by meter reader. However, due to unique nature of distribution 
arrangement43 and lack of metering in Sundarbans, electricity theft involves 
more consumption than allotted electrical points and bypassing electricity to 
neighbours. The practice of hooking is non-existent in the area, as a check was 
provided from beginning with formation of beneficiary committees. When a 
case of fraud identified, beneficiary committee takes stringent actions against 
the culprit that involves suspension of supply for seven days and cash fine as 
decided by the committee. 
All these measures taken by the users’ committees have been successful 
in reducing theft. There has been a change in mindset towards electricity 
stealing. As the electricity users put it “stealing electricity is like stealing paddy 
from others’ field. Those who engage in such activity degrade their status in the 
society and are considered ineligible for forging a [matrimonial] relationship” 
(Author interviews). In both the cases, 84 per cent of the users interviewed 
agreed that theft is one of the main reasons behind poor electricity provision. 
Local utility staffs acknowledge the rising consumer awareness against theft: 
“We get phone calls from people, even late in the evening, about their 
neighbours stealing electricity. In some cases, people have made repeated calls 
till our staffs have reached on the spot to catch the defaulter red-handed” 
(Author interview with Electrical Section Officer, Godbhaga Section). As a result, 
stealing through hooking has almost disappeared in Orissa case; six users’ 
committees studied reported only nine cases of hooking during last two years. 
But there was not a single case of hooking in the three beneficiary 
committees studied in Sundarbans; it shows that involving people from the 
beginning increases awareness and helps in controlling theft. On the other 
hand, meter tampering is suspected to exist in few cases in Orissa, particularly 
when the user has some electrical knowledge. Committees could not identify 
                                                          
43 As the amount of electricity produced and distributed in Sundarbans is limited in 
quantity, the users are not supplied up to the level of their demand. They are supplied 
electricity with limited electrical points and fixed tariff. 
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these cases due to lack of technical expertise. Billing irregularities have also 
been checked through keeping track of meter reading. 
Interviewees, particularly in Orissa, noted some past instances of 
resistance to users’ associations’ action in theft cases. At the same time, they 
claim that these resistances have been overruled gradually with support of 
traditional village committees and local political representatives. It seems the 
users’ associations have been supported by the traditional village committees 
(Gram Sabhas). In addition, punishment for electricity theft have been often 
clubbed with prohibition of access to other community services, which has 
created a fear. 
5.4 Improvement in End-Use Efficiency 
The benefits of end-use efficiency in electricity service have traditionally been 
underestimated by the energy policy makers and planner, across the globe 
(Jochem 2000). Keeping with the global practice, conventional Indian 
planners have focused solely on supply side option to increase production. 
Demand-side option like end-use efficiency, that requires more efficient use of 
final energy though conservation and demand side management, is hardly 
considered. It underlies the belief that developing countries should not conserve 
energy as their consumption levels are already low (PEG and Kalpavriksh 2007). 
Nevertheless, with the mounting global concern for climate change and 
resulting pressure from international community to keep carbon emission low in 
India, the state has shown some concern in recent years by enacting the Energy 
Conservation Act 2001 and establishing the Bureau of Energy Efficiency. The 
Bureau aims to “‘institutionalize’ energy efficiency services, enable delivery 
mechanisms in the country and provide leadership to energy efficiency in all 
sectors of the country.”44 The subsequent initiatives, however, have focused on 
technological innovations and large scale planning. While technology is 
                                                          
44 Bureau of Energy Efficiency website, http://www.bee-india.nic.in/ accessed on 17 
May 2009. 
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necessary to bring in end-use efficiency, there is an equally important need of 
delivering the technology to the end users and make them aware about end-
use efficiency. That would require institutional innovations. Can the 
participatory micro-institutions play any significant role in meeting the need? 
End-use efficiency could be one of the solutions to growing electricity 
crisis in India. By conserving electricity, it can not only reduce the need for 
capacity addition and reduce potential carbon emission, but also help in 
expanding the service.45 At the same time, it will contribute to better quality of 
service- reducing load shedding and voltage fluctuation through increasing 
availability. It will also have economic benefits for the users by reducing the 
bill. In India, about 40 per cent of the electricity consumed in domestic sector 
goes to meet lighting needs; of which 80 per cent could be saved through use of 
compact fluorescent bulbs (CFLs). Considering higher cost of CFLs, compared to 
incandescent bulbs, the economic potential of this efficiency measure is 
estimated up to 70 per cent (Jochem 2000). However, the major obstacles to 
end-use efficiency in developing countries has been lack of knowledge, lack of 
awareness of potential benefits, subsidised prices promoting over consumption, 
desire to minimise initial cost through purchasing inefficient equipment and lack 
of effective energy efficiency policy (for a detail list of obstacles see Jochem 
2000). 
Though there is a sluggish progress towards end-use efficiency at macro 
level, the users’ committees have taken some commendable steps contributing 
to end-use efficiency. While there is hardly any awareness among people about 
larger benefits of energy efficiency, they have realised that over consumption of 
                                                          
45 The IRP (Integrated Resource Planning) study conducted in Karnataka reported that 
end-use efficiency can reduce the need for generation capacity addition by 50 percent 
of the amount proposed by official conventional plan. In another case, Akshay Prakash 
Yajana, a load management scheme implemented in 4,611 villages in Maharashtra 
has reduced the peak demand by 960 MW. A new 960 MW power plant, to meet the 
peak demand, would have cost Rs 30 billion (PEG and Kalpavriksh 2007). 
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electricity leads to poor quality of service and inflated bill. Again this 
awareness is gained through discursive pooling of information within the 
users’ committees, making it binding on all the users. 74 per cent of the users 
interviewed in Orissa agreed that over consumption leads to high load on 
distribution transformers and thus, to low voltage during peak hours and 
frequent transformer burnout. On the other hand, 79 per cent of the users 
interviewed in Sundarbans agreed that over consumption is a cause of less hour 
of supply. In response, they have taken three steps: promoted use of CFLs; 
mandated ethical use of electricity (ban of cooking heater); and peak time load 
management. 
Sundarbans has been projected as a pioneering case of clean electricity 
generation and conservation. Though the primary objective of establishing solar 
photovoltaic power plants was to find an alternative source of electricity for a 
region geographically disconnected from the grid, it has emerged as a model of 
clean electricity generation. At the same time, the objective to distribute limited 
electricity among maximum number of households has pushed them to adopt 
end-use efficiency. From the beginning West-Bengal Renewable Energy 
Development Authority (WBREDA) with the help of rural electric cooperatives 
has been promoting energy efficient electrical equipments. As a result the load 
for average household remains between 100 – 200 W, while the minimum 
calculated load for domestic consumers in grid connected area (including 
Orissa) is one kW. Considering the fact that most of the electricity consumption 
is made for lighting, users in Sundarbans are supplied with CFLs at the time 
of taking new connection. Moreover WBREDA and the cooperative have made 
efforts to encourage use of other energy efficient products like low consuming 
fans and televisions. The meetings of beneficiary committees are used as a 
platform for sharing this information, where the users have deliberated on the 
issue to reach on the consensus that “using energy efficient products would 
increase the duration of supply by reducing consumption. That is what [longer 
duration of supply] every user wants” (Author interview with Panchayat Samiti 
representative in Sagardweep Rural Energy Development Cooperative Society). 
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Over time, however, there is change in pattern of light use as the supplied CFLs 
have died after few years of use. While encouraged by beneficiary committees 
many of the users have continued with CFLs, a few users have started using 
incandescent bulbs due to higher cost of CFLs. 
In Orissa, the utility has not made any such effort to deliver the message 
to end users, particularly in rural area. Yet the users’ committees have made 
some successful efforts in introducing CFL with the objective to reduce the load 
on distribution transformer and cut the bill by reducing consumption. As a 
result, around half of the households in the six villages studied use CFL. The next 
two measures are taken particularly in the Orissa case. Use of cooking heater 
has been completely banned again with the objective to reduce the load on 
distribution transformer. After formation of users’ committees, users were 
asked to surrender their cooking heaters. Later on if heater is found in the 
premise, it is confiscated and cash fine, ranging between Rs 200 to Rs 500, is 
imposed. While prohibition of theft has made heater use unaffordable, strict 
vigilance of users’ committee makes it impracticable. Finally, the users’ 
committees have also played a significant role in demand-side management- 
load reduction during peak hours. The user members are advised not to use 
heavy consuming equipments and switch off unnecessary equipments during 
evening hour. While the objective is to get better voltage and protect 
transformer from burn out, it has contributed to energy conservation. All 
together these three measures have also contributed to better quality of supply 
(see Section 6.7). 
5.5 Increase in Revenue Realisation 
While a large portion of electricity supplied is consumed unaccounted, a 
significant portion of the accounted consumption is not paid for. These 
unpaid consumptions reflect low collection efficiency of utilities. In case of 
Orissa, utilities had a collection efficiency of 82.62 per cent for LT supply, in 
2007-08. The figure was lower (78 per cent) for the utility serving in the study 
area (OERC 2008), which could be further low in rural areas. It has contributed 
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to financial crisis in the utilities by escalating commercial losses. There are 
several reasons for this low collection efficiency: lack of willingness to pay; local 
politicians’ encouragement of non-payment and protection from legal action; 
illegal consumption by non-users encourages non-payment by legal users; and in 
the absence of proper metering, inflated minimum bill46 coupled with past 
arrear becomes exorbitant. While the first three reasons are behavioural in 
nature, the last one is technical and managerial in nature. In the absence of 
proper communication between the service provider and users, 
misinformation and rumours can also lead to non- payment affecting revenue 
realisation. The micro-institutions are expected to bring in behavioural change 
through deliberation, help the utilities in technical and managerial improvement 
and serve as a forum for information dissemination. 
The technical factors behind low collection efficiency were addressed 
first, when the decentralised participatory model was introduced in Orissa. 
Metering was mandated for all the existing consumers as well as new 
consumers. Although there was some opposition in the beginning, it was 
manipulated through deliberation in users’ committees. The high end 
consumers wanted to maintain the load based minimum bill, as their 
consumption level was higher, and motivated others to oppose metering. The 
users’ committees played an important role by resolving the issue in their 
meeting. The initial meetings were attended by utility staff and reform 
consultants who provided technical information, especially a rough estimate of 
monthly bill based on the kind and number of equipments used and duration of 
use. “Before the village [electricity] committee was formed and these meetings 
were held, there was a rumour that metering is a strategy to increase bill and 
extract more money from users. People were suspicious of metering drive and 
                                                          
46 Unmetered consumers are charged with a minimum bill of Rs 270 per month for 1 
kWh load. This amount is much more than what most of the rural households 
consume and can afford. Most of the old rural consumers fall victim of this 
arrangement as they were not metered. 
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opposed it. But when it became clear that metering will help to monitor 
consumption and reduce monthly bill, people demanded for meter installation” 
(Author interview with President, Lahanda Village Electricity Users’ Committee). 
The economic effect of this measure was lucrative and became immediately 
evident through almost 50 per cent reduction in monthly bill for most of the 
consumers. However, the consumers still had accumulated arrears, due to non- 
payment, irregular collection and inflated bill, which were too high for utilities to 
wave off and for consumers to pay. As a solution, the consumers were given 
choice to pay the arrear at one go with substantial (ranging up to 50 per cent) 
discount or to pay the amount in instalments (at least 10 per cent of it every 
year). While some people could pay it at one go, many are paying it in 
instalments. Those who could clear the arrear were further benefited by rebate 
on monthly bill when paid regularly on time.47 
When the technical problems regarding payment were addressed, it 
promoted behavioural change. Change in users’ attitude towards payment of 
electricity bills is facilitated by users’ committees through motivating and 
mandating regular payment. It is evident in the slogan of one of the users’ 
committees, which says “Bina bijulire au chaliheba nahin; Bina paisare bijuli 
jaliheba nahin” (It is impossible to live without electricity; it is impossible to 
use electricity without paying for it). Many users claimed that attending the 
users’ committee meetings have educated them about the cost of electricity 
service. This awareness was noticeable in their opinion when they said: “...for 
our children electricity is as important as food. Like food electricity has a 
price... The price needs to be paid regularly to get regular supply and good 
voltage... We cannot blame the company [utility] for power cut and low voltage, 
if we do not pay the bill” (Informal focus group discussion with Katabaga Village 
Electricity Committee). The users’ committee made it mandatory for all the 
users to pay their bill on time; the defaulters were not only disconnected from 
                                                          
47 If electricity full bill is paid on time, the user is entitled to get a rebate at the rate of 
Rs 0.10 per unit of electricity consumed. 
 136 
electricity service but also threatened to deprive from community facilities. 
Those who could not pay on time are asked to provide explanation in the 
meeting and seek extension. As many of the rural households do not have 
monthly income, it is not possible for them to pay the bills on monthly basis. In 
that case, the users’ committee provides guarantee for the consumer and the 
period of guarantee (up to six months) is decided by the committee. When the 
committee realises that a consumer is trying to cheat, it recommends 
disconnection. During initial years, committee members used to visit every 
household with the bill collectors to ensure everybody pays their bill. 
The users committees have also shown potential in addressing 
information asymmetry that may misguide the users. For example, central 
government policy to wave off agricultural loans in 2008 spread a rumour in 
Orissa that government is going to wave off electricity bills. Some local 
politicians tried to encash it in the forthcoming elections by making false 
promises to wave off electricity bills if they come to power. Influenced by the 
false promises and rumours, some users stopped paying the monthly bill. To 
deal with the situation, some users committees have contacted the utility staff 
to get the right information, shared the information with users and appealed 
the users to continue to pay their bills regularly. 
With regard to billing and collection, there is difference in approach and 
thus in performance between the franchisee served area and utility served area 
within Orissa. The first set of villages, with a local provider as franchisee, has 
shown more efficiency than the second set of villages served by the utility 
directly. In the first case, meter reading, billing and collection is done every 
month. Franchisee has two collection dates for each village, when the revenue 
collectors visit. If a consumer misses the first date, he can pay on the second 
date and continue to get rebate. In the second case, meter reading, billing and 
collection is done bi-monthly, partly due to lack of adequate staff in the utility 
and partly due to inefficiency of existing staff. Revenue collectors visit the 
villages once in two months. If a consumer misses the date, his arrear is 
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accumulated. It affects the poorest consumers, the daily wage labourers, who 
would be comfortable to pay less money more frequently (here monthly than 
bi-monthly). As a result revenue collection efficiency is higher in the franchisee 
served area than utility served area. Godbhaga electrical section coming under 
service coverage of franchisee has recorded highest collection efficiency within 
the utility for past four years. Nevertheless, in both the cases collection 
efficiency remains higher than utility’s average collection efficiency due to 
better awareness. In 2007-08, the utility served and franchisee served villages 
had a collection efficiency of 88 per cent and 95 per cent respectively, while the 
average collection efficiency of the utility was 78 per cent.48 
However, non-payment and related issues are not a problem in 
Sundarbans. Firstly, there is no technical problem as there is no metering and 
users are charged a fixed amount on the basis of number of electricity points. 
Secondly, the amount of bill is decided by the beneficiary committees, based on 
hours of supply. Thirdly, the behavioural problems also do not exist as the 
beneficiary committees have been there from the beginning and have promoted 
regular payment. Involvement of local government in the process and entrusting 
the responsibility to collect revenue has worked out well. It has resulted in 
hundred per cent collection efficiency.49 
5.6 Reduction in Technical Loss 
High loss in Indian electricity sector is not only a bane of the sector but also a 
source of overall infrastructure deficit. Even after efforts over past one and half 
                                                          
48 Calculated by the author on the basis of information collected from utility local office 
record and franchisee record on revenue collection. 
49 Information collected from cooperative record book and validated by the revenue 
Collector. 
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decades to reduce it, the aggregate technical and commercial (AT&C) loss50 in 
sector remains more than 35 per cent in 2006-07, which is worth Rs 274 
billion (PFC 2008). The figure is worse for Orissa with 40.25 per cent overall 
AT&C loss and 64.50 per cent in LT supply, during 2007-08 (OERC 2008). As the 
Prime Minister puts it, “No civilised society nor a functional commercial entity 
could sustain losses on such a scale.”51 AT&C loss has two components: 
technical loss occurred due to widespread and ill-maintained distribution 
network; and commercial loss due to rampant theft and low bill recovery. 
Although these two components are not calculated separately, it is believed 
that the technical part remains more than the standard figure for a strong 
power system.52 It keeps open the scope for technical loss reduction. Having 
discussed, in earlier sections, the measures taken by users’ committees for 
commercial loss reduction, this section will focus on the steps taken to reduce 
technical loss. 
Even though the users’ committees are not formally shared with the 
responsibility, they have taken several steps that reduce technical losses in 
electricity supply. Firstly, they look after maintenance of LT transmission lines in 
their locality. Due to lack of sufficient human resource and their inefficiency, 
utilities have not been able to take proper care of transmission lines. In 
response, the users’ committees have come forward; they regularly do 
                                                          
50 AT&C losses represent the difference between electricity available for sale and 
electricity realised. Electricity realised is the electricity billed factored by the collection 
efficiency. 
51 Addressing to a meeting on infrastructure, convened by planning commission in 
October 2006, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh argued that high transmission and 
distribution loss is the source of power crisis and it is partly contributing to 
infrastructure deficit (Srinivasan 2006). 
52 UNESCAP (1990) argues that the standard technical loss of a strong power system is 
8.75 percent, while medium and weak power systems have a loss of 12.63 percent and 
16.50 percent respectively. 
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maintenance work, under guidance of utility staff, including cutting of tree and 
branches where it touches transmission wire, putting separator between wires 
and putting stay for poles. The level of maintenance, however, varies between 
franchise served areas and utility served areas. In the franchisee served villages 
maintenance is done twice a year, while in utility served areas it is done once a 
year. This is primary because of the initiative of franchisee to keep the 
distribution network in good health and availability of additional manpower in 
form of franchisee staff. Involvement of users’ committee makes it easier to 
access private property: cutting of private trees, using private property to put 
poles and stays, and taking wire over private premise. A local electrician states 
that “when there were no electricity committees, it used to be difficult to 
convince people and access private property, particularly when the property 
owner was a non-consumer. Earlier we have diverted the line in many cases, 
increasing expenditure, when such situation arises. But now the committee 
settles these issues. They take permission from the property owner” (Author 
interview). The users committee makes use of the social relations to convince 
property owners to allow access for collective good of the village. In worst cases, 
when the property owner does not agree, the matter is put into the meeting of 
traditional village committee and the concerned person is threatened to be 
deprived of community services in case noncompliance. Secondly, committees 
also take care of distribution transformers serving them. It includes changing oil, 
taking care of fuse and lightening arrester, and cleaning weeds around 
transformer. Finally, the committees in Orissa, in recent years, have been 
funding small maintenance works. Due to the financial crisis in utilities and lack 
of subventions from the government, there is a funding crisis for maintenance 
work. To meet with the situation, the users’ committees have been funding 
purchase of small equipment (like fuse wires, sockets and lightning arresters) 
and sometimes, they also hire private electricians to do the maintenance as 
utility electricians are not usually available. Major part of the fund for 
maintenance works is collected from the user members and rest of it comes 
through fines from defaulters and contribution from commercial and small 
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industrial electricity consumers in the village. However, the motivation behind 
these measures has been protection of the local distribution network and 
getting better quality of supply. But this has resulted in reduction of technical 
loss and transformer burnout. Although there is no data for technical loss 
reduction, records of local utility office and users’ committees confirm that 
there was not a single case of transformer burnout in the six villages since 2002. 
In case of Sundarbans, maintenance of the plant and distribution 
network has been outsourced to a local agency hired by the cooperative. Yet the 
beneficiary committees and the cooperative staff help in regular maintenance of 
the distribution network and getting access to private property in the similar 
manner. As the beneficiary committee was formed from the beginning, 
distribution network has been planned in consultation with the users. Due to 
proper maintenance and revenue realisation, funding for maintenance work is 
not problem in Sundarbans. 
5.7 Improvement in Quality of Supply 
Quality of supply is another indicator of efficiency in electricity supply industry. 
Quality of supply as perceived by the users will be increasingly important to the 
success of utilities. It has two components: continuity of supply and 
reasonable voltage level. Supply interruptions, affecting continuity, is very 
common in India. It could occur due to planned outage for load shedding or 
maintenance work, or due to unexpected breakdown because of malfunctioning 
of distribution equipments, physical damage to distribution equipments or 
overload on the distribution network. Efficiency of the utility could be measured 
through analysing type, number and duration of supply interruptions in a given 
period of time. On the other hand, the source of low voltage problem is growing 
demand and overloading of distribution network. Poor planning and bad 
maintenance has contributed to it. When electricity is supplied at a less 
voltage than the prescribed voltage (i.e. 240 Volt and 50 Hz for LT supply), it 
indicates poor quality of supply. It leads to lower efficiency and reduction in life 
of electrical appliances. Rural consumers are given low priority when it comes 
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to quality of supply due to low revenue realisation in rural areas, weak political 
muscle of rural consumers and lack of sensitivity to their issues (PEG 2008). 
Electricity users’ committees not only address the causes of poor quality 
of supply, but also generate a strong demand and enter into bargains for 
better supply, and sensitise the issue of poor service. The measures taken by 
these committees, as discussed in the previous sections, have a great impact on 
improving quality of supply. While maintenance of distribution network and 
reduction of peak load reduces the chances of breakdowns, increased revenue 
realisation makes the utility attentive towards users’ interest. On the other 
hand, these committees provide a platform for the rural users to air their 
voice, unitedly and strongly. They have entered into a bargain with utility where 
better quality of supply is assured in return of regular payment and cooperation 
in maintenance and protection of distribution network. This commitment has 
been acknowledged in the recognition letter of users’ committees issued by 
the utility. 
The results, drawn on the basis of testimonials from users and discussion 
with utility staffs, show commendable improvements in quality of supply, in 
terms of continuity in supply and reasonable voltage level. In Orissa, 83 per cent 
of the users interviewed argued that there is significant improvement in quality 
of supply. In recent years, no planned load shedding has been done, partly 
due to better availability of power and partly because of loss reduction. 
However, there have been limited interruptions for maintenance and several 
cases of breakdown. In case of franchisee served villages in Orissa, there are less 
than ten cases of breakdown in a month, while it is around 25 in case of utility 
served villages. While the average duration of breakdowns is around 30 minutes 
in the first case, it is around one hour in the second case.53 It has been noticed 
                                                          
53 Breakdowns from the grid are attended immediately in both cases. But breakdowns 
due to problem in the distribution network take time depending on the distance of 
breakdown location from utility office and time of breakdown. In case of franchisee 
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that, in case of overload, utility staffs prioritise the villages served by franchisee 
due to higher revenue realisation from the area, more demand and pressure 
from the franchisee. On the other hand, there has been no voltage fluctuation in 
the study area over recent years. The findings from Orissa illustrate 
commendable quality of supply when compared to status of rural electricity 
supply in much developed states like Maharashtra where the consumers face 
up to 14 hour of power-cut everyday (PEG 2008). 
In the case of Sundarbans, there are no similar issues. Being standalone 
systems with fixed number of consumers as well as fixed load and limited hours 
of supply, there is no variation in quality of service. The measures taken by 
beneficiary committees towards maintenance of distribution network have 
contributed to it. According to a senior WBREDA staff, “success of the rural 
electricity cooperatives lies in users’ participation, contribution and sense of 
ownership. It is their efforts, management and our [WBREDA’s] guidance that 
has sustained the system” (Author interview with Assistant Director, WBREDA). 
However, there is a growing demand for expansion of the service in terms of 
duration and coverage of supply. 64 per cent of users interviewed in Sundarbans 
asserted that they will pay more for extended hour of supply. In response to 
this demand and willingness to pay for it, in recent years, private players 
have expressed interest in setting up renewable power generation plants in 
Sundarbans for service expansion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
served villages, breakdowns are attended within 12 hours, while in case of utility served 
villages it takes up to 24 hours. 
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Table 5.1: Efficiency Gain Across Cases 
Inefficiencies Problems Orissa (Franchisee) 
Franchisee & Users’ 
Committee 
Orissa (Utility) 
Users’ Committee 
Sundarbans (Cooperative) 
Cooperative & Beneficiary 
Committee 
Electricity Theft  Hooking (Taping from open 
transmission wire) 
 Meter tampering 
 Billing irregularities 
 Hooking has completely 
stopped 
 Few cases 
 Completely checked 
 Hooking has completely 
stopped 
 Few cases 
 Completely checked 
 Not a problem 
 
 Not Applicable 
 Not a Problem 
Lack of End-Use Efficiency  No use of energy efficient 
products 
 
 No load management 
 Use of CFL in around 50% 
households 
 
 Yes, during evening 
 Use of CFL in around 50% 
households 
 
 Yes, during evening 
 Use of CFL in 80% cases and 
other energy efficient 
products 
 Not applicable 
Low Revenue Realisation  Lack of willingness to pay/ 
non-payment 
 Irregular collection 
 Low collection efficiency 
 Increased willingness 
 
 Monthly collection 
 95 % collection efficiency 
 Increased willingness 
 
 Bi-monthly collection 
 88% collection efficiency 
 The problem did not exist 
 Monthly collection 
 100% collection efficiency 
High Technical loss  Lack of proper maintenance 
 
 Lack  of manpower 
 Lack of funds for 
maintenance 
 Users, franchisee and utility 
staff collaborate for regular 
maintenance 
 Private electricians hired 
 Users partly fund 
maintenance 
 Users and utility staff 
collaborate for maintenance 
 Private electricians hired 
 Users partly fund 
maintenance 
 Maintenance has been 
outsourced 
 
 Not a problem 
 Not a problem 
Poor Quality of Supply  Regular load shedding 
 Frequent breakdowns 
 
 Low voltage 
 No load shedding 
 Ten cases/month 
(Average duration 30 min) 
 Does not exist 
 No load shedding 
 25 cases/month 
(Average duration one hour) 
 Does not exist 
 Not applicable 
 Not applicable 
 
 Not a problem 
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5.8 Conclusion 
The findings suggest that putting people at the centre of service delivery can 
work; it has potential to improve the operative efficiency in service delivery 
mechanism. Decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery embodies 
institutionalised coproduction where the users contribute to service 
improvement. It emerges as one of the best solutions to problems in 
conventional electricity delivery mechanism, particularly in rural areas. The 
participatory micro-institutions also have potential of contributing to climate 
change mitigation through promoting energy efficiency and demand-side 
management. They can play a key role in implementation of India’s integrated 
energy policy. While these micro-institutions can efficiently manage an 
electricity service delivery mechanism on their own, they can also be embedded 
into existing electricity delivery systems for efficiency gain. 
Participation in the micro-institutions makes better consumers out of 
electricity users by creating awareness about electricity theft and its impacts, 
cost of service and payment necessity, end-use efficiency and energy 
conservation. This awareness is generated through discursive pooling of 
information in face to face interaction, which each participant has agreed upon. 
That makes the awareness authoritative and binding. Participation brings in 
behavioural change among the users: the users see electricity theft as 
offensive, affecting their social status; they gain willingness to pay for electricity 
service and pay on time. Participation also provides the opportunity to the users 
to be co-producer of the service by contributing their time, skill and ideas to 
check unaccounted consumption, practice end-use efficiency, conserve 
electricity, maintenance of distribution network. 
By doing so, users’ participation has, to a great extent, addressed the 
major problems in Indian electricity supply industry and contributed to 
efficiency gain in electricity service delivery. It has checked electricity theft, 
promoted end-use efficiency, increased revenue realisation, reduced technical 
loss and in consequence, improved quality of supply. However, there is 
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variation in performance across cases (see Table 5.1). In case of Sundarbans, 
most of the problems do not exist as users participation was introduced from 
the beginning and participation is institutionalised well. In case of Orissa, both 
the franchisee served villages and utility served villages have performed equally 
where efficiency gain is due to the contribution of users. But where efficiency 
gain requires service provider’s contribution, franchisee served villages have 
performed better than utility served villages. It shows presence of decentralised 
or local service provider contributes to better maintenance of distribution 
network, better collection of revenues, better quality of supply and better 
accountability to users (accountability issue is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter). Sundarbans experience demonstrates that introducing users’ 
participation from the beginning can facilitate building an efficient service 
delivery mechanism and prevent the typical problems in electricity supply. 
Orissa experience suggests that introducing users’ participation in an existing 
service delivery mechanism can produce substantial efficiency gain. 
However, there is still scope and opportunity for electricity service 
improvement. The biggest opportunity for Indian electricity supply industry lies 
in promoting energy efficiency that can reconcile national need for electricity 
supply expansion and tackling climate change. Though the users’ committees 
have started the initiative at micro level, there is a need for more intense efforts 
at the macro level. The first step should be promoting energy efficient products. 
For example, replacing incandescent bulbs with CFLs can produce real 
benefits; replacing one incandescent bulb with a CFL saves 1,000 Kw electricity 
during lifetime of the CFL and saves 70 kgs of carbon emission per year. More 
recently, Indian government has planned to subsidise the cost of CFLS as the 
first step under National Action Plan on Climate Change. The Bachat Lamp 
Yojana (lamp saving scheme) aims to distribute CFLs at a reduced price of Rs 15 
(equal to the cost of an incandescent bulb)(IANS 2009). The state and utilities 
should also subsidise other energy efficiency products to promote its use. 
Energy efficiency is a win-win situation for the state, utilities and users. The 
users benefit from low monthly bill through reduced consumption; utilities 
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gain from saved electricity, which can be used to expand service coverage; and 
the state gains by reducing potential carbon emission. The participatory micro 
institutions can play a significant role in it. 
In case of Orissa, a major problem is lack of technical manpower. Owing 
to the financial crisis, utilities are not increasing their manpower while 
consumer base has been increasing. At present, each electrician is serving 4-6 
villages. It affects maintenance work as well as delays response to breakdowns. 
Though the users have provided manpower support, they lack technical 
expertise. It requires the utilities to increase their technical manpower to match 
the consumer base. Secondly, there is an urgent need of funds for maintenance. 
Lack of funds has hampered maintenance work, which has put the distribution 
network in danger. Although the users have been funding purchase of small 
equipments to meet minimum requirements, it puts extra burden on them, 
particularly on the poor users. Moreover, the users will not be able to sponsor 
major costs. If proper maintenance is not done regularly, the distribution 
network may collapse and require large investment in future. At the same time, 
there is a need to invest in tamper proof metering to stop fraud. In case of 
Sundarbans, more investment is required in power generation to meet the 
demand and extend the service to other areas. Finally, the participatory micro-
institutions and their members do not have access to adequate information on 
policy issues and its relevance for them; it requires information sharing from 
utilities and the state. These institutions can serve as single point information 
dissemination centre for their members on various emerging issues. These 
measure need to be taken for sustainability and further efficiency gain. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Decentralisation and Users’ 
Participation 
Assessing Effectiveness Gain in Electricity Service Delivery 
 
6.1 Introduction 
State provision of electricity service in India has been ineffective in reaching 
to the poor; as a result, half of the population (predominantly poor) still do not 
have access to the service even after six decades of efforts and public spending. 
The failure has been blamed to ‘long route’ of accountability between the 
service users and providers- “clients [users] as citizens influencing policymakers, 
and policy makers influencing providers” (World Bank 2003: 6). The emerging 
service delivery system not only lack accountability between the service 
provider and users, but also is non-transparent and corrupt, where the 
providers are inaccessible to users, equity of access is challenged and quality 
of service remains poor. Weaknesses in the long route of accountability can be 
addressed and service delivery can be improved, as proposed, “by strengthening 
the short route- by increasing the client’s power over providers” (World Bank 
2003: 6). One of the ways it can be done is by bringing the service provider 
closer to the users (decentralisation) and involving the users in service delivery 
process (users’ participation). The chapter aims to assess effectiveness of 
decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity service delivery, drawing 
on experiences in Eastern India. 
The chapter seeks to find how far decentralisation and users’ 
participation has contributed to effective electricity provision, to achievement of 
desired outcomes- provision of electricity service for all, to the desired level and 
at an affordable cost. The two cases under study- Micro-privatisation in Orissa 
and Cooperatives in Sundarbans- represent some level of decentralisation 
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through franchisee and cooperative and participation through users’ 
committees with the objective to make the service delivery process effective. In 
case of Orissa, decentralisation and participation was introduced to make an 
existing failing delivery system effective, while in Sundarbans the objective 
was to build an effective delivery system. Analysis of experience in both 
the cases would useful in drawing lesson for existing electricity delivery 
systems as well as for new electricity delivery systems planned and thus, can 
guide electrification programmes in general. Based on the findings, the chapter 
ascertains the potentials of decentralisation and users’ participation in 
electricity provision. It concludes that decentralisation and users’ participation in 
electricity delivery has potential to make the delivery system effective, given 
that there is support and cooperation from the top, decentralisation of power 
and resources match with the responsibilities and users’ participation is valued. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 contextualises the concept of 
effectiveness in electricity delivery and identifies indicators of effectiveness in 
Indian context drawing on the existing problems and desired outcomes of the 
sector. Following four sections (Section 6.3 – 6.6) analyse performance 
improvement under individual indicators. The concluding section provides a 
comparative review of the findings and specifies methods and approaches by 
which the model of decentralised governance could be more effective in 
electricity provision and produce real gains for the poor. 
6.2 Effectiveness in Electricity Provision: What does it mean? 
Though the literature on public service delivery is full of debates over 
effectiveness in service provision, there is less clarity on what effectiveness 
means. The concept of effectiveness has been used with various meaning at 
different context for evaluation of service delivery systems. In case of electricity 
service, it has often been used from quantitative perspective, where 
effectiveness of service delivery is judged from macro statistics.54 At the same 
                                                          
54 For example, effectiveness of electrification programmes in India were frequently 
judged with the number of villages connected, rather than considering number of 
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time, effectiveness has repeatedly been used simultaneously with and as a 
synonym of efficiency. Efficiency gain in service delivery does not necessarily 
mean effective service provision. While efficiency gain refers to improvements 
in capability to deliver, effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness 
with which service is delivered. The concept of effectiveness emphasises more 
on the output than input. Effectiveness lies in producing desired outcomes; it 
depends on the objectives set and realised. An effective service delivery system 
may be inefficient; and an activity considered inefficient may lead to 
effectiveness in service delivery. For example, subsidised electricity provision 
remains a requirement for effectiveness of electrification programmes- to 
make the service affordable to poor, even though it is considered as a 
major reason for inefficiency of Indian electricity supply industry. 
A service provision is considered effective when service users are 
satisfied with the service and service has resulted in beneficial outcomes for the 
service users. To understand effectiveness of electricity service in general, we 
need to understand how it is used and what beneficial outcomes it produces for 
the electricity users. However, the study does not seek to assess effectiveness 
of electricity service.55 Rather it aims to analyse effectiveness of a particular 
model of electricity service delivery, based on decentralisation and users’ 
participation, in achieving the desired objectives and allocative efficiency. 
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the value placed by users on the service, 
reflected in the price they can afford and are willing to pay, equals cost of 
supply. The set of desired objectives, however, will vary according to specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
households electrified, sustainability of programme and satisfaction of users (Swain 
2006). 
55 Unfortunately, Indian electricity sector has given less emphasis on effectiveness in 
electricity use; rather it has focused on effectiveness in electricity delivery. However, 
effectiveness in electricity use can bring in effectiveness in electricity delivery as 
beneficial outcomes from electricity use will generate demand for the service (See 
conclusion). 
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context. 
In case of Indian electricity, the objective is not just efficient service 
delivery, but a socialist goal set by the constitution makers of India that is 
echoed in current global debate around equitable development. The goal for 
Indian electricity sector has been providing universal access to electricity, as a 
right, at affordable rate, and at least, to the level essential for secure and 
adequate livelihoods as well as dignified life (Swain 2006). Efficiency gain of 
utilities is, of course, required to achieve the goal and is a step towards it, but it 
does not imply improvement in effectiveness of electricity provision. In the 
larger debate on public service delivery, however, both efficiency and 
effectiveness are complementary and share one desired goal- improvement in 
service delivery. In practice, effectiveness must imply a degree of efficiency to 
ensure sustainability. Having discussed the micro-institutional innovations and 
their potentials and contributions for efficiency gain in electricity delivery, in this 
chapter I will focus on their contributions to effectiveness in electricity provision. 
While conventional planning has focused on economic roots of 
electricity crisis in India, a major part of the problem is governance related. 
Governance of the sector has failed due to inadequacy and breakdown of 
accountability and transparency mechanisms and lack of public participation, 
resulting in an ineffective electricity delivery mechanism that has failed the 
poor. The situation calls for ‘adequate, effective and mandatory provisions’ for 
ensuring direct accountability between the users and providers, transparency 
and public participation in governance (Dixit et al. 2001). The institutional 
arrangement under study is a response to the need, although it is limited to 
few cases in the absence of a national strategy. The question arises, how far 
these institutional innovations are capable of improving effectiveness of the 
delivery process. Improved effectiveness will be reflected in increased 
transparency and reduced corruption, ease of access to service providers, 
improved quality of supply, and equity of access and value for money. The 
following sections analyse the improvements in these areas that represent an 
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effective electricity service provision. 
6.3 Transparency and Reduction in Corruption 
A major source of failure in state provision of electricity in India is lack of public 
control over delivery system that has arisen from inadequacy and breakdown 
of mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability. Decentralisation 
and users’ participation in service delivery process, as proposed, is expected to 
restore the mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability. In this 
section, I analyse the impact of decentralisation and users’ participation on 
transparency in electricity delivery process and how it has contributed to 
effectiveness of electricity service provision. In the absence of transparency, 
corruption has emerged as a chronic problem in electricity provision challenging 
effectiveness of the service delivery. It is practised at various levels through 
informal nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, utility staff and muscular user 
groups. At macro level, corruption has taken form of patronage in human 
resource management, location of generation plant and distribution network, 
while at micro level it has often taken the form of bribe.56 Considering the micro 
nature of institutional innovation for decentralisation and users’ participation as 
well as limited coverage, I analyse its contribution to improvements in 
transparency and reduction in corruption at micro level. 
Participation in the electricity users’ committees not only informs the 
users about effective and efficient use of the service, but also informs them 
about metering, billing, load shedding and breakdown. That makes the users 
aware about their rights and functioning of the delivery system, which enable 
the users to demand for better service. Users’ committee meetings also discuss 
individual experiences in dealing with service provider to inform others and set 
strategy to deal with service provider collectively as well as individually. This 
                                                          
56 Bribe is a transactional form of corruption where money changes hands in 
anticipation of favours or favours already rendered. In case of electricity service 
delivery, favour means access to the service (both legally and illegally), continuation of 
service, privilege over others or manipulation in cost calculation for the service. 
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information accumulation enables the users to collectively bargain with the 
service provider for better service. An assertive user claimed, “We the 
customers are paying the full cost [monthly bill] regularly. So we have right to 
get continuous supply. We have fought for and will fight for continuous supply. 
Now we know they [service provider] are doing load shedding to supply more 
power to companies [industrial consumers]. We will not pay our bills if they do 
load shedding” (Author interview). However, the utility has done very little to 
share information with the users’ committees. Though the utility staffs have 
provided some information during initial months, later they have become 
suspicious about the users’ committees and have shown reluctance in sharing 
information. In fact, lately they have perceived the users’ committees as a 
threat to their (undue) status and earning. On contrary, the villages served by 
franchisee claim that franchisee staffs are accessible for information when 
required. The owner-manager of the franchisee claims “sharing information with 
people helps in gaining their support. If you explain the reason behind 
breakdown, people will understand and accept it. But if you do not respond 
them, they will shout at you and will not pay their bill on time” (Author 
interview). 
Due to lack of transparency the users have little knowledge of cost of 
service that has contributed to transaction of bribe for access to service. 
Transparency International has ranked electricity service as seventh most 
corrupt service (CMS 2008) and fourth most corrupt basic service in India (CMS 
2005). The value of petty corruption in electricity service delivery is estimated to 
be as high as Rs 21.7 billion per annum. While average amount of bribe paid by 
urban households is Rs 841, rural households have paid Rs 1089 to gain access 
or continue access to electricity service (CMS 2005). In 2007, the below poverty 
line (BPL) households, mostly living in rural areas, have paid more than one 
billion rupees as bribe for electricity service (CMS 2005). It shows that rural poor 
consumers are worst affected by corruption. Although decentralised 
participatory model has not been able to eliminate corruption completely out of 
electricity supply industry, it has been successful in reducing it by bringing in 
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transparency in the process and generating consumer awareness against 
corruption. Improved transparency and awareness, gained through users’ 
participation, has exposed the real cost of service. It has generated 
resistance among users towards paying bribe. It was observed that users now 
ask for receipt for their payment. Earlier utility staffs have siphoned up the 
revenue collected without receipt; as a consequence, the users’ bill kept 
accumulating. Users were also noticed asking for explanation of their monthly 
bill and claiming rebate. In most cases, bill is paid by the female members as 
male members of family stay out for work. The first thing they ask for is a receipt 
before making payment; in many cases, they also ask for explanation on the 
bill- how much they have consumed, how much they are paying for current use, 
how much they are paying from the arrear and how much rebate they are 
getting. It was observed that the franchisee staffs better attend the situation by 
answering the queries compared to the utility staffs.57 This is mainly because 
the utility staffs are overburdened- while two franchisee staffs spend two days 
for collection in two to three villages, two utility staffs spend one day for 
collection in five to six villages- and partly because of arrogance among 
utility staff due to their perceived higher status. 
While in Orissa the actual cost of new connection with one kW load is 
Rs 382, the practical cost including bribe ranges up to Rs 3000. The average 
practical cost of new connection in franchisee served villages is Rs 850 
(includes Rs 468 as bribe), while it is Rs 1150 (includes Rs 768 as bribe) in utility 
served villages.58 However, the amount of bribe in both the cases is lower than 
national average bribe for getting a new connection, i.e. Rs 1171 (CMS 2005). 
On the other hand, the bribe charged, in the franchisee served villages for 
                                                          
57 During my stay in field, I have travelled with revenue collectors to observe behaviour 
of users as well as revenue collectors. 
58 The amount of bribe presented here represents the mode value, what most of the 
users have paid in recent years. Some users’ manage to pay less using their social status 
and relations, while some end up paying more to get faster response. 
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repairing is between Rs 50 to Rs 200, while in the utility served villages it is 
between Rs 100 to Rs 200.  The amount of bribe is again lower, in both the 
cases, than national average for repairing, i.e. Rs 286 (CMS 2005).59 Public 
awareness and consciousness, gained through participation, has not only 
resulted in reduction in intensity of bribing, but also it has contributed to change 
in the nature of bribing. As the users are no more willing to pay bribe, they are 
refraining from collusive or anticipatory bribing; the existing form of bribing is 
often extortionary, where the users are compelled to pay bribe for immediate 
response. 
Sundarbans case again demonstrates that introducing decentralisation 
and users’ participation from the beginning, at the stage of designing a service 
delivery mechanism, helps in preventing many of the problems including failure 
of transparency mechanism and corruption. WBREDA and the local cooperative 
have taken initiative to share information with the users; beneficiary committee 
meetings are regularly attended by cooperative staff and sometimes by 
WBREDA staff to disseminate information and answer any questions. As a result, 
the users have awareness on functioning and management of delivery systems. 
Cost of the service is calculated by the respective beneficiary committees with 
inputs from the cooperative and WBREDA; the beneficiary committee has the 
final say. So there is a high level of awareness on the price. That has resulted in 
prevention of corruption, something very common in conventional electricity 
delivery mechanism. According to a local user, “Bribing does not exist. I have 
never heard of anybody asking for more money...The committee decides the 
money. We all know the exact amount and we pay it every month at the power 
plant site. We have been told not to pay more than what we owe” (Author 
interview). Because the system is transparent and people are aware about 
cost of service, many people are willing to pay more for extended hour of 
supply. However, when people are asked about corruption and bribing, some 
                                                          
59 However, the users opt for private electricians for repairing when it does not 
involve meter handling, as they find it cheaper and faster. 
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people referred to bribing and patronage in subsidy for purchase of individual 
solar home lighting systems. But subsidy for individual home lighting systems is 
not under management of the cooperative. 
6.4 Improvement in Accountability 
Holding the service provider accountable require that there is transparency- 
access to reliable and timely information. But that is not enough for 
effectiveness in service delivery; there is a need for accountability between the 
service provider and the users. There is a consensus that the mechanisms for 
accountability in electricity service delivery has failed; the consensus is more 
valid when the users are poor. Accountability in service delivery is best 
understood as a character of the relationship between service provider and 
service users. An accountable relationship is one where the service provider is 
obliged to account for and take responsibility for its actions, while the 
service users are able to hold the service provider to account. The conventional 
model of electricity delivery, where the bureaucrats responsible for service 
delivery are responsive to the users and accountable to the government, has 
failed to build such relationship between the service providers and users in most 
of the developing countries; and more so in India. The method has not only 
failed top-down accountability from the service provider to the users, but also it 
has failed the bottom- up accountability from the users to the service provider, 
as a consequence. Root of the problem lies in design of public institutions for 
service delivery in India and over politicisation of governance within the 
institutions. “Most of the [public] institutions and rules... are so riddled with 
perverse incentives structures that accountability is almost impossible” (Mehta 
2003: pg.). Solution to the problem is sought in getting the provider closer to the 
users and involving the users in delivery process to establish ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ 
mechanisms (Paul 1992) based on marketisation and users’ coproduction, and 
to introduce ‘co-governance’ (Ackerman 2004), which involves users’ 
participation in core activities of service delivery. Recent experience suggests, 
exit mechanism, that requires market competition and choice for users, is hard 
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to establish in electricity service delivery and when established, it promotes the 
interest of better off users at the cost of poor users. However, institutional 
innovation for decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery is a 
step towards restoring ‘voice’ and ‘co- governance’ mechanism. 
In the conventional model of electricity delivery, one of the problems for 
rural consumer is to get access of authorities, partly due to the physical distance 
and partly because of perceived status gap. While the geographic distance of 
electricity office60 has been a barrier in accessing the utility staff, the 
perceived superior status of the utility staff makes it difficult for poor users to 
approach them. In the decentralised model, the service provider 
(franchisee/cooperative) being a smaller entity is physically closer to the users. 
The staffs of these bodies are more accessible physically as they are drawn from 
the villages served and users have an existing social relation with them. 
Moreover, the franchisee model in Orissa has a village contact person for each 
village who takes up complains from users along with reading meters and 
distributing bills. It allows the users to register complains in their village rather 
than going to electric office. According to CMS (2005) 55 per cent of rural users 
have visited respective electricity service department in last one year and 58 per 
cent of them have done so at least three times. In case of franchisee served 
villages in Orissa, the number of users’ visiting local electricity office is 
insignificant and often, the frequency of visit is limited to one time. Those who 
have visited, most of the time have done so for their own fault- missing the 
payment date. But, the villages served by utility complain of requirement for 
                                                          
60 Conventional electricity delivery systems are big; the local offices (electrical section 
office) serve up to twenty villages. The physical distance between the local office and 
farthest village ranges up to 25 kilometres. In the absence of proper transportation 
facility, travelling to and from the local office may take a full day, which means 
loss of one day’s job and earning. Frequent visit to office is not affordable to many, 
particularly to the poorest who live on daily wage earning. Often users end up paying 
bribe to avoid repeated visit. 
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frequent visit to local office (see the following section for further discussion). In 
case of Sundarbans, the users hardly visit the cooperative for service 
requirements. However, they have to visit the plant site, which is in the same 
village or nearby village, every month to pay their bills. 
While presence of a local service provider solves the problem of physical 
distance between the service provider and user, it also solves the problem of 
perceived status gap. The staffs of franchisee and cooperative are drawn from 
local villages served. In that, way they are not only physically close to the 
users, but also socially close. Pre-existing social relationship between the staff 
and users turns out to be a facilitator in day-to-day dealing. The users can relate 
to and argue with the local provider and its staff and thus hold them 
accountable. The staffs drawn from local villages are more approachable, 
accessible and answerable. They are also accommodative to local needs. For 
example, in the franchisee served villages in Orissa, the franchisee staffs change 
the time of bill collection to evening during farming season, so that, the users 
can do farming in the day time and pay their bills in the evening. It was 
observed that franchisee and its staff are more accountable compared to utility 
staff. For instance, during breakdowns, users try to call the respective service 
provider to enquire about the reason, status and expected duration. (Thanks to 
telecom revolution in India!) While the franchisee staffs respond to these 
queries, the utility staffs often disconnect their telephone in such situation. 
Participation in the micro-institutions has improved the transparency, if 
not to the desired level, in service delivery process and made the users aware 
of their rights and responsibilities. This has contributed to enhancement of the 
capacity of rural users to express their voice, which is visible in the form of 
complaint, organised protest and active participation in discussion. The 
‘constructive’ benefit of this voice lies in the “shaping of shared values through 
deliberation” (Goetz and Jenkins 2005: 7). It is not just a mechanism for holding 
the service provider accountable, but it enables the users to arrive collectively 
at the standards against which performance of the service provider will be 
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judged. Though participation through micro-institutions helps the voice of the 
poor to find its way back in, “but they are often left speaking into a void” 
(Ackerman 2004: 447). This is very much true in the cases studied. Participation 
has helped in generating a voice of the rural users, setting their preferences and 
standards. But this is never communicated to and heard by the decision-makers. 
It is, firstly, because the top authorities are, in reality, least interested in the 
preferences of the rural users. The Chief Executive Officer of the utility in 
Orissa claims “we are always interested to hear from people. We would change 
our strategy to accommodate their preferences.” But when asked what has 
been done to accumulate the preference of people, there was no response 
(Author interview), neither any initiative for the purpose exists in practice.61 
Secondly, the utility staffs at the bottom level see the rising ‘voice’ as a threat 
to their undue status and income, and they want to curb the voice. In a division 
level staff meeting, a senior officer of the utility asserted that “these village 
committees are dangerous for our functioning. We need to break them” (Author 
participation). In summary, though decentralisation and participation has 
improved the upward accountability making the users accountable to the 
provider for their behaviour and consumption, downward accountability still 
remains to be improved. Though franchisee and cooperative are relatively more 
accountable to users, they hardly have any influence over decision making. 
However, local providers are perceived as responsive to local needs even though 
at small scale limited to their capability.  
6.5 Improvement in Quality of Service 
Poor quality of service is another problem that affects effectiveness in electricity 
                                                          
61 The only opportunity for users to provide inputs and preferences and question the 
utility is the public hearings organised by the state Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
The rural users are neither aware of this opportunity nor it is practically possible for 
them to participate in these hearings because of the procedural barriers and physical 
distance of venue of the hearings. Establishment of a strong network of rural users 
may facilitate representation of their views in these hearings (See conclusion). 
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service delivery. Quality of service here indicates quality of various interactions 
between the users and the service provider, which includes regularity and 
accuracy in meter reading, billing and bill collection, attending faulty meter, and 
handling complaints. Considering the poor quality of service and associated 
economic cost (i.e. bribe to get better service), poor households tend to go for 
alternative energy sources. Poor quality of service, in the form of inattention, 
extortion and humiliation, is often the single reason for low access to the service 
among poor (PEG 2008). The problem has been worse in rural areas due to 
various reasons. First, delivering to rural consumers is relatively costlier while 
revenue realisation has been poor in rural areas. That has made electricity 
delivery in rural areas less attractive for utilities. Secondly, lack of transparency 
and failure of accountability mechanism has made quality of service in rural 
areas further vulnerable. Thirdly, rural consumers lack a strong voice and 
demand for better service. Finally, rural users have less access to service 
providers, which had compromised the quality of service by delaying response. 
Decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery has been, to a 
great extent, effective in addressing these issues. As we discussed in the last 
chapter, improved revenue collection has lead to recovery of cost of service, 
making delivery system financially sustainable. Highest collection efficiency in 
franchisee served villages in Orissa has gained attention of and response from 
the utility. Hundred per cent collection efficiency in Sundarbans has generated 
interest of private players in the model of electricity generation and distribution. 
Improvement in transparency and accountability has contributed to users’ 
awareness and voice that has resulted in increased demand for better service. 
As discussed in the last section, presence of a local service provider has 
substantially improved access to authority, complaint mechanism and thus 
provider’s response. These improvements are expected to result in improved 
consumer dealing, complain handling and users’ satisfaction. 
While quality of service has improved in all the cases studied with users 
assertion through participation, the level of improvement varies across cases. In 
case of Orissa, the quality of service is far better in the franchisee served villages 
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compared to utility served villages. Franchisee served villages have better 
regularity and accuracy in meter reading, billing and bill collection as meter 
reading and billing is done on monthly basis and bill is collected twice a month. 
But in utility served villages, meter reading, billing and bill collection is done, 
though regularly but less frequently, on bi-monthly basis. There is also 
improvement in complaint handling in franchisee service. It has been easier to 
complain through the franchisee and follow it up without visiting the office. 
The franchisee, in collaboration with the utility staff, organises a consumer 
camp every month on a fixed date where billing errors are rectified on the 
spot. But, this facility is not available in the other case in Orissa, where users 
have to make several visits to utility office to get the bill corrected. Till the bill 
is not corrected, the users are deprived of rebate. While all effort is made to 
prevent breakdown in franchisee served area, repairing is done within 12 hours, 
even in late evening and bad weather. On the other hand, same repairing work 
takes up to 24 hours in case of direct service by utility. In both the cases, 
faulty meters are replaced on the next working day conditional on new meters 
are available and the certain amount of bribe is paid. But the amount of bribe 
varies in the two cases; while in franchisee served villages the amount is fixed 
at Rs 50, in utility served villages it is between Rs 100 to Rs 200. When the 
complaint handling is a responsibility of the utility staff in both the cases, better 
service in franchisee served villages can be credited to proactive initiatives of 
the franchisee. The franchisee recognises its business and income can flourish 
when the users are satisfied with quality of service and thus, remains 
accountable to people. “The franchisee business and profit is dependent on loss 
reduction and maximum revenue realisation, which only can be achieved by 
satisfying the consumers. They will be satisfied when they get better service. If 
consumers do not get better service, my [franchisee’s] business will be at 
risk” (Owner-Manager of the franchisee, Author interview). In contrast, similar 
sense of risk and ownership is missing among the utility staffs. The franchisee 
manages to get better service for users from the utility staff by offering 
them some incentives like buying meal or fuel for their vehicle, and 
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sometimes by threatening them to complain at the higher level, to which the 
franchisee has access. Responsiveness towards local needs and demands has 
enhanced in the model due to intervention of the franchisee and persistent 
demand from users. It is evident when the utility staffs take utmost care to 
prevent interruption in power supply during local functions and festivals. For 
example, during Dussehra festival, the utility had arranged for backup power 
supply in franchisee served villages from another grid to meet breakdown and 
both utility and franchisee staffs were on duty in the night. On the contrary, in 
the utility served villages the villagers had arranged for diesel generators to 
meet breakdown (Author observation). To arrange this special service, the 
franchisee has been using various tools. It offers some incentives (or a different 
form of bribe) to the utility staffs, which includes feasts and gifts during the 
festive season, so that they would put extra effort to ensure steady service. It 
also gets order from higher authority to use other grid resources to ensure the 
service. Being the highest revenue generator across the state for past few years, 
the franchisee has a good reputation in the sector, which makes it easier for him 
to get such orders. At the same time, it used the franchisee human resources to 
support the utility staff in maintaining the grid stability during period. 
Users in utility served villages also complain of misbehaviour from the 
utility staff. In comparison, the franchisee staffs are friendly and the users have 
better satisfaction in dealing with them. A user in a franchisee served village 
explaining the difference between franchisee and utility staff behaviour said: 
“they [utility staff] are outsiders. They do not understand our needs and 
circumstances. They misbehave us as if they are doing charity to us. They never 
explain us. They used to come suddenly and ask for bill. They never informed us 
about the dates. We always do not have money. If we cannot pay, they scold 
us and disconnect the line. But these people [franchisee staff] are among us. 
They understand our needs and circumstances. Franchisee has fixed two 
dates for bill collection in our village. We keep the money ready for the fixed 
date” (Author interview). Difference in behaviour of utility staff and franchisee 
staff reveals failure of accountability mechanism. Though a Consumer Grievance 
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Redressal Forum has been established in recent years to deal with consumer 
complaint on such issues, rural users are not aware about its existence. This 
requires better arrangement for information sharing. However, most of the 
users agree that there is substantial improvement in quality of service over since 
users’ committees were established. Sixty-four per cent of the users 
interviewed in Orissa claim that they are somehow satisfied with the quality of 
supply and service considering the money they pay for the service and the cost 
of alternative source of energy. 
In case of Sundarbans, the quality of service is has been good and 
consistent from the beginning. Due to the off-grid nature of electricity 
delivery, much of the complexities in grid-based electricity supply are not 
present in Sundarbans. Billing and bill collection is done regularly on monthly 
basis. As the bill amount is fixed by the users, there is no problem of 
inaccuracy. Maintenance work of the plant and distribution network is done by a 
local private firm hired by the cooperative, who is directly accountable to the 
concerned beneficiary committee and the cooperative. On the other hand, 
cooperative staffs are drawn from the local government institutions and are 
from the local villages; thus they remain responsive to local needs. Presence 
and involvement of an effective local government system has facilitated better 
quality of service. As the users have been involved from the beginning, they 
are able to hold the cooperative staff and maintenance workers accountable. 
While the stipulated time limit for complaint handling is 48 hours, most of the 
complaints are addressed within 24 hours. Small size of distribution network has 
facilitated quick response. The system of service delivery is also responsive to 
local needs; duration of supply is increased during community functions. 
Overall, users are highly satisfied with the service rendered by the 
cooperative and the maintenance staff. 
 
 
 
 163 
6.6 Equity of Access 
Effectiveness of a service delivery mechanism also depends on its potential in 
ensuring equity of access- improved access for poor. The conventional model of 
service delivery has failed to reach the poor for two reasons: firstly, high initial 
cost of connection owing to lofty bribe is unaffordable to the poor (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006); secondly, poor cannot go through the cumbersome 
procedure of application that requires submitting multitude of documents (PEG 
2008). No serious effort has been made to connect the rural households; rural 
electrification programmes in India has been more targeted towards 
electrifying villages. This has resulted in electrification of only 44 per cent of 
the rural households, while more than 82 per cent of villages have been 
wired. In this context, can decentralised participatory approach promote 
household electrification? Its potential to reach poor households lies in 
reducing not only initial cost of connection, but also the monthly cost of 
supply. At the same time, it also needs to make the legal procedure of getting 
connection convenient for the poor. 
Reduction in the level of bribing, as discussed earlier in the chapter, has 
substantially reduced the practical cost of new connection, making it 
affordable for more households. On the other side, proper metering by the 
utility and improvements in end-use efficiency by users has resulted in 
reduced monthly bill. At the same time, cost of alternatives to electricity, 
predominantly kerosene, has been increasing. This has made electricity service 
affordable and desirable for many poor households. The poor households get 
more productive hours and sense of satisfaction with access to electricity. A new 
user in Orissa points out the improvement narrating his personal experience: 
“electricity was always a need of life. Earlier it was too costly to get a 
connection; so we were using kerosene lamp for light. But now it is 
affordable...because my income has increased while the [practical] cost of 
connection has reduced... Paying the bill regularly every month is easier and 
affordable than paying irregularly. Monthly bill comes close to my one day’s 
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earning [He earns Rs 120 - 140 as a daily wage labourer]. I am happy to pay 
it as my family is happy with it” (Author Interview). Yet, there are some 
households who cannot afford at this rate; reaching to these people would 
require state intervention. The model has also substantially reduced the legal 
hassles in getting a new connection. For a new connection, an applicant 
needs to submit an identity proof, a resident proof, connection charge (with 
bribe) along with the application form. Most of the rural households do not 
have the first two documents ready. These two documents needs to be 
procured from local administrative offices and involves cumbersome process. 
While getting these documents costs up to Rs 250 (including bribe), the 
applicant has to make multiple visits to the administrative office. To get the 
poor applicants out of this cumbersome process, the applicants were asked to 
get a letter of recommendation from the concerned users’ committee as an 
alternative of identity and residential proof. The recommendation letters 
served not only as proof of residence and identity, but also as a guarantee of 
applicant’s capability to pay. The arrangement was put in place across the 
state, as part of the original micro-privatisation design, in the areas where 
village electricity committee was formed and registered with the utility . 
Though, the arrangement was quite effective during initial years, later on the 
utility staffs have stopped accepting the letter to challenge legitimacy of the 
users’ committees. While asked about it, most of the utility staffs suggested that 
the arrangement made the users’ committees powerful. As discussed earlier, 
the utility staffs see strong users’ committees as a threat to their undue status. 
While the franchisee and the users would like to reinstate the arrangement, the 
utility staffs are not in favour of it, even when they do not have any valid 
explanation for avoiding it. 
The cases from Orissa show a considerable improvement in household 
electrification. While the national average for rural household electrification 44 
per cent, the franchisee served villages have achieved 71 per cent and the utility 
served villages have achieved 63 per cent household electrification. Though the 
study did not involve any systematic analysis of unelectrified households, 
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from discussion with community leaders and some of the unelectrified 
households it became evident that often marginal farmers or landless 
labourers do not have access to the service. Economic means and affordability 
is the major factor that deprives some household from getting access. Yet, 
few community members suggested that people are still afraid of the inflated 
bills that used to come earlier and the cumbersome process of getting a new 
connection. Moreover, the fact that electricity was never marketed in India, 
as mobile telephone service was marketed, there is limited awareness on how 
people can benefit from electricity service. Consequently, the demand for 
electricity access is low among the poorer households who have other 
competing priorities to meet with limited resources. 
However, electricity provision in Sundarbans is a different case. Because 
of its off-grid nature and limited electricity generation, the rate of access in 
Sundarbans is limited. Three of the beneficiary committees studies together 
have achieved around 40 per cent household electrification, while many of the 
remaining households have individual home lighting systems. The cost of new 
connection and cost of supply has been low and affordable to many. There two 
category of connection for domestic consumers: first comes with three 
electrical points with a load of 100 W and the second has five electrical 
points with a load of 150 W. The costs of new connection for the two 
categories are Rs 500 and Rs 1000 respectively; the cost covers household 
wiring and supply of CFLs. Monthly cost of supply charged to users is Rs 75 for 
100 W load and Rs 150 for 150 W load. Though the hour of supply is limited, the 
cost has been lower than the grid connected supply. As there is no bribe 
involved, the cost is affordable to many. The potential users are guided to form 
the beneficiary committee at the design stage of power plant. Once the plant is 
established those households are supplied electricity on priority. Depending on 
availability, any further connection is provided on the recommendation of 
beneficiary committee. Many of the well-off households go for individual home 
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lighting system62, while the plant based supply remains affordable and accessible 
to the poor. 
 
                                                          
62 In case of individual home lighting system, the user has to pay the cost of 
instruments, which is partially subsidised by the state for domestic users. But the user 
owns the system and is not accountable to anyone else. So they can user the 
electricity at their discretion. That makes it attractive to well-off households, who can 
afford to pay for it. 
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Table 6.1: Effectiveness Gain Across Cases 
Inefficiencies Problems Orissa (Micro-Privatisation) 
Franchisee & Users’ 
Committee 
Orissa (Users’ 
Participation) 
Users’ Committee 
Sundarbans (Cooperative) 
Cooperative & Beneficiary 
Committee 
Lack of Transparency and 
Corruption 
 Lack of information and 
awareness 
 
 
 Rampant corruption 
 Participation informs and 
educates the users 
Franchisee shares 
information 
 Corruption has reduced 
 Participation informs and 
educates the users 
Utility is reluctant to share 
information 
 Corruption has reduced 
 Participation informs and 
educates the users 
Cooperative and WBREDA 
share information 
 No corruption 
Lack of Accountability  Low access to provider 
 
 Lack of users voice 
 Franchise is more accessible 
 Shaping of shared values 
and standards through 
deliberation 
 Utility remains less 
accessible 
 Shaping of shared values 
and standards through 
deliberation 
 Cooperative is more 
accessible 
 Shaping of shared values and 
standards through 
deliberation 
Poor Quality of Service  Poor complaint handling 
 
 
 Irregularity in billing and 
collection 
 Low responsiveness of 
provider 
 Easy to register and track 
complaint through 
franchisee 
 Regularised  
(Frequency: Monthly) 
 Franchisee is responsive 
 Complaint handling remains 
poor 
 
 Regularised 
(Frequency: Bi-monthly) 
 Utility remains less 
responsive 
 Easy and fast complaint 
handling by cooperative 
 
 Regular billing and collection 
 Cooperative is responsive 
Low Access to Service  High initial Cost 
 High cost of service 
 Cumbersome procedure of 
application 
 
 Low rate of household 
electrification (44%) 
 Reduced Initial Cost 
 Reduction in monthly bills 
 Less paper work with 
recommendation from the 
users’ committee 
 71% household 
electrification 
 Reduced initial cost 
 Reduction in monthly bills 
 Less paper work with 
recommendation from the 
users’ committee 
 63% household 
electrification 
 Low initial cost 
 Users decide the bill 
 Not applicable 
 
 
 40% household electrification 
through cooperative
63
 
 
                                                          
63 Further electrification is made through individual home lighting systems. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
Decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity service delivery certainly 
can bring in effectiveness in service delivery. As the case studies show it can 
bring in transparency in process of service delivery making the users aware of 
their rights and responsibilities. As a consequence, there is decline in level of 
corruption and change in nature of corruption. Deliberation in users’ 
committees enhances the capacity of rural users to express their voice, shape 
shared user values and standards of performance to judge the service provider. 
As an outcome, it empowers the users to hold the provider accountable. At 
same time, presence of a local service provider with a sense of responsiveness 
and risk makes the delivery system more accountable to the users. Users’ 
awareness gained through participation and increased transparency makes 
them upward accountable to the service provider. Increased transparency and 
accountability, in the presence of a local service provider, improves the quality 
of service. While transparency and accountability enables the users to demand 
and bargain for better service, local service provider remains more accessible to 
the rural users. At the same time, the local franchisee has been negotiating for 
the consumers it serves. For example, the franchisee in Orissa has a very good 
track record of revenue collection; for the past five years his sub-division has 
highest collection in Orissa. To maintain that collection rate, he has been 
negotiating with the utility to ensure regular electricity supply. This negotiation 
has been so effective that the utilities have provided backup arrangement of 
electricity supply during festival season (Author Observation). Altogether these 
improvements in electricity delivery have contributed to equity of access, 
reflected in increased access to service, making the service accessible to the 
poorer segment of society. Decentralisation and users participation in service 
delivery clearly emerges as a solution to the failures in conventional model of 
electricity delivery and a strategy for India’s universal electrification drive. Orissa 
experience suggests that decentralisation and users’ participation can make 
an existing failing system of service delivery effective, while Sundarbans 
case suggests introducing decentralisation and participation from the beginning, 
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at the design stage, can build an effective service delivery mechanism. While 
decentralised participatory model of service delivery mechanisms can work 
effectively on its own, it can be embedded into existing institutional 
arrangement to produce better effectiveness. While all the cases have shown 
commendable improvement in effectiveness in reaching to the poor, there is 
significant variation across cases (see Table 6.1). The major reason for this 
variation in the cases is presence or absence of a decentralised local provider. 
While users’ awareness, voice and demand can be raised through participation, 
there is a need for responsive service provider to respond to users demand, 
provide better access and quality of service. The emerging lesson is 
decentralised local service providers are more effective that large service 
providers, be it state run or private owned. However, there is ample scope and 
opportunity in improving the decentralised participatory service delivery model 
to produce real gains for the poor and include remaining population in service 
coverage. Following paragraphs list some suggestion in that direction. 
At first, there is a need for clarity on the functions and powers of 
institutions; who is responsible for what and what powers and resources are 
devolved to meet those responsibilities. In the absence of clarity, the micro-
institutions are forced to perform certain functions for which they are not 
responsible and do not have resources. For example, users have been funding 
of maintenance work in Orissa, while it is responsibility of the utility; it puts 
extra financial burden on the poor users. Better clarity would help in planning 
devolution of power and resources to match with the responsibilities and make 
the system more accountable. As evident in the Sundarbans case, demarcation 
of functions and powers of the beneficiary committees, cooperative and 
WBREDA has been a major reason for proper functioning of the institutions and 
success of the model. The micro-institutions are given informal status in the 
service delivery chain, keeping them at a lower status to the utility. While the 
grievance redressal is inaccessible to the rural consumers, it becomes difficult 
for them to challenge noncompliance from utility staff. There is a need of 
recognising them as formal part of the delivery chain and devolving some 
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formal power and authority, so that they can hold the service provider 
accountable for their activity. At the same time there is a need for change in 
attitude of utility staffs towards the users, which could be done through directly 
involving them in the micro-institutions and by putting pressure from top to 
take the committees seriously. Another obstacle for effective functioning of the 
users’ committees is lack of funds for operation that restricts them from 
interacting with the provider and organising meetings. Most of the users’ 
committees collect a small amount from the members to meet the expenses, 
which could be provided by the utility as an honorarium towards their 
contribution. 
The users lack adequate knowledge on policy issues and its relevance for 
them; it requires information sharing from utilities and the state in an accessible 
form. The micro-institutions can serve as information dissemination centre for 
their members on various issues of relevance. These institutions can be further 
strengthened by building a network of users’ committees, which will serve as a 
guiding body and promote benchmarking competition among the institutions for 
effective functioning. In case of Sundarbans, the need for such a network and 
guiding body has been fulfilled by the WBREDA, which has contributed to 
effective functioning of the cooperative model. On other hand, a strong network 
of users’ committees can build a political muscle for rural consumers 
representing their interest in policy arena. Such a network can represent the 
rural users’ interest in technical events like public hearings organised by 
regulatory commissions. 
Though these changes would further enhance effectiveness in electricity 
delivery, still there would be a group of extreme poor households who cannot 
afford the cost of service. Reaching to them requires special schemes with 
subsidised rate and funding from the state. The state have intermittently 
developed and implemented several schemes to reach the poorest households, 
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though without much success. Kutir Jyoti64 (Hut Light), one of the central 
government schemes to connect BPL households at a subsidised rate has been 
abandoned by the private utilities in Orissa as the government is not funding for 
it. Restoration of the scheme will make electricity service accessible to many 
among the poorest. On the other hand, the commitment to connect the BPL 
households free of charge under Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikarana Yojana 
(Rajiv Gandhi Village Electrification Scheme) is yet to be implemented. While 
these schemes have potential to reach the poorest, they need to be expedited. 
The micro institutions can play a potential role by identifying the beneficiaries. 
Finally, there is an urgent to need to widen the focus of rural electrification 
programmes to ensure effectiveness of electricity service. So far electrification 
programmes in India have focused on effectiveness of electricity delivery, 
reaching to maximum people. Making electricity service effective would require 
emphasis on productive use of the service, getting maximum benefit from 
electricity usage. More the benefits are realised by the users, more active will be 
the users’ involvement in delivery process. That will make the delivery process 
more effective. 
                                                          
64 Under Kutir Jyoti scheme, single point light connections are provided to the 
households of rural people below poverty line at the lifeline rate of Rs 30 per month. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Participation as an End in Itself 
Spillover Effects of Users’ Participation in Electricity Delivery 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Though there is a growing consensus in academic and policy arena on 
desirability and importance of public participation, the advocates of public 
participation, varying on approaches and objectives, fall into two broad groups 
of developmentalists and democrats (See Chapter 2). The developmentalists 
view participation as a method to achieve institutional efficiency and 
developmental goals, while the democrats see participation furthering the goals 
of empowerment, equity and democratic governance (Puri, 2004: 2511). While 
the developmentalists promote public participation for functional motives, as a 
means of better service delivery, the democrats promote participation for 
empowering motives, as an end-in-itself. Given the current fascination, in 
academic and policy thinking, with people-centred solutions for social and 
economic problems and democratised governance, participation as an end in 
itself seems to dominate the debate, at least at the rhetorical level. It is 
evident in the fact that empowering effects are frequently set as explicit 
objectives of participatory initiatives. 
In this chapter, I aim to analyse empirical validity of claims for 
participation as an end in itself, drawing on users’ participation in electricity 
service delivery. In the preceding two chapters, I have discussed the 
developmental implications of users’ participation in electricity delivery and 
contributions to efficiency and effectiveness gain in the service delivery. The 
main objective of promoting users’ participation in public service delivery has 
been improvement of service delivery. However, as participatory democracy 
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suggests, participation in any organisation and in any sort of collective decision 
making is expected to have some educative spillover effects. These educative 
effects empower the participants and promote democracy in practice; that 
makes participation an end in itself. The underlying ideas are “people can and 
should govern themselves” (Pitkin and Schumer, 1982: 43) and “participating in 
democratic decisions makes many participants better citizens” (Mansbridge, 
1999: 291). The proponents of participatory democracy have stressed on the 
educative effects of participation as a justifying function of public participation; 
they claim participation develops individuals’ powers of thought, feeling, and 
action (Kaufman, 1960; Mansbridge, 1999; Pateman, 1970). Participatory 
democracy claims that participation in a forum of decision-making enhances 
political efficacy of the participants, builds “confidence in one’s ability to 
participate responsibly and effectively, and to control one’s life and 
environment” (Pateman, 1970: 45-46). Participation in a democratic system is 
expected to lead to a process of positive self-transformation of the participants 
by catalysing a set of desirable changes in the individual. It enhances the 
participants’ faculty of practical reasoning, make people more tolerant of 
difference, more sensitive about the need for reciprocity, enhance people’s 
ability to think and act with autonomy on the basis of their own preferences, 
and to engage in moral discourse and make moral judgments (Warren, 1995). 
Public participation is also expected to produce more cognitively competent and 
well informed people with an enhanced capacity for consensual action. It helps 
to determine a ‘unanimous preference’ through the power of reasoning (Elster, 
1998: 112). 
Before I discuss the democratic contributions of users’ associations, it is 
important to understand organisation and operations of these micro-
institutions. Electricity users’ associations are informal community level 
institutions. Though they are required to register with the utilities, they do not 
have any formal legal status. While participatory decentralised governance 
model requires them to hold the service provider accountable, the model does 
not confer any formal power for that. These electricity users’ associations 
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coexist with other community level institutions, like traditional village 
committee, village education committee, water users association, with 
overlapping membership. All the legal electricity users are default members of 
the users’ association. These associations are governed by a small governing 
body consisting of 7-11 members. Leadership is often based around elders, 
experienced leaders and political aspirants. In case of Sundarbans, 
representatives to local government institutions are represented in the 
governing body. Consequently, it has resulted in sabotage of the group by local 
ruling party. The governing body is revamped along with the panchayat 
elections. However, the users’ associations in Orissa have been apolitical. 
In both cases, the groups meet once every month or more if required. In 
these meetings, members discuss any personal issues or community issues, take 
decision on penalising defaulters and cases of electricity theft, share 
experiences, discuss new policies and seek clarification. Occasionally, 
representative of service provider attend these meetings to offer clarifications 
and explanations. The decisions are usually taken by leaders and supported by 
the members. But in case of any opposition, the decision supported by majority 
of the present members prevails. Opposing members are obliged to comply with 
the final decision, as incompliance would mean deprivation from social goods. 
The users’ associations seek to merge individual preferences to community 
preference. Further details with reference to particular cases are provided in the 
chapter. 
Main goal of this chapter is to examine these claims of participatory 
democracy against actual evidence. Does users’ participation in electricity 
service delivery has any educative spillover effects? In this chapter, I aim to 
identify spillover effects of users’ participation in electricity service delivery. In 
the following five sections, I discuss five broad effects of users’ participation 
observed in the cases studied. The effects discussed in the chapter are not 
exactly the same effects expected in the theory of participatory democracy; 
rather it goes beyond to include any observable consequence of users’ 
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participation that has implications for democratic practice at present or in 
future. The section 7.2 analyses contribution of participation to enhancement of 
human dignity and respect of the participants; Section 7.3 discusses 
construction of ‘citizen-consumers’, a new form of citizenship; Section 7.4 
analyses development of leadership quality and group solidarity at grassroots 
and discusses how users’ participation in electricity delivery has promoted 
collective action for better service in other sectors; section 7.5 analyses how the 
above developments have affected public perception of government 
performance and their trust in government; and Section 7.6 aim to identify 
improvements in political participation among the electricity users. In the 
concluding section 7.7, I analyse the implications of these spillover effects for 
democratic practice at the grassroots. Do these effects matter for democratic 
practice and sustainability at grassroots? Do these effects contribute to 
empowerment of the rural people? 
Considering the limited nature, scope and period of participation 
observed in the study, it is really hard to measure the spillover effects of 
participation and establish strong causal relations. Jane Mansbridge rightly 
claims that “the kind of subtle changes in the character that comes about, 
slowly, from active participation in democratic decisions cannot easily be 
measured with the blunt instruments of social science” (Mansbridge, 1999: 291). 
The changes observed in the study are subtle and patchy, primarily due to 
limited intensity and duration of participation. The findings across the two cases 
studied are skewed; I have more evidence of change from Orissa than West 
Bengal. It is so for three reasons: first, West Bengal, with a higher level of 
democratic practice and empowerment compared to Orissa, has experienced 
subtle and less observable changes during the period of study; secondly, my 
personal experience of living in rural Orissa has helped me in identifying the 
changes better in Orissa; and finally, I have spent more time conducting 
fieldwork in Orissa than in West Bengal. However, the cumulative findings 
suggest that active participation can have relevant and sustainable spillover 
effects on empowerment of participants and democratic practice at grassroots. 
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7.2 Enhancement in Human Dignity and Self-Respect 
Human dignity and self-respect, as sources of freedoms and rights, have an 
important role in democracy. Joel Feinberg rightly claims that “having rights 
enables us to "stand up like men," to look others in the eye, and to feel in 
some fundamental way the equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of 
rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect 
that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of others. Indeed, respect 
for persons...may simply be respect for their rights, so that there cannot be the 
one without the other; and what is called "human dignity" may simply be the 
recognizable capacity to assert claims. To respect a person then, or to think of 
him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential 
maker of claims” (Feinberg, 1970: 252). Human dignity and self-respect are 
inherent and inviolable rights of every individual. However, they are frequently 
violated and compromised in unequal societies like India, through norms of 
inferior and superior status. The norms of inferior or superior status are not only 
based on caste, class and gender, but also driven by perceived self-respect, 
respect for others, access to information, and physical location. 
Participation in collective decision making and activity is expected to 
promote individual self-development and restore human dignity and self-
respect. It is expected to develop individual powers of ‘thought’, ‘feeling’, and 
‘action’. “The main justifying function of participation is development of man’s 
essential powers- inducing human dignity and respect, making men responsible 
by developing their powers of deliberate action” (Kaufman, 1960: 289). As 
claimed in the theory of participatory democracy, participation plays an 
educative role “in very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect 
and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures” (Pateman, 1970: 
42). However, these claims of participatory democracy are rarely tested 
empirically. In this section, in support of the claims of participatory democracy, 
I discuss some of ‘psychqological or characterological’ benefits gained through 
participation in electricity users’ committees. 
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The rural people tend to internalise an inferior status compared to the 
service providers. As part of my personal experience in living in rural Orissa, I 
have observed that the rural people are often afraid of the electric utility staff 
for their rude behaviour and demand for money towards inflated and erratic 
cost of service as well as bribe. Being unable to meet the demand for money, 
the poor people remain submissive to rude behaviour from the utility staff 
and still endeavour to provide high respect to them. In the process, the rural 
people compromise with their dignity, self-respect and rights as service users to 
please the service providers. As a consequence, the rural users have less 
demand for quality service, lack of voice against injustice, and accept erroneous 
norms and practices. It not only affects the quality of service and curtails 
their consumer rights, but also has serious implications for democratic practice 
by degrading political efficacy of the villagers. 
Participation in the electricity users’ committees, to a great extent, has 
contributed to restoring the human dignity and self-respect of rural people. 
Firstly, one must know his/her rights before claiming it; the villagers get 
awareness on their rights as service users through discourse in the meetings of 
users’ committee. Second, participating in these meetings, which provide them 
the opportunity to discuss their preferences and reconcile it with others’, the 
villagers learn to claim their rights. The users’ committees not only provide 
awareness on consumer rights, but also provide opportunity to exercise these 
rights. A villager explaining his experience said: 
Electricity [users’] committees are very important...we identify our 
consumer rights through discussions in the committee. The 
committee provides opportunity to learn from experience of senior 
and educated people...This has helped us to claim our rights from the 
electricity company [utility]. In the meetings we decide on what we 
can claim while not affecting others right to the service. (Author 
interview) 
Thirdly, the model of participatory service delivery, as discussed in the 
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previous chapters, has been able to solve the problems of inflated and erratic 
bill; that makes electricity service affordable to many of the rural poor. With 
increased ability to pay the cost of service and awareness of rights, the users are 
able to wane off the fear for utility staffs and resist any erroneous demand for 
bribe. This has resulted in transformation of users’ behaviour while dealing with 
service providers. It was observed that users have become assertive about their 
consumer rights and are no more submissive to any rude behaviour from the 
service providers; rather the users dare to question the utility staff for anything 
they are not satisfied with.65 In some cases, the villagers have successfully 
organised protests and gherao against service providers’ inaction and for 
immediate response to problems. Many of the users in both Orissa and West 
Bengal asserted that they are not scared of the utility staff: “they are 
appointed to serve our needs...They get their wage from our money. They 
should be accountable to us. Why should we fear them?” (Author interviews) 
The assertion is not just limited to electricity service, but extends to other 
services like education, health and public distribution system. Local 
                                                          
65 In my early experience of living in rural Orissa, I have noticed that female members 
of fa mily would not come out, at least in the absence of male members, when the 
utility staffs are around in the fear of misbehaviour. But during the field work, it was 
noticed that, in most cases, female members would pay their bill as male members of 
the family would stay out on work. It was also noticed that female members would ask 
for explanation of their utility bill as many cannot read, ask for a receipt and complain 
about any problem they face. This transformation from hiding behind the walls in fear 
to coming out to interact shows improvement in human dignity and self- respect. This 
transformation has been possible through improvement in self-respect as well as 
capability to pay bills on time. Though the women members do not participate 
directly in the process, they gain this self-respect and confidence through their male 
counterpart. The empowerment in part of the women is partly an outcome of male 
member’s empowerment and partly because they have become righteous consumers- 
by consuming on measure and paying bills on time. 
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administrative staffs complain about rising assertiveness of villagers: 
The concept of specific village committee is very notorious. The 
villagers have formed a committee for almost everything; there is an 
electricity committee, an education committee and a committee for 
water users. It makes our job difficult. You have to deal with so many 
of them. Whenever there is a small problem, they start a protest, 
gherao the office till you find a solution for them. They are impatient 
and irrational. When 20/30 people stand in front of you, you feel 
helpless; it is hard to control them. (Author interview with local Block 
Development Officer, Orissa) 
It shows there is a rising consciousness on rights and enhancement of 
human dignity and self-respect among the villagers. The villagers demand 
some respect from the utility staff in day-to-day dealing; they are not ready to 
submit to rude behaviour from the utility staff. In a particular case, one of the 
users’ committees studied in Orissa has successfully demanded change of local 
revenue collector for his rude behaviour. The villagers, who had internalised an 
inferior status to the service providers (local bureaucrats and utility staffs), 
now are able to challenge the same officials and hold them accountable for 
their action and inaction. Enhancement in human dignity and self- respect 
through participation has also initiated and contributed to other educative 
effects discussed below. 
7.3 Construction of Citizen-Consumer 
In the era of market populism66, public participation has an important role to 
play in sustaining publicness of public services. In the past two decades, public 
service delivery has been going through structural reforms for service 
                                                          
66 Market populism is the idea that markets within a capitalist system serve as the best 
expression of popular will. Supposedly capitalist markets are democratic institutions 
that "do what people want." Markets are not only mediums of distribution and 
exchange, but mediums of consent that express the will of the people (Frank, 2000). 
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improvement. The central theme of public service reforms is that service 
users want to be treated as consumers by service providers. But access to 
public service is not same as shopping. People see public services as different 
from market place and value ‘publicness’ of these services (Clarke et al., 2007). 
While the neo-liberal reforms in public service delivery aims to commodify the 
services and treat the users as mere consumers, the users of public services 
have many relationships with the services as citizens, experts, tax-payers and 
voters. They are part of the wider community, member of the service delivery 
system. Users’ participation in service delivery has significant implications for 
sustaining various relationships between people and public services. Interplay 
between public participation and market populism has resulted in construction 
of a new vision of citizenship which is referred as ‘citizen-consumers’ (Clarke et 
al., 2007; Cohen, 2003). Citizen-consumer is demanding for better service, but 
sceptical of market strategies, particularly of competition and choice (Clarke et 
al., 2007). As opposed to purchaser consumer, which is located in part in the 
atomised appetitive behaviours of individuals and in part within ideologies 
among economic planners, the citizen consumer is located self-consciously 
within consumer organisations and consumer movements and as an ideal 
among people in those organisations and movements and some people outside 
them (Cohen, 2003). In this section, I discuss how and to what extent the 
electricity users’ committees, as consumer organisations, construct citizen 
consumers. 
As I discussed in earlier chapters, electricity supply industry in India is 
under transformation during past two decades. Structural reforms initiated since 
early 1990s aim to establish a free and competitive market of electricity service 
where the users’ have choice, freedom to choose. But where there is inequality 
of income, this freedom reinstates the inequality between poor and rich. The 
main criticism of this approach is that it treats electricity service as a commodity 
and reduces publicness of the service. The electricity users’ committees seem to 
be protecting publicness of electricity service by reconciling individual interest 
to construct a public interest. At the same time, it trains the members to be 
 181 
sensible consumers. Users’ committee meetings act as a forum where the 
users deliberate to reach at a collective preference and where individual 
preferences are transformed through discourse. In the process, all member 
get opportunity to express their preferences and defend it. The users as 
member of a community (citizens) fulfil their obligations to one another, engage 
in mutual deliberation, and exercise their thought and choice in the definition 
and pursuit of collective interest. The decision to control load during peak hours 
and provide access to private property are examples where individual 
preferences are transformed in pursuit of collective interest. As a purchaser 
consumer in a free market, the members are free to consume as much 
electricity they want given that they pay for it. But as a member of the 
community, they agree and abide to consume sensibly so that other can 
have access to the service. Similarly, as an individual, the users have every right 
to protect their private property from infringement. But as members of the 
community, they agree and abide to provide access to their private property for 
benefit of the community. As experts, members shape their requirement, plan 
for local electrical development and extend support for implementation. As a 
consortium of voters, they also try to influence their political representatives for 
their needs. Describing the changes after users’ participation, one of the users’ 
committee head in Orissa said: 
As individual consumer or voter we had less bargaining power. As a 
group, we have double bargaining power. Now we can directly 
demand better service from the utility [as a group of consumers] and 
put extra pressure for our demand through our political 
representatives [as a group of citizens/voters]… As individual 
consumers, those who had money power and political connections 
used to get better service. But as a group, all the members benefit 
from any improvement that happens… For this collective benefit, 
every member has to make some commitment and contribution 
[These commitments and contributions include compromise of 
individual interests or preference for collective benefit]. (Author 
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interview) 
The electricity users’ committees also shape, protect and defend 
consumer interest of their members. The users are trained to hold the service 
providers accountable, express their need and challenge the provider. It is 
evident in rising assertiveness of the electricity users and their anxiousness to 
get efficient, effective and transparent access to the service. Simultaneously, 
they are educated to be responsible as consumers to the providers. It is evident 
in less differential attitude, increasing willingness to pay for the service and 
follow the rules and regulations. Even though being a consumer organisation, 
a community of private figures, the electricity users committee tend to promote 
a sense of citizenship, though different from traditional citizenship. The 
horizontal relationships of citizenship, based on egalitarian principles, are 
present in the users committees. The members are treated as equals and 
have equal say in the process, even though their status would vary as 
consumers. This has been possible through enhancement in dignity and self-
respect that puts the members as equal citizens to their fellow members 
irrespective of their consumer status. At the other hand, the members become 
more assertive citizens as their membership is associated with cash payment in 
form of their utility bill. 
7.4 Promotion of Leadership, Group Solidarity and Collective Action 
Participation, leadership, group solidarity and collective action are closely 
interrelated. Effective participation requires good leadership. Goodman et al. 
(1998) points out the important role leaders play in the development of small 
groups and organisations which are part of the continuum of participation and 
community empowerment. At the same time, participation is a means for 
leadership building through education and empowerment. Similarly, group 
solidarity and collective action are required for effective participatory initiatives 
and fostered through continuous participation. In this section, I aim to find if 
participation in electricity users’ associations promotes leadership, group 
solidarity and collective action. Though the study does not make a strong claim 
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that participation in electricity users’ associations results in leadership building, 
group solidarity and collective action, it points out some positive instances. 
Leadership is a blurred concept often confused with other forms of social 
influences. Leadership is a particular aspect of human capital that enables 
individual community members, as leaders, to act as agents of change to 
mobilise others and catalyse action (Bass, 1990). On that basis, the leaders in 
the case studies are the governing body members of electricity users’ 
associations, who lead the users associations in all their initiatives. There is no 
standard size of these governing bodies. Each users’ association decides the size 
of their respective governing body, which varies from seven to 11 in the cases 
studied. Again there are no fixed norms for selection of the governing body. 
The members of users’ associations select their leaders on the basis of three 
criteria: 1) whom they like (often educated elites and elderly people), 2) whom 
they perceive to be leaders (people with some experience of leadership), 3) 
whom they think are active participants (enthusiastic and energetic members 
with innovative ideas). However, there are two variations between Orissa and 
West Bengal in selection and composition of governing body members. In 
Orissa, the governing body comprises of only selected leaders from the 
users/members irrespective of their political affiliations. But in West Bengal, by 
design, the governing body comprises of two members from the local 
government. At the same time, as the electricity users’ associations are co-
opted by the ruling political party (in the local government)67, the other 
                                                          
67 The electricity users’ associations in West Bengal (and in Orissa) are designed to be 
apolitical. But in practice, the ruling political parties at the grassroots level have 
captured these users association in West Bengal. My observation during the fieldwork 
substantiates this claim. During my fieldwork, West Bengal had an election for local 
government institutions. In the study area, Trinamool Congress Party came into power 
defeating the ruling CPI(M). Immediately after the elections, the electricity users’ 
associations were reshuffled to accommodate the members of the Trinamool 
Congress. 
 184 
members of the governing body are usually affiliated to the ruling party. 
In all the cases studies, the governing body comprises of some members 
active in other forums like traditional village committee, water users’ 
association, education committee or local government institutions. However, 
a deliberate effort has been made to keep some positions available for new 
leaders. As a member in Orissa said, “we do not want the same people to 
head all the committees. Then, they work for some committees and ignore 
others… Those who are interested and active should get a chance. Otherwise, 
they bring in negative energy and create obstacles for those who work” (author 
interview).68 Some users associations have developed innovative models to 
accommodate new leaders and for better representation. For example, one of 
the users’ associations in Orissa has fixed two year tenure for governing body 
members. None of the governing body members can serve for a second term 
until all the members of the users’ association have served once in the governing 
body. That ensures that all the members get a chance to lead the users’ 
association. Another users’ association has a provision to have governing body 
members from different geographic parts of the village. All the users’ 
associations in Orissa claimed that if a governing body member is inactive and 
continuously absent in meetings, then he is replaced by a new member. 
However, these innovations could not be found in case of West Bengal, possibly 
due to interference from the local government, political parties and WBREDA 
leaving little space for the users’ associations to manoeuvre. 
While participation in electricity users associations not only empowers 
the members by educating them and enhancing their dignity and self-respect, 
the electricity users’ associations provide some space for new leaders. However, 
leadership building varies from case to case based on the manoeuvres done 
by the users’ associations. There are a few instances where leadership in social 
                                                          
68 I came across similar viewpoints in both the cases. But in Orissa this strategy is 
followed to accommodate newly emerging assertive youths, while in West Bengal it is 
more a strategy to accommodate party workers to hold party control. 
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participation has transformed into representative or political leadership. In both 
Orissa and West Bengal, some of the leaders in electricity users’ associations 
have been elected to local government institutions. A Ward Member (village 
representative in local government) in Orissa, who have served in the governing 
body of electricity users’ association, narrated his experience: 
It was the best thing that happened for me. I never thought I would 
be part of development, sit with government people and talk to 
them. I always had fear for them and never understood the way they 
work. I got to learn a lot from working in electricity committee. When 
my friends suggested to contest in election, I had some confidence in 
myself and support of the electricity committee. Now I am capable of 
negotiating with government people. (Author interview) 
Another local government representative in West Bengal reported slightly 
different experience and motivation for working in the governing body of 
electricity users’ association: 
I always wanted to join politics and work for people. The electricity 
committee provided an opportunity to gain some experience and 
prove my leadership capability. I also gained [political] support of 
people for my good work in the electricity committee. For me, 
electricity committee was a step to Panchayat [local government]. 
(Author interview) 
Another anticipated contribution of community participation is 
promotion of strong group solidarity. Group solidarity is a pre-requirement for 
effective participation and can be promoted through effective participation. 
Rural communities are often fragmented on the basis of various social identities 
like caste, class and gender. These social identities often dominate any form of 
group mobilisation and hinder mobilisation on the basis of any other identity. In 
that context, how far the electricity users’ associations are successful mobilising 
the members on the basis of electricity user identity, surpassing the social 
identities? 
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Group solidarity can be facilitated through bringing together people who 
share common interests or problems. It is characterised by strong internal 
monitoring and sanctioning systems, strong intra-group ties, high exit costs and 
lack of information about resources outside the group (Heckathorn and 
Rosenstein, 2002). In the present context, the electricity users groups brings 
together people facing a common problem of poor electricity service and 
sharing common interest to improve their access to better electricity service. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, the groups have ensured internal monitoring of 
their members, how they behave as consumers, and have some sanctioning 
power. Active participation in the group provides a wide range of information 
on user rights, obligation and available resources, which is not easily 
accessible outside the group. Participating in the group, over time, the 
members also realise that they can serve their interests better as a group than 
as an individual. Exit from the group would imply deprivation of the common 
goods and even deprivation of the basic access to electricity. 
So the electricity users’ associations demonstrate stronger group 
solidarity as electricity users. This is partly facilitated by lower social division and 
less caste based mobilisation in the study areas. Electricity users’ associations 
are male dominated arenas, where there is no role for female members of the 
society. So, there is no problem of gender divisions. The villages in Eastern 
India are divided on the basis of Varna System. There are separate villages for 
Savarna (caste Hindus) and Avarna (out castes or untouchables). Coincidentally, 
all the villages studied are Savarna villages. Even though there are differences 
within Savarna, in the absence caste based politics in the two states, the caste 
divisions are not extreme like Northern states of India. 
A unique characteristic of the users’ association is that they not only 
foster intra-group solidarity, but also exhibit inter-group ties. It was 
observed that in both cases, the electricity users’ association work with their 
counterparts from nearby villages for common goods like extension and 
maintenance of distribution network. Inter group ties have been facilitated by 
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the presence of second tier institutions, viz. cooperative in West Bengal and 
franchisee in Orissa, who brings the associations under one platform. The users’ 
association not only work together, but also learn from each other’s experience 
of handling issues. 
Leadership building, group solidarity and consistent participation have 
resulted in some form of collective action. In the previous chapters, I have 
discussed how collective action has contributed to improved electricity supply. 
In some cases, the users’ associations have taken up developmental actions 
beyond their core activity. In a village in Orissa, the electricity users’ association 
developed a plan for improving school education in the village. Along with the 
Gram Sabha (traditional village committee), the electricity users’ association has 
appointed para-teachers in the school to increase teaching hours and provide 
additional support to students. Later an education committee was created to 
monitor the teachers and their performance. 
7.5 Declining Faith in Government 
In recent years, among the politicians, journalists and citizens, there is an 
increasing concern about declining trust in the government and its agencies, and 
the detrimental effects this has on government and the cohesion of society 
(Bok, 2001). The underlying rationale is that higher citizens’ trust in government 
will equal better governance. The debate on citizens’ trust in government is not 
new; it has received central position in classical liberalism, in the writings of 
John Locke. Locke claims that the relationship of citizens to government is one 
of trust, not one of contract (Dunn, 1984). However, the standard 
contemporary argument for the importance of trust in government is related 
to the commonplace view that without normative commitments by citizens, 
government cannot gain obedience from citizens. Citizens must trust 
government if government is to work well and decline in citizen trust of 
government bodes ill for many contemporary democratic societies. A striking 
thing about the contemporary vision that citizens should trust government, and 
that it is a failing of either citizens or government if they do not, is that it is 
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strikingly contrary to the traditional liberalism (Hardin, 1998; Hardin, 1999). 
The contemporary view establishes a perceived link between 
government performance and citizen trust in government (Yang and Holzer, 
2006). The efficiency with which government delivers services is an important 
determinant of government performance and thus, a determinant of citizen 
trust, but there are several other contributors. Sims (2001) has listed a variety 
of factors as possible explanation for deteriorating performance of 
governments and declining trust of citizens. Government performance is a 
complicated amalgam of what government is actually doing and what the public 
perceives it to be doing. Nye (1997) points out complexities in measuring 
government performance: “[It] is more complicated than it first appears. To 
what should we compare government performance? Expectations? The past? 
The performance of other countries? That of other institutions such as private 
businesses or non-profit organisations? Another problem with measuring 
performance is distinguishing general outcomes from specific outputs of 
government” (Nye, 1997: 101). On the other hand, most citizens do not have the 
information they need to assess government performance and to decide to 
trust. These are such information which many of the citizens cannot sensibly 
claim to have with respect to most government policies and officials or with 
respect to government generally (Hardin, 1999). 
However, rising education level and people’s ability to access more 
information about government from a variety of sources may enhance their 
capability to assess government performance and thus influence their trust in 
government (Sims, 2001). With that assumption, I aim to find out whether users’ 
participation in electricity delivery affects their trust in government. Does 
participation in electricity users associations enhance the participants’ skill of 
assessing government performance? How does that affect their expectations 
from and trust in government and its agencies? 
As discussed earlier, electricity users gain important information 
regarding the service (including relevant policies, their implementation, user 
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rights and obligations) through participating in electricity users associations. 
These information are collected from and validated by various sources and 
certainly richer than the information available to individual electricity users. In 
the light of these information, the electricity users are able to better assess 
government (and its agencies’) performance in delivering the service. The 
information also enables the users to identify loopholes in government system 
that affects their access to service. Consequently, it shapes their expectation 
from the government and their trust in government. 
This has resulted in multi-level understanding of government 
performance in electricity service delivery. There is a general understanding that 
government has failed to delivery good quality electricity service at affordable 
price. Here, the perception is that the national government has ignored their 
state and the state government is less sensitive to electrical development in 
rural areas. This perception is shaped by comparing with the perceived status of 
electrical development in other states, which is based on mere assumption than 
facts.69 Secondly, there is an understanding that the policies are not properly 
implemented and resources are not effectively targeted owing to an inefficient 
and corrupt human resource within the sector. As a response, the users try to 
minimise corruption by monitoring the utility staffs. Finally, the users 
acknowledge that weak fiscal status of the utilities has affected quality of 
electricity supply in rural areas. As a response, they try to access alternative 
sources of funding70 for electrical developments, while ensuring their revenue 
contribution. 
                                                          
69 The electricity users, in both the cases, assume that electrical development in the 
developed states is at a much advanced stage due to their easy access to national 
resources. This assumption is partly based on media reporting. However, it cannot be 
substantiated with facts. 
70 In some instances, the electricity users associations have tried to generate 
alternative funding for electrical development from constituency development funds 
of local elected representatives and through community pooling. 
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These understandings have shaped the expectations of electricity 
users and trust in government. However, it varies across cases based on the 
local context. In the West Bengal case, the access to electricity is limited by 
duration of supply and geographical spread. So, the users expect the state 
government to make investment for increased electricity generation. In Orissa, 
where electrical developments are substantially advanced, the users expect less 
from the state government. They expect the local government to monitor the 
performance of local utility staffs. They are also willing to partner in local 
electrical development. Users’ participation in electricity delivery has promoted 
obedience to government regulations (in relation to electricity supply) from the 
users, while shaping their expectation from the government in tune with their 
requirement. But that does not necessarily imply higher trust in the 
government. The users in West Bengal bestow high trust in the state 
government as they believe that the recent electrical developments in their 
area have been possible through government initiatives and it is capable of 
sponsoring further development. However, in Orissa, the users believe that the 
recent improvements in electricity delivery have been possible through their 
initiatives at the local level, while the government has been ‘irresponsive’. This 
shows the electricity users’ trust in the government is framed by their 
perception of government performance and their expectation from the 
government. 
7.6 Increasing Political Participation 
Participatory democracy suggests that participation in decision making in social 
institutions is an educative tool for the creation of democratic citizens. It 
suggests that being involved in democratic social relations in a variety of 
institutions helps people gain the confidence, knowledge and outlooks that 
enable them to be effective and participatory citizens in the larger society (Dahl, 
1985, Pateman, 1970, Greenberg, 1986, Barber, 1984). Based on these 
assumptions, the study aims to find if the members of electricity users’ 
association demonstrate higher political participation. Though the study finds 
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significantly high political participation among the members of electricity users’ 
associations, due to lack of substantial evidence, it does not establish a 
causal link between participation in users’ associations and political process. 
The major difficulty in this part of the study is lack of secondary 
resources on the status of political participation in India. With limited 
information available, it is hard to set a concrete baseline. However, there are 
two studies available which have analyses grassroots political participation in 
two states, viz. West Bengal and Karnataka. Bardhan et al. (2008), based on a 
survey in rural West Bengal, claims that 50 per cent of the rural households 
attend political meetings, 25 per cent participate in political campaigns, 37 per 
cent attend Gram Sabha meetings and 11 per cent ask questions at these 
meetings. Crook and Manor (1998), studying grassroots participation in 
Karnataka, claim 23 per cent of the rural households are involved in campaigns, 
17 per cent attend Gram Sabha meetings, and 6.5 per cent ask questions. Taking 
these finding as baseline, I seek to find out if political participation rate is higher 
among the members of electricity users’ associations. 
Most of the electricity users interviewed were asked about their political 
participation during last elections for state legislative assembly and local 
government institutions. Out of 283 electricity users interviewed in Orissa, 221 
interviewees and all 127 electricity users interviewed in West Bengal were 
asked about their political participation. The findings imply higher political 
participation among members of electricity users associations.  
In Orissa, during the state assembly elections, 37 per cent of the 
interviewees have attended political meetings and 22 per cent have participated 
in political campaigns. However, in the election for local government 
institutions, 72 per cent interviewees have attended political meetings and 46 
per cent were engaged in political campaigns. 83 per cent interviewees claimed 
that they have attended the Gram Sabha meetings at least once during last one 
year and 46 per cent claimed to have attended all the meetings during last one 
year. 27 per cent of them claimed to have raised a question in these meetings. 
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All the interviewees (100 per cent) claimed that they have voted during both the 
elections. 
In West Bengal, 68 per cent interviewees have attended political 
meetings and 39 per cent have participated in political campaigns during the 
state assembly elections. In the local government elections, 85 per cent 
interviewees have attended political meetings and 45 per cent were engaged in 
political campaigns. 92 per cent interviewees claimed that they have attended 
Gram Sabha meetings at least once during last one year and 57 per cent 
claimed to have attended all the meetings during last one year. 32 per cent of 
them claimed to have raised a question in these meetings. 98 per cent of the 
interviewees have voted in state assembly elections and 99 per cent have voted 
in elections for local government institutions. 
It shows a significantly higher political participation among members of 
electricity users’ associations compared to findings of Crook and Manor (1998) 
and Bardhan et al. (2008). However, there is no evidence to prove that this rise 
in political participation is an outcome of participation in electricity users’ 
associations. There could be various other explanations for the increase in 
political participation. In recent years, there is a general trend of increased 
political participation in rural India compared to urban India. In Orissa, vote 
purchase (direct payment of cash for political support) might be a reason for 
increased political engagement, while in West Bengal political clientelism 
remains a reason for higher political engagement. 
Yet, the findings demonstrate a new trend in democratic political 
practice. In both the cases, there is higher political participation, particularly 
attending meetings and campaigns, during elections for local government 
institutions. Possibly, it is because the rural people can connect more with the 
local governments than the state governments. Declining faith in the higher tier 
of government, as discussed in the last section, partly explains lower political 
engagement during state assembly elections. Social closeness and accessibility 
of candidates, which is higher in local government elections, might influence 
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attendance of political meetings and campaigns. Nevertheless, increased 
political participation during local government elections imply strengthening of 
grassroots democracy. 
However, participation within the electricity users’ association is quite 
high, though the meetings are not held regularly. Because, the committee meets 
to discuss specific issues, they meet only when there is any issue to discuss. 
But, the meeting are highly attended. Though it was practically difficult to 
quantify the attendance, it was observed that attendance was higher than 
traditional village committee meetings (which are regular). As expected, 
however, participation in discussion is low; while few people raise the issue and 
take a decision, other just give their consent. Interestingly, in none of the 
meeting I had attended, there was any opposition or resistance to the decisions. 
Perhaps, it is because of the local culture in eastern India to accept and oblige 
elderly and qualified members of society. For example, one of the meetings in 
Orissa was called to discuss a member’s resistance to put a stay on his private 
land. Though the member had declined permission to the utility staffs to put 
the stay in his land, when requested by the committee member, he agreed to it 
instantly (Author observation). 
7.7 Conclusion 
Drawing on the discussion in this chapter, it seems that users’ participation in 
electricity delivery has some spillover effects. The five broad effects of 
participation discussed in the chapter imply that participation may contribute to 
civic and democratic values of participants. Enhancement of human dignity and 
self-respect enables the participants to interact with the service providers as 
equals and hold them accountable. This confidence could be useful to interact 
and negotiate with their political representatives and decision makers and hold 
them accountable for their decisions. Awareness gained through participation 
makes better citizen-consumers who are informed about their rights and 
sensible to their obligations. While as consumers they are informed about their 
rights and how to claim them, as citizens they know their obligations and 
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perform them. Electricity users’ associations have been able to promote 
leadership, group solidarity and collective action. While participation in users’ 
associations instils the skills of leadership in the participants, the users’ 
associations provide a platform to exercise these skills. Here, participation has 
resulted in strengthening of group solidarity among the electricity users as a 
community bridging the social divisions. In some cases, this solidarity has 
resulted in constructive collective activities and goods. 
At the other hand, participation leading to awareness and self-
confidence has resulted in declining faith in state institutions, particularly the 
higher tiers of government. There is an emerging perception that state has 
failed to deliver. Consequently, there is a building pressure on the state 
institutions to perform well, while there is enthusiasm to collectively take on 
some of the responsibilities where the state has failed. A related development is 
higher political engagement at grassroots compared to macro level political 
events. Though the participants of electricity users’ associations tend to engage 
more in political activities, they are more active in micro level political events. 
This has significant implication for democratic institutions and practice. This 
trend might demand further devolution of power, responsibilities and resources 
to lower tiers of government and result in strengthening of grassroots 
democracy. 
Participation in users’ associations seems to appreciably influence 
democratic institutions and practices in rural India. Yet, there is not enough 
evidence to establish a causal link. The study has not clearly established that 
these changes are direct outcome of participation in electricity users’ 
associations. The changes observed are subtle and found in few places. That 
implies there is a long way to go. Scaling up community participation and 
sustaining it for longer period might produce better results. However, it is hard 
to make a case for any kind of state intervention to promote community 
participation for the purpose of strengthening democratic institutions and 
practices. Further research on community participation and its impact on 
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democratic value and practices would be useful to make a strong case. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
I opened the research with the backdrop that state provision of electricity 
service has failed in India. It has failed more for the rural poor. In this research, I 
have tried to analyse the potentials of decentralised participatory electricity 
delivery as an alternative to the conventional centralised state provisioning of 
electricity service. The aim of the research was to identify and analyse the 
outcomes of decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, decentralisation and users’ participation 
in electricity delivery have significantly improved electricity service in parts of 
Eastern India by contributing to efficiency and effectiveness gains in electricity 
delivery. At the same time, the study finds that participation in electricity users 
associations have resulted in some improvements in civic values and political 
efficacy of the participants. 
This final chapter spells out the wider implications of the empirical 
analysis of decentralised participatory electricity delivery. It draws out the 
general conclusions reached on this research, their implications for Indian 
energy policy, highlights some limits and further research questions. The 
chapter is organised as follows. The Section 8.2 summarises the findings of the 
research and points out the limitations. The Section 8.3 makes a case for an 
integrated approach to local public service delivery. The Section 8.4, based on 
the findings, outlines several policy recommendations for improving electricity 
service in rural India. The Section 8.5 outlines some unanswered questions 
and identifies issues for further research. 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
Perceived failure of centralised electricity delivery and market-oriented 
reforms has led to increasing advocacy of decentralised and participatory model 
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of electricity delivery (decentralised governance of electricity delivery, as it is 
referred in the literature) in India. The proposed institutional reforms in 
electricity service delivery, driven by international experiences and global 
debate on participatory development, does not pay attention to uniqueness of 
Indian experience and context. The study, drawing on experience in two cases 
from Eastern India, is an attempt to fill the gap and contribute to the policy 
process. The purpose of this study is to identify and analyse the potentials of 
decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity service delivery in Indian 
context. The key question is that can decentralisation and users’ participation 
address the problems existing in conventional model of electricity delivery and 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of electricity supply system. At the same 
time, building on the theory of participatory democracy, the study aimed to find 
out spillover effects of users’ participation in electricity delivery; how 
participation in electricity users’ associations affects participants’ political 
efficacy. The study is aimed at identifying the potentials of decentralised and 
participatory electricity delivery in Indian context. So it has primarily focused on 
the positive outcomes of the new institutional arrangements, drawing on 
successful cases. 
At first, the study has analysed the politics of electricity delivery in 
India and how it has contributed to the current state of electricity service. It 
finds that since India’s independence, Indian electricity sector has passed 
through four phases of major policy shifts: the first, following independence in 
1947, led to the consolidation of public power in the sector; the second, from 
the late 1960s through the 1980s, was characterised by political interference 
and led to the emergence of a populist paradox in the sector; the third, 
beginning in the early 1990s, laid the groundwork for the shift to market 
orientation by opening up the sector to private players and structural reforms; 
and the fourth phase began with the enactment of the Electricity Act 2003, 
marking a new beginning and seeking to strike a balance between the 
economic and the social objectives through various approaches. From the 
analysis of these policy shifts and their impacts, I conclude that the Indian 
 198 
electricity sector has developed several inefficiencies over the past six decades 
that impede its performance. First, technical and commercial loss in Indian 
electricity is as high as 35 per cent, while the loss for a standard efficient 
system is below 10 per cent. Second, high level of theft is a unique feature of 
Indian electricity and is almost non-existent in efficient electricity delivery 
systems. Third, poor revenue realisation due to non-payment by users (induced 
by non-users’ theft and political protection) and ineffective revenue collection 
mechanism has contributed to the financial crisis of the utilities. Fourth, lack of 
transparency, resulting in high levels of corruption, and lack of accountability 
has contributed to the poor quality of the service. Fifth, the Indian electricity 
sector has underestimated the potential of end-use efficiency, which has 
resulted in unethical use and overuse of the service. Lack of end-use efficiency 
coupled with other problems has contributed to poor quality of supply which is 
evident in low voltage and frequent blackout. Finally, all these problems 
together have seriously impeded access to the service for the poor, 
undermining the social objective set at the time of independence to bridge the 
gap between urban and rural areas and between rich and poor in terms of 
access to the service. In the empirical analysis in the thesis, I have discussed 
how decentralisation and users’ participation has been addressing these 
inefficiencies and thus contributing to improvement in electricity service 
delivery. 
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I have questioned the 
normative claims around efficiency gain in decentralised governance of service 
delivery drawing on experiences of decentralised and participatory electricity 
delivery in Eastern India. The findings suggest that putting people at the centre 
of service delivery can work; it has potential to improve the operative efficiency 
in service delivery mechanism. Decentralised participatory model of electricity 
delivery embodies institutionalised coproduction where the users contribute to 
service improvement. It emerges as one of the solutions to problems in 
conventional electricity delivery mechanism, particularly in rural areas. 
Decentralised governance of electricity delivery has, to a great extent, 
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addressed the major problems in Indian electricity supply industry and 
contributed to efficiency gain in electricity service delivery. It has checked 
electricity theft, promoted end-use efficiency, increased revenue realisation, 
reduced technical loss and in consequence, improved quality of supply. 
However, there is variation in performance across cases. In case of Sundarbans, 
most of the problems do not exist partly because users participation was 
introduced from the beginning and participation is institutionalised well. In case 
of Orissa, both the franchisee served villages and utility served villages have 
performed equally where efficiency gain is due to the contribution of users. But 
where efficiency gain requires service provider’s contribution, franchisee served 
villages have performed better than utility served villages. The study finds that 
presence of decentralised or local service provider contributes to better 
maintenance of distribution network, better collection of revenues, better 
quality of supply and better response to users. 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I have discussed how 
decentralisation and users’ participation have brought in effectiveness in 
electricity service delivery. The study concludes that decentralisation and users’ 
participation has significant impact of effectiveness of electricity delivery 
system. As the case studies show, decentralisation and users participation can 
bring in transparency in process of service delivery making the users aware of 
their rights and responsibilities. As a consequence, there is decline in level of 
corruption and change in nature of corruption. Deliberation in users’ 
committees enhances the capacity of rural users to express their voice, shape 
shared user values and standards of performance to judge the service provider. 
As an outcome, it empowers the users to hold the provider accountable. At 
same time, presence of a local service provider with a sense of responsiveness 
and risk makes the delivery system more accountable to the users. Users’ 
awareness gained through participation and increased transparency makes 
them upward accountable to the service provider. Increased transparency and 
accountability, in the presence of a local service provider, improves the quality 
of service. While transparency and accountability enables the users to demand 
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and bargain for better service, local service provider remains more accessible 
and responsive to the rural users. Altogether these improvements in electricity 
delivery have contributed to equity of access, reflected in increased access to 
service, making the service accessible to the poorer segment of society. 
Decentralisation and users participation in service delivery clearly 
emerges as a possible solution to the failures in conventional model of 
electricity delivery and a strategy for India’s universal electrification drive. While 
all the cases have shown commendable improvement in effectiveness in 
reaching to the rural households, there is significant variation across cases. The 
major reason for this variation in the cases is presence or absence of a 
decentralised local provider. While users’ awareness, voice and demand can 
be raised through participation, there is a need for responsive service provider 
to respond to users demand, provide better access and quality of service. The 
emerging lesson is decentralised local service providers are more effective that 
large service providers, be it state run or private owned. Orissa experience 
suggests that decentralisation and users’ participation can make an existing 
failing system of service delivery efficient and effective, while Sundarbans case 
suggests introducing decentralisation and participation from the beginning, at 
the design stage, may help to build an efficient and effective service delivery 
mechanism. It must be recognised that having an off-grid electricity system, 
Sundarbans is less likely to have some of the inefficiencies found in grid-based 
systems. For example, limited availability of electricity makes metering 
unnecessary and billing error and over consumption virtually impossible. 
Moreover, the fact that electricity is generated within the community, it 
becomes a common pool resource that is owned and protected by the 
community. Consequently, scope of theft is technically limited.  
In the final part, I have tried to analyse empirical validity of claims for 
participation as an end in itself, drawing on users’ participation in electricity 
service delivery. Here, I have tried to locate how participation in electricity 
users’ associations has contributed to civic values and political efficacy of the 
participants. The study concludes that users’ participation in electricity 
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delivery have some spillover effects, though subtle and patchy, evident in 
improvement in dignity and self-respect of the participants, construction of 
citizen consumers, promotion of leadership, group solidarity and collective 
action, changing expectations and faith in government performance, and 
increased political participation. However, these spillover effects of users’ 
participation in electricity delivery are mediated through local social and 
political context. However, the study has not established that these positive 
changes are direct outcomes decentralisation and participation in electricity 
supply. Further research is required to find evidence to establish the link. 
The research concludes that decentralised and participatory electricity 
delivery can be pursued as an alternative to centralised state provision of 
electricity service. Decentralisation and users’ participation can be embedded 
into the existing centralised arrangement to improve service delivery. Moreover, 
the model of service delivery, by ensuring users’ participation, can have 
educative effects for the participants. 
However, there are several limitations and some unanswered questions 
in the research. The conclusions of this research are based on limited empirical 
foundations. The research is based on experience of decentralised governance 
of electricity delivery in parts of two states in Eastern India. So, I do not 
generalise the findings. The findings are specific to the cases. However, insights 
from these two cases can be used to improve the model for electricity delivery 
and can be scaled up across the country and sectors with consideration for local 
social and political context. Secondly, though the study has two case studies and 
makes comparison between them, there is more information from the first case, 
i.e. Orissa, due to various reasons mentioned in Chapter 4. Thirdly, as the study 
aimed to identify and analysis the potentials of a specific model of electricity 
delivery, there is some biasness in presenting and emphasising the positive 
outcomes of decentralisation and users’ participation in electricity delivery. 
Finally, as the model of electricity delivery is implemented at micro level (in few 
villages), the outcomes are limited within the micro level. The outcomes of 
decentralisation and users’ participation have little impact on macro (state or 
 202 
national) level status of electricity delivery. Yet, I have compared the findings 
with macro status of electricity service where possible. 
8.3 A Framework for Local Public Service Delivery 
The participatory development literature identifies three different approaches 
to local development, viz. decentralised sectoral approach, community 
participation approach and local government approach. Decentralised sectoral 
approach emphasises on functionally specialised organisations at the local level, 
with operational autonomy allocated through deconcentration or delegation 
policies. Community participation approaches emphasise community 
organisations as institutions of collective action and interlocutors between 
people and public service providers. Local government approach promotes 
territorially organised political and administrative institutions, with policy and 
operational autonomy allocated through devolution policies. These three 
different approaches to local development aim to provide public facilities and 
services at local level and share common principles like empowerment of the 
poor and marginalised groups, responsiveness to beneficiary demand, autonomy 
of local institutions, better downward accountability, and enhancement of local 
capabilities (Helling et. al., 2005). 
In the present study, we can see presence and integration of these three 
approaches to local development (See Figure). In all the cases, the bottom level 
of institutions (users’ associations) is an outcome of the community participation 
approach pursued for improvement in electricity delivery. In the franchise 
served areas of Orissa and Cooperative served areas in Sundarbans, the middle 
layer of institutions (franchisee and cooperative) is an outcome of decentralised 
sectoral approach. In Sundarbans, local government approach is pursued with 
integration of local government institutions in the electricity cooperatives. 
Sundarbans case depicts integration of all the three approaches to local 
development, while in the franchised served areas of Orissa there is a 
combination of decentralised sectoral approach and community participation 
approach. 
 203 
 
Though these three approaches to local development have shared 
principles and aim for a common goal of better public service delivery, they 
differ in their organisational principle and strategic orientation (See Table 8.1). 
Each addresses the same challenge from a different entry point and therefore 
has its advantages and limitations. General insights from the case studies are 
summarised in the table below. Decentralised sectoral approach, because of its 
entry through functional specialisation, tends to be better at mobilising 
technical capacity, but with limited devolution of authority and resources, it is 
insufficient to address local demand and issues. Local government approach, 
because of its entry through the institutions of territorial government, ensure 
clear formal autonomy and accountability of local decision makers and, to 
certain extent, sectoral authorities, but is often more politicised and less 
effective in managing utility services. Community participation approach 
contributes to empowerment and responsiveness to local priorities and 
conditions, but its entry point through community structure makes it weaker 
and sometimes complicated to coordinate with public sector agencies. 
As we can see from the table below, each approach offers useful 
methods for improvement in service delivery, but each has limitations. Linking 
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these approaches for local development may offer better opportunities for 
significant synergies. As found in the research, there is variation in achievements 
across cases reflecting the combination of approaches followed. The Sunderbans 
case, with integration of all the three approaches, has performed better than 
Orissa cases. It has been successful in avoiding many of the inefficiencies that 
typically exist in Indian electricity supply industry (while some of the 
inefficiencies are technically absent in an off-grid system). Within Orissa, the 
franchisee served villages, with integration of decentralised sectoral approach 
and community participation approach, have achieved higher improvement in 
electricity service compared to the utility served villages with only community 
participation approach. 
However, to effectively link these approaches, there is a need to find 
ways to ease the tensions arising from their different principles of organisation, 
strategic orientation and operational methods. A successful integrated approach 
for public service delivery would link community organisations, local 
governments and deconcentrated sectoral agencies more coherently to improve 
the way public decisions and actions are organised at the local level. While 
these basic local institutions are part of the integrated institutional arrangement 
for public service delivery, their roles and relationships may vary according to 
context. The venue for local decision making and resource management also 
vary according to the context. For example, the venue for final decision making 
and resource management is the electricity cooperative in Sundarbans, while in 
Orissa the venue is village electricity users’ association. Linking this integrated 
bottom-up approach with national efforts for better public service delivery may 
produce better results. 
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Table 8.1: Approaches for Local Development 
 Decentralised Sectoral Approach Community Participation Approach Local Government Approach 
Principle of 
organisation 
Function Social Unit 
(Users as a Community) 
Territory 
(Political or administrative Units) 
Institutions Functionally specialised local agencies 
(Franchisees or Cooperatives) 
Users’ Associations Panchayats or Municipalities 
Strategic 
Orientation 
Work as agents of the centralised utility to achieve 
mandatory policy goals 
Educate and empower communities to decide, organise 
and act in their own interest 
The lowest tier of government directly provide the 
services within their jurisdiction 
Key Findings  It is necessary, but not sufficient for efficient and 
effective service delivery on its own 
 Delegated to outside (public or private) agencies 
 Brings the service provider closer to the users. More 
accessible, accountable and responsive to users 
 Demand-responsive arrangements- participatory 
priority setting, linking of service to willingness to pay, 
marketising of service 
 Tend to engage with users as co-producers and for 
service oversight 
 Enables allocation of scarce resources strategically, 
increase coordination, promote partnerships, and 
strengthens synergies 
 Increases accountability among service providers and 
users 
 Local government responsiveness requires both 
electoral accountability and political participation by 
users 
 More accessible to users and can be accountable and 
responsive to them 
 Effectiveness of service delivery system depends not 
only on the local governments also on the effectiveness 
of local civil society 
 Effective service delivery requires collaboration and 
coordination between local government and sector 
agencies 
 Can hold sectoral staff accountable through political 
pressure 
 Can generate local resource for service improvement 
 Can advocate local interests in regional and national 
forum 
 Community participation serves as an end-in-itself. 
 Educates and empowers the community members as 
service users and citizens 
 Participatory priority setting shapes the demand for 
services in tune with available resources 
 Encourages citizen co-production in service delivery 
 Promotes collective action for service improvement 
and beyond 
 Promotes willingness to pay for service and use 
limited resources responsibly 
 Promotes transparency in service delivery process 
 Enhances opportunities for choices and voices for 
marginalised rural community 
 
Limitations  Lack of discretion to adjust sector policies and service 
priorities to local context 
 Lack of sufficient coordination, collaboration and 
integration across the sector 
 Difficulty in ensuring adequate responsiveness and 
accountability from higher sectoral officials 
 Absence of resource transfer for addressing local 
problems 
 Lack of policy support 
 Often over loaded with demand, while their 
organisational capacity and resource endowments are 
inadequate to meet citizen expectations and functional 
responsibilities 
 In prioritisation of services, some services (like 
electricity) get less attention 
 Lack of technical expertise required for service delivery 
 Possibility of politicisation of decision-making or elite 
capture 
 Reliance on formal mechanisms of accountability (e.g. 
elections) might undermine direct contact between 
local government and users 
 Weak links to broader service delivery system 
  Little coordination and integration with the service 
providing agencies 
 Lack of resources and adequate information for 
functioning 
 Lack of technical expertise 
 Possibility of elite capture and political co-optation 
 Lack of policy support 
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8.4 Policy Implications 
Findings of this research suggest that decentralisation and users’ participation in 
electricity delivery can improve electricity delivery in Indian context. In the 
empirical part of thesis, I have demonstrated how decentralisation and users’ 
participation lead to improved electricity delivery. However, there is still scope and 
opportunity for electricity service improvement. In this section, I have tried to make 
some recommendations for improvement in the particular model of electricity 
delivery and scaling up the model at national level. 
Firstly, the institutional structure developed under the decentralised 
participatory electricity delivery model is an informal structure largely at the 
discretion of the utility. In the absence of formal legal mandate, these micro-
institutions have little authority to make decisions, take action and hold the service 
provider accountable. Having a legal mandate (i.e. a policy) in support of the 
institutional structure for electricity delivery may contribute to the effectiveness of 
the model and give some authority to the micro-institutions. 
Secondly, partly due to absence of a policy and partly for arbitrary nature of 
sectoral authorities, there is no clarity on role and responsibilities of these 
institutions. Often these new institutions are overburdened with responsibilities to 
perform without any devolved resources for that. In some case, it has resulted in 
putting extra burden on the users for resources required to run these 
institutions. In that context, there is a need to transfer more power and resources 
to these micro-institutions for their effective functioning. 
Thirdly, these micro-institutions often do not have the relevant information 
regarding relevant policies, provisions and authorities. The state should provide 
them with relevant information in accessible form. Considering the requirement of 
technical knowledge for electricity service delivery, the state should provide 
training to these institutions. 
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Fourthly, these institutions can be further strengthened by building a 
network of users’ associations, which will serve as a guiding body and promote 
benchmarking competition among the institutions for effective functioning. In case 
of Sundarbans, the need for such a network and guiding body has been fulfilled by 
the WBREDA, which has contributed to effective functioning of the cooperative 
model. On other hand, a strong network of users’ committees can build a political 
muscle for rural consumers representing their interest in policy arena. Such a 
network can represent the rural users’ interest in technical events like public 
hearings organised by regulatory commissions. 
Fifthly, while the institutions are at their early stage and till the sector 
becomes financially viable, the state should be responsible for funding maintenance 
of the electricity delivery system. If the maintenance aspect is ignored, it will impair 
the quality of service and thus fail any attempt to improve electricity delivery. 
Finally, while the decentralised and participatory model of electricity 
delivery has extensive potential for improving electricity service, the state has to 
play a significant role to improve access to the service among the poorest in the 
society. Though the model, as demonstrated, brings down the cost to access 
electricity service, there is sizable population who cannot access the service at the 
reduced cost. The state needs to make special schemes with government 
subventions to subsidise the service to make it accessible to the poorest. 
In the presence of enabling elements, like a favourable policy and 
institutional environment, capacity enhancement, and resource transfers, 
decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery can be a solution to many 
of the problems in Indian electricity supply industry. It can be a great facilitator in 
achieving India’s goal for universal electrification. The findings of the research make 
a case for scaling up the decentralised and participatory electricity delivery model 
across national level, at least in the rural areas. Considering substantial similarity of 
social and political conditions across Indian states, introducing decentralisation and 
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users’ participation in electricity delivery through a combination of decentralised 
sectoral, local government and community participation approach will result in 
improvements in electricity delivery. However, making a case for applicability of the 
model to other public services requires further research on state of particular 
service delivery. 
8.5 Further Research 
When I conceptualised the current research, the key policy question was how to 
extend the electricity service to half of the population in India, while improving the 
service for those who have access to it. Since then, owing to increasing greenhouse 
gases (GHG) emissions and climate change concerns, there is another aspect to the 
policy question: how to achieve the above objective while keep GHG emissions low 
in electricity sector. Under this circumstance, like other developing countries, Indian 
energy policy is confronted by the challenge of balancing between four competing 
objectives: i) sustain economic growth through powering industrialisation, ii) 
increase energy access for the poor, iii) enhance energy security, and iv) improve 
the environment (World bank, 2009). In response, the energy policy in India has 
been modified to make arrangements for energy end-use efficiency and 
conservation, something that has been ignored for years. In that context, can 
decentralised participatory model of electricity delivery achieve its goals, while 
promoting energy efficiency? This question merits further research. Though the 
research finds some evidence that decentralised participatory delivery of electricity 
service promotes end-use efficiency for demand management and reducing load on 
weak distribution network, it is not enough to claim that decentralisation and users’ 
participation in electricity delivery can promote energy efficiency and contribute to 
India’s climate mitigation. In my future research, I aim to further look into it to 
identify and analyse potential of the model in achieving climate mitigation goals. 
Decentralised participatory model has been promoted in almost all the 
public services. Finding evidence of its success in electricity service does not imply 
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that it will be successful in other public services. There is a need to study the 
potentials of decentralisation and users’ participation in other public services to 
make a case for the model in all public services. 
Due to limitation of time and resources, the study could not get into further 
details to establish a correlation between the degree of decentralisation and users’ 
participation with level of outcomes. It is worth exploring how the intensity of 
decentralisation and participation is correlated with the level of improvement in 
service delivery. 
Finally, the research finds some evidence in support of educative effects 
of users’ participation in electricity users’ association. However, the findings are not 
enough to make a strong case for state intervention to promote community 
participation for strengthening democratic institutions and practices. Further 
research on different forms of community participation in India and their impact on 
democratic institutions and practices would be useful to reach at a conclusion. 
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